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Directions for Directed Verdicts:
A Compass for Federal Courts
Edward H. Cooper*
Directed verdicts, and their hang-fire cousins judgments notwithstanding the verdict,1 are among the most fundamental tools
used by judges to control juries. Exercise of this control in an
individual case inherently involves a large measure of careful
judgment, tailoring general principles of deference to jury freedom to the unique facts before the court. Many of the various
and frequently confusing phrases used in an attempt to establish
guiding standards provide no more help than this general statement. For many of the problems, nothing more can be said.
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Minnesota.
1. Since the standards for entering judgment notwithstanding the
verdict are the same as the standards for directing a verdict, the discussion throughout will refer only to directed verdicts. Appellate courts
are increasingly insisting on the advantages of obtaining an actual verdict, e.g., Campbell v. Oliva, 424 F.2d 1244, 1251-52 (6th Cir. 1970), so in
practice it is likely that more and more of the rulings actually will
occur in the form of grant or denial of judgment notwithstanding the
verdict. The primary advantages of allowing the jury to return its own
verdict are that the jury may very well reach the result the judge
thinks is required, thereby sparing the need to make what may be a
difficult determination of the appropriateness of a directed verdict, and
that, if the trial judge should chance to be wrong in his determination
that the case is appropriate for judicial disposition, the results of the
first trial can be salvaged if it is otherwise free from reversible error.
Direction before the jury has a chance to return a verdict, however,
has advantages which ensure its continued employment. The more obvious advantages lie in the direction of "efficiency"-the directed verdict
obviates the need for argument, instructions, and what may be lengthy
jury deliberation. Some cases may call so clearly for a directed verdict
that these advantages easily outweigh the potential advantages of judgment notwithstanding the verdict; at the extreme are cases disposed of
by directed verdict on the basis of opening statements of counsel at
trial, e.g., Morgan v. Koch, 419 F.2d 993, 999 (7th Cir. 1969). An
advantage more difficult to evaluate is that direction before the jury
has had an opportunity to deliberate changes the nature of the confrontation between judge and jury. Although the directed verdict is a
clear exercise of a control which might have been avoided by awaiting
rendition of the verdict, there is an offsetting uncertainty whether the
control has functioned so as to do anything more than expedite a result
which any jury would inevitably reach anyway. Judgments notwithstanding the verdict, on the other hand, place the fact of control in stark
relief-the jury's actual verdict has been superseded by an exercise of
judicial power. Long-run acceptability of our combined judge-jury system of adjudication may well be best served by retaining, and using,
both options.
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More can be said, and indeed has been said often and at length,
about some of the most fundamental problems. None of the extensive literature, however, has analyzed together, in depth, the
details of all the separate problems capable of such reasoned elaboration. Since these problems are interdependent as well as independent, much is lost in approaching them separately. Perhaps more importantly, a clear statement of the functions and
limitations of directed verdicts is a necessary prelude to any
effective attempt to determine whether federal courts should use
state or federal standards in diversity litigation. This article is
intended to create, within the limits suggested by current decisions, 2 a general analytic framework for directed verdict problems in the federal courts. This purpose requires acceptance of
the basic premise that civil jury trial is a desirable institution,
worthy of the constitutional protection it enjoys. Quite apart
from the impropriety of effecting constitutional amendment by
drastic judicial expansion of directed verdict practices, it is clear
that any radical alteration of the jury's role, or its abolition, could
be accomplished much more effectively and fairly by other
means.
Few, if any, of the specific conclusions built into the general
framework are entirely novel or startling; many of them will be
familiar to some readers, others to other readers. Those who
confidently agree with the conclusions in one area may profitably
skip on to the next. As a general roadmap, the exposition begins
in Part I with an exploration of the proposition that there are no
rigidly definite directed verdict standards to be found in the Constitution; a general policy of respect is about the most that can
be developed with any secure foundation. Part II explores specific problems of the jury's function with respect to choosing the
direct testimony to be credited, inferring facts from the accepted
testimony, and applying the law to the direct and inferential
facts thus found. The most important conclusion offered is that
the appropriate exercise of judicial control in these areas properly
depends heavily on the nature of the factual uncertainties and
legal rules involved on all the evidence in specific cases: general
statements of deference to the jury cloak widely different degrees of deference according to the perceived consequences of
possible jury error. Part III then suggests that once the present
federal standards are identified, and the underlying policies un2. For obvious reasons, no attempt has been made to canvass all

of the recent federal decisions. Enough have been surveyed, however,
to establish firm foundations for much of what follows.
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derstood, it becomes apparent that in diversity litigation they

should be applied in lieu of conflicting state standards only with
respect to general rules controlling the evaluation of credibility.
All else should be referred to state practice.
L GENERALITIES OF PURPOSE AND HISTORY
A.

THE BAsIc PROBLEM
Juries are admittedly, even vauntedly, tyros at the task of
adjudication. 3 And the adjudicatory task set for them is one of
immense intellectual challenge. The central difficulty of recreating historic data-of "finding" facts which often have never
been known and which cannot be known with certainty at the
time of decision-requires a literally unattainable combination of
experience, intuition, understanding and luck, no matter who is
trying the case. Jurors additionally are charged with the burden
of comprehending instructions on the law, often involving concepts which boggle the minds of students, confuse experienced
practitioners, and narrowly divide the opinions of outstanding
judges. Application of uncertainly comprehended law to imperfectly induced or deduced fact is a final chore of no mean demands. The jury, moreover, must perform these separate duties
so as to produce a unanimous result. Difficult as the task is, a
verdict ordinarily is produced, and ordinarily it is effective to
terminate the lawsuit. The merciful obscurity of the verdict
commonly alleviates the embarrassment which might result from
any detailed knowledge of a jury's chosen means of discharging
its duties. Many cases remain, however, in which either the
prospect of a particular verdict or its actual rendition is in itself
enough to impugn the jury's performance. Directed verdicts are
4
the basic means for controlling jury performance in such cases.
This control is exercised, as it must be, by the only other public
3. Dean Griswold's delightfully pithy phrase characterizes trial
by jury as "the apotheosis of the amateur." 1962-1963 HARvARD LAW
SCHOOL DEAN'S REPORT 5-6, quoted in Kalven, The Dignity of the Civil
Jury, 50 VA. L. REv. 1055, 1068 (1964). The amateur status of the jury

may be aggravated by the fact that rules of excuse and exemption from
service may tend to omit from many juries the best trained, most
widely experienced members of the community. See, e.g., Broeder,

The Functions of the Jury: Facts or Fictios?, 21 U. CHL I, REv. 386,
390 (1954).
4. The same function could conceivably be discharged solely by
exercise of the power to grant repeated new trials until some jury
should return a verdict in agreement with the views of the judge. The
obvious unfairness of such a procedure to the parties, and the heavy
burden an unseemly parade of successive trials would impose on the

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 55:903

participants in the litigation-the judges, trial and appellate.
The contemporary problem of directed verdicts is the problem of developing and enforcing the standards limiting this
power of judicial control. Since judges are experts in adjudication by training and experience, at least as compared to jurors, it
might be urged that the limits on their power of control should
be wide. The extreme reach of such power, short of simply abolishing any effective jury function, would allow a judge to dictate
the result whenever he prefers one outcome of the suit to another. This extreme has never been approached in formal statement and probably has seldom been realized in actual application.
Indeed, judges instead have veered a zigzag pattern, at times approaching rather close to the opposite extreme, at which the jury
is denied the right to dispose of a case only when there is literally
nothing to support the position of one party.
Such strict limits on the judicial power to control jury verdicts have been developed in large measure because of the preferred position assigned to the jury by Constitution and tradition.
The preservation of jury trial by the seventh amendment' includes the basic division of functions ascribing the task of factfinding to the jury and the task of lawgiving to the judges.0 The
immediate result of this division is that judges have assumed a
very narrow role in limiting jury factfinding, acting to control
the jury only when a factual determination opposed to that made
by the judge is, in some varying and uncertain sense, very probably wrong.
Factfinding freedom, further, has had the additional consequence of carrying with it a largely unintended, but unavoidably high, degree of jury freedom with respect to following and
applying the law. This consequence has followed because no one
has been able to devise a system for limiting the jury to its primary factfinding chore. In most cases, the variety of factual issues and the number of possible combinations of findings make it
impossible even for judge and litigants to frame adequately detailed, alternative specific findings, much less ask the jury to geninstitution of jury trial, have persuaded virtually everyone that the
power to grant new trials is not alone sufficient to the needs of jury
control.
5. "In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall
exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and
no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise reexamined in any Court of
the United States, than according to the rules of the common law."
U.S. CONST. amend. VII.

6. E.g., Baltimore & C. Line v. Redman, 295 U.S. 654, 657 (1935).
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erate such findings on its own. Simple examination of a respectable set of findings of fact prepared by a judge trying a case
without a jury, and reflection on the number of implicitly rejected alternative findings, should demonstrate the complexity
of the task involved.7 Even if such findings could somehow be
prepared with adequate completeness in the heat of litigation,
asking jurors to reach unanimous acceptance of such findings, instead of simple concurrence in the general justice of a general
verdict, or a partly degeneralized special verdict, could impose
unwise loads on the system. Since the jury's findings of fact thus
cannot be adequately communicated to the judge, the alternative
has been accepted that the judge must communicate his learning
in the law to the jury. Without any system to check on the
jury's understanding of the judge's instructions, or on their application of the instructions to the unknown facts they have found,
the result is that for all practical purposes the jury has a large
degree of freedom to misunderstand, misapply or wilfully ignore
the law.
The vital justification for the institution of directed verdicts
is found in the need to provide at least some minimal device for
preserving the integrity of the legal rules given by the judges.
(It need hardly be added that very often the legal rules transmitted by the judges have their ultimate source in legislative,
rather than judicial, rulemaking.) At some point, undefinable in
the abstract, it must become clear that a particular jury verdict
would represent not a finding of facts which justify that result
in terms of the legal rules authoritatively prescribed for the jury
but a failure, for whatever reason, to apply the legal rules to the
facts as they "must have been" found. As a homely example, a
plaintiff might demand damages on the ground that the defendant had hurt her feelings by failing to say "good morning" as
they passed in the street. A jury verdict for the plaintiff, following a trial at which nothing else was claimed and at which proper
instructions were given on the law, could scarcely result from
jury findings on the truth or falsity of the asserted failure to give
greeting. The legal rules that there is no duty to give greeting,
and no duty to pay damages unless violation of some judicially
7. One reflection of the difficulty of the chore of preparing findings of fact may be found in the running battle appellate courts wage
with trial judges over the advisability of adopting findings prepared by
counsel. See, e.g., United States v. El Paso Nat. Gas Co., 376 U.S. 651,
656-57 (1964); In re Las Colinas, Inc., 426 F.2d 1005, 1008-10 (1st Cir.
1970).
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sanctioned duty can be shown, are to some extent made juryproof by the directed verdict.
One of the major shortcomings of the directed verdict as a
device for preserving the integrity of legal rules is that it depends upon the preliminary determination that the jury "must"
find the facts in a certain way; whenever it cannot be said, within
the accepted limits of judicial reticence, that the jury could not
find facts sufficient to warrant invocation of a particular legal
rule, the jury is given its factfinding, law-applying chore without
any means of determining whether it has so found the facts or has
instead worked an intentional or unintentional change in the law.
Under current approaches, directed verdicts simply cannot be
used to ensure rigid obedience to the law by jurors. Matters are
complicated further, moreover, by the fact that, despite the bromide that judges decide the law, juries have an avowed function
in generating little "one-case" rules of law in many areas-refining the standard of reasonable care is simply the most common
example-and often are urged to have as well a clandestine function of improving the law as given by the judges to keep it more
in tune with current community values. Even if directed verdicts could be used to ensure rigid obedience to the law, in short,
courts would not always wish to use them so.
These twin functions of limiting jury freedom in factfinding
and law application are patently incapable of translation into
definite standards automatically determining the appropriateness of directing a verdict in a particular case. No one has ever
pretended otherwise. The most that can be sought are helpful
expressions of the appropriate degree of judicial self-limitation
and particular answers to some of the most common underlying
problems. History must provide the starting point in this quest.
The constitutional measure of the right to jury trial is in large
part one of history; even apart from constitutional compulsion,
an important part of the purpose in limiting judicial inroads on
jury functioning is the preservation of traditional methods of adjudication for want of any consensus on better ways of doing
things. The following summary of current historical knowledge,
however, will show that history provides little more by way of
answers than the caution that has already been posited: protection of the jury's function requires that juries be left a large, but
undefined and clearly not unlimited, scope of freedom in discharging their tasks. Once this point is examined, the stage
should be set for a restatement of the general judicial ap-
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proach and for the ensuing examination of the particular problems of credibility, inference, and application which are at least
capable of further analysis.
B. HISTORY
1.

Jury as Judges of Fact.

'"Preservation" of the right of jury trial has been taken to
mean that the measure of the right should be sought in the practices of the common law courts at the time of adoption of the
seventh amendment in 1791.8 As will be noted at somewhat
greater length below, this measure has generally been applied to
allow reforms of the details of trial procedure in ways which may
substantially affect the jury's discharge of its duties, so long as
the fundamental factfinding function is not usurped by the
judges.9 The basic historic difficulty posed by directed verdict
practices is that there had not emerged, by 1791, either the detail
or more than the approximate substance of a parallel method of
judicial control.
Tardy emergence of means of judicial control adapted to the
needs of jury trial as a contemporary institution is almost certainly due in major part to the gradual evolution of the nature of
the jury. Originally responsible for deciding cases on the basis
of the individual knowledge of the facts possessed by the jurors
themselves, it only gradually developed into a body responsible
for deciding solely on the basis of evidence produced in court.
Bushel's Case,'0 decided in 1670, reflects the slow pace of this
growth. In freeing on habeas corpus the jurors imprisoned for
failure to follow a London Sessions Court's directions to convict
William Penn and another for "unlawful assemblies and tumults," the Court of Common Pleas noted that since the jurors
could have decided the case on the basis of their own knowledge
of the facts, the original court could not say on the basis of the
evidence offered at trial that the result of conviction must follow
as a matter of law." Around the close of the century, however,
it was becoming established that the jury should reach its verdict
not as a body of witnesses but solely by judging evidence offered
in court.' 2 With a principle of such recent growth, it is not sur8. See, e.g., Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 476 (1935).
9. See text accompanying notes 37-39 infra.
10.

Vaughan 135, 124 Eng. Rep. 1006 (C.P.1670).

11. Vaughan 147-49, 124 Eng. Rep. 1012-3.
12. See, e.g., Blume, Origin and Development of the Directed Ver-
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prising that fully developed means for confining the jury to decision within the reasonable reach of the facts offered in evidence
at trial had not emerged by 1791. So Professor Scott long ago observed that "[t] he methods of controlling the jury grew up in a
haphazard sort of way. Most of them grew up at a time when
the jurors still had a right to decide upon their own knowledge,
as well as upon the evidence, a right which in the eighteenth
century became obsolete."'13 This pattern of growth by itself suggests that 1791 practices should not be adopted as setting the final definitions of the methods and extent of judicial control.
2.

Methods of Control.

Turning first to the methods by which judicial control was
effected, there did exist in 1791 a practice of "directing" juries as
to the verdict which should be returned. Although it is not entirely clear, apparently the direction was simply a particularly
clear way of combining instructions on the law with advice on
the facts-the jury was told, in effect, that the court was of the
view that, on the facts shown at trial as combined with the law,
one party or the other was entitled to recover. While the jury
was apparently thought to be under a duty to obey the instruction,'1 4 the remedy for disobedience was a new trial.", Since
obedience was expected and ordinarily must have followed,
thereby finally terminating the case, the device is of course
something considerably more potent than simply waiting for the
jury's verdict and then setting it aside if against the court's
views. On the other hand, the limited effect of the sanction
makes this form of directed verdict a considerably less efficient
0
means of control than the modern version.'
dict, 48 MiCH. L. REV. 555, 558 (1950); see also J. THAYER, PREMMINARY
170-74 (1898).
13. Scott, Trial by Jury and the Reform of Civil Procedure, 31

TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE COMMON LAW

HARv. L. REv. 669, 678 (1918); cf. McBaine, Trial Practice: Directed Verdicts; FederalRule, 31 CALI.F. L. REV. 454, 457 n.6 (1943).
14. Henderson, The Background of the Seventh Amendment, 80
HARV. L.REV. 289, 302 (1966).
15. Blume,supra note 12, at 560-61.
16. Compare the observation in Galloway v. United States, 319
U.S. 372, 391 n.23 (1943), that while the conception of directing a verdict
was not entirely unknown to eighteenth century common law, "there is
no reason to believe that the notion at that time even approximated in
character the present directed verdict." Perhaps surprisingly, it was
only in 1963 that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were amended to
provide expressly that "[tihe order of the court granting a motion for
a directed verdict is effective without any assent of the jury." Fed. R.
Civ. P. 50 (a).
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New trials were given not only as a sanction for failure to
follow the court's directions, but more importantly, also on the
ground that the verdict was against the evidence at trial.17 While
this device was well established by 1791, its differences from the
directed verdict are so apparent as to need no further elaboration.
The third primary method of control in well-established use
in 1791 was the demurrer to the evidence.18 Something will be
said below about the uncertainty surrounding the sufficiency of
the evidence standards for granting the demurrer. For the moment, the procedural distinctions between the demurrer and a
modern directed verdict are all that need be noted. The consequence of demurring to the evidence was to deprive the demurring party of any chance to have the case considered by the jury;
by demurring, he admitted the truth of his opponent's case, and
all that his opponent's proof reasonably tended to prove, and
posed the question of law whether upon the facts as thus admitted his opponent was entitled to recover. The admission was
binding-the answer to the question of law was the end of the
case. 19 Under modern practice, of course, denial of a motion for
directed verdict does not end matters but simply paves the way
for a jury determination. The jury remains perfectly free to find
facts quite different from those the court is obliged to assume in
passing on the motion.
Several other devices aimed at controlling the factfinding
function of the jury are of small enough importance for present
purposes that they need only be enumerated. The attaint was
used to some extent in the early colonies, but its traces had vanished everywhere by 1791.20

The nonsuit had not really grown

into the compulsory nonsuit most closely approaching directed
verdicts; judgments notwithstanding the verdict and motions in
arrest of judgment were used to test the sufficiency of the plead17. See, e.g., J.THAYER, supra note 12, at 169-74.
18. A brief survey of the demurrer may be found in King, Trial
Practice-DemurrerUpon Evidence as a Device for Taking a Case from
the Jury, 44 MIcm L. Rsv. 468 (1945).
19. E.g., Smith, The Power of the Judge to Direct a Verdict, Section 457-a of the New York Civil Practice Act, 24 COLUM. L. Rsv. 111,
113 (1924). In Gibson v. Hunter, 2 H. Blackstone 187, 209, 126 Eng.
Rep. 499, 510 (H. of L. 1793), the requirement was clearly spelled out
that the demurring party could compel his opponent to join in the
demurrer, withdrawing the case from jury consideration, only by admitting upon the record "every fact, and every conclusion," which the
evidence offered by the opposing party "conduced to prove." The
demurrer thereupon fell into disuse in England. See J. THAYR, supra
note 12, at 235-37.
20. See Scott, supra note 13, at 681.
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ings after the verdict; and some measure of control over legal
issues was attained by the use of special verdicts and a "case reserved."'2 1 None of these offers any persuasive analogy or help
for modern directed verdicts.
3.

Jury as Judges of Law.

Before turning to the problem of historic standards for measuring the suffiency of evidence to go to the jury, it is necessary
to consider the rather brief fling in the American colonies of the
doctrine that juries have the right to determine the law as well
as the facts. If followed today, this doctrine would eliminate the
primary function of directed verdicts. Even if the court could
tell the jury that it must take certain facts as established, the case
would have to be left for a jury determination of the law applicable to the facts, and there would be scant room for controlling
jury redetermination of the facts as well as the law. The embarrassing aspect of this doctrine is that it reached its fullest development at the time of the adoption of the seventh amendment.
By far the most important stage in the development of the
notion that juries are entitled to determine the law for themselves came in Georgia v. Brailsford.22 The State of Georgia had
instituted an original action in the Supreme Court to enforce a
claim under state statutes providing for confiscation of debts due
to British subjects or to persons subject to confiscation of their
property in other states by the laws of such states. 23 The case
was tried before a jury, and the charge of the Court to the jury
was delivered by Chief Justice Jay, with the remark that it was
fortunate to find the Court of unanimous opinion. During the
course of the charge, it was noted that the facts of the case were
not in dispute, so that the only remaining point was to settle the
law. The jury was told that the opinion of the Court was that
the defendants should win, since the state statute did not have
21.

Details as to these practices, and the various colonial treatment

of them, may be found in Henderson, supra note 14.
22. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 1 (1794).
23. The case began with an original bill in equity filed in the

Supreme Court.

The defendants in the Supreme Court, Brailsford,

Powell, and Hopton, had obtained judgment for the money in question in

a suit in the United States circuit court in Georgia. The state was denied leave to intervene in those proceedings, and sought injunctive re-

lief in the Supreme Court against disposition of any money that might
be collected by execution on the judgment. See Georgia v. Brailsford,
2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 415, 419 (1793).

The reporter notes that "[a]n amicable

action was accordingly entered and tried at the bar of the Supreme
Court.

. . ."

Id.
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the effect claimed by the state. Continuing from that point, the
charge admonished the jury of the "good old rule" that questions
of fact are in the province of the jury, and questions of law in the
province of the court, and went on:
But it must be observed that by the same law, which recognizes this reasonable distribution of jurisdiction, you have nevertheless a right to take upon yourselves to judge of both, and
to determine the law as well as the fact in controversy ....
[Although we do not doubt that you will pay respect to the
opinion of the Court,]
still both objects are lawfully within your
power of decision.24
The charge concluded with the observation that it had been
suggested that the jury should give consideration to the fact that
recovery could not mean much to the state, while it would impose a considerable burden on the defendants, but that the jury
should not consider this, for "if the money belongs to her, she
5
ought to have it."2
The Court's charge has been set out at some length, and emphasized, for the purpose of illustrating that however "anomalous" it may seem today,2 6 there is little reason to believe that it
was not the considered judgment of the Court and in accord with
a doctrine which was not at all novel.2 7 The charge does not represent a simple statement that the jury, in returning a general
verdict, has power to disregard the law even though it has no
right to do so. Instead, it begins with a statement of the Court's
views of the law, exhorts the jury to pay them respectful heed,
but clearly admits of the jury's "lawful right" to find the law is
something else; it even concludes with a statement that if-contrary to the Court's opinion-Georgia is entitled to the money,
"she ought to have it."
24. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 4 (1794) (emphasis added).
25. Id. at 5.
26. After noting that the decision seems extraordinary doctrine a
scant century later, Thayer suggests that it "is, perhaps, partly explained by the practical difficulties existing at that period, in controlling the verdicts of juries in trials at bar, and by the lack of learning on
the bench." J. THAYEn, supra note 12, at 254. See also Henderson,
supra note 14, at 317-18: the decision "is an anomaly unless we assume
that Chief Justice Jay in his own mind distinguished sharply between
the 'power of decision' and the right to decide."
27. In Sparf v. United States, 156 U.S. 51, 64-65 (1895), the
Court seems to approve the suggestion of Mr. Justice Curtis in United
States v. Morris, 26 F. Cas. 1323, 1334 (No. 15,815), 1 Curtis 23, 58 (D.
Mass. 1851), that perhaps the charge of the Court was incorrectly reported. The answer of the dissenting opinion is persuasive, although
it is not framed in quite the same way as the answer offered in the text
See 156 U.S. at 154-58.
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The most impressive examination of the late eighteenth century notion that juries should be judges of the law suggests several reasons for its popularity. There was, first, a strong sentiment in favor of the jury as a check on manipulation of the law
as an instrument of royal despotism, shared both in England and
the colonies. In the colonies there was added the understandable
preference for colonial juries over royal judges. Many of the
judges were not lawyers, and, even if the judge should happen to
be one, there was an underlying distrust of legal experts. Natural rights theories, further, suggested that principles of natural
justice were more important than accepted notions of law and
that such principles were accessible to the ordinary man. 28
Whatever its sources, the theory of the jury's right to make
the law soon disappeared in civil cases, and has now all but vanished in criminal cases as well. 29 Judges were quick to find ways
to reestablish their traditional authority over the law, often flying in the face of express statutory or constitutional provisions1'0
At the same time, in parallel and almost certainly interreacting
steps, courts were developing the directed verdict or analogous
devices to ensure some measure of effective control over the law
in civil cases. 31
Today it would be accepted on all sides that juries are dutybound to follow the law as laid down in judicial instructions. We
28.

See Note, The Changing Role of the Jury in the Nineteenth

Century, 74 YALE L.J. 170, 171-73 (1964).

It is concluded that "[j]udging

from the limited sources available, the right of the jury to decide questions of law was widely recognized in the colonies." A similar list of
factors is set out in Howe, Juries as Judges of Criminal Law, 52
HARV. L. REv. 582, 584, 591 (1939). See also A. VANDERBILT, JUDGES AND
JURORS: THEIR FUNCTIONS, QUALIFICATIONS AND SELECTIONS 57-58 (1956).
29. Maryland appears to have the last functional doctrine of jury
lawgiving freedom. MD. CONsT. art. 15, § 5 provides that, subject to
the power of the court to pass on the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain a conviction, "the Jury shall be the Judges of Law" in criminal
cases. See the discussions of this provision in Wyley v. Warden, 372

F.2d 742 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 863 (1967); Prescott, Juries as
Judges of the Law, 60 MD. ST. BAR Ass'N 246 (1955).

One of the delight-

ful consequences is that counsel are free to argue the law to the jury.
See, e.g., Phillips v. State, 6 Md. App. 56, 250 A.2d 111 (1969); cf. Brady v.
Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).

30. The story is told in Howe, supra note 28. Professor Howe concluded that "[w]hat seems discreditable to the judiciary in the
story . . . is the fierce resolution and deceptive ingenuity with which

the courts have refused to carry out the unqualified mandate of statutes and constitutions." Id. at 616.
31. A study of Massachusetts practice points out that the directed
verdict developed as a device to prevent the jury from making its own
determination of the law in the same decade, 1850-1860, as it was finally
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trust, at least in theory, to application of known law, not the
divine or profane magic of jury wisdom.3 2- But if the measure
of the right to jury trial is to be one of common law practice in
1791, which included a right of jury lawgiving, how can this principle, and the directed verdicts which depend on it, be reconciled
with that practice?
One slightly shoddy source of support for present practice
can be found in the doctrine that the 1791 common law which
controls the seventh amendment is the law of England, without
regard to colonial practice. This rule has been unequivocally
stated by the Supreme Court,3 3 largely on the ground that colonial practices were too widely divergent to afford any sufficient
guide for constitutional doctrine.3 4 One minor objection to this
approach is that the Court at times has considered colonial practices as at least some help in determining the meaning of the
amendment. 3 5 A more important objection might be that it is
simply bad constitutional doctrine to seek the meaning of the
amendment by excluding from consideration a widespread, if
transient, contemporary practice which may have been very
much in the minds of the framers.
There is no entirely satisfactory response to this objection.
Nonetheless, it has clearly been accepted that the Constitution
preserves the factfinding core of jury trial and does not preserve
a right of jury lawgiving. Since this result squares so clearly
with the only rational or even tolerable role for the jury today,
further discussion may be pretermitted in favor of a brief review
of the process by which the Supreme Court approved the modern
settled that the jury had no right to make its own determinations of
the law in criminal cases, and that the directed verdict was clearly

seen as a way to keep questions of law out of the jury's power. Note,
supra note 28, at 183-85.
32. Cf. J. FRANK, CouRTs ON TRIAL ch. 4, "Modern Legal Magic"
(1949).
33. Capital Traction Co. v. Hof, 174 U.S. 1, 5-8 (1899), quoted
with apparent approval in Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 97 n.44
(1970); see also Slocum v. New York Life Ins. Co., 228 U.S. 364, 377
(1913).
34. The diversity of colonial practices was urged by defenders of
the Constitution as one of the primary difficulties making it impossible
to draft a constitutional provision preserving the right to civil jury trial.
See Tnu FEDERALIST No. 83 (Hamilton). It may be added that a cor-

responding difficulty is found in attempting to form any accurate notion
as to what colonial practices actually were, particularly in such areas
as judicial control of jury factfinding. See Henderson, supra note 14.
35.

E.g., Dhrick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474 (1935); Ex PartePeterson,

253 U.S. 300, 307-09 (1920); cf. Continental lal Nat'l Bk. & Trust Co. v.
Chicago, R.L & P. Ry., 294 U.S. 648, 669 (1935).
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directed verdict as a method of control more effective than any of
the methods known to the practice of 1791.
4.

Effective Directed Verdict Procedure.

The Supreme Court resolved the problem raised by the lack
of precise common law precedent for the modern directed verdict
procedure in the masterful, if slightly slippery, opinion in Galloway v. United States.36 The primary basis for the decision is
found in the Court's statement of the proper method of applying
the seventh amendment preservation of jury trial. Following a
position adopted in earlier opinions upholding the use of interrogatories accompanying a general verdict 7 and the use of a
special master's report as evidence for consideration by the
jury,38 the Court ruled that the vital aspect of jury trial is that
the jury be allowed to perform the factfinding part of adjudication. Procedural reforms designed to facilitate the jury's factfinding function, or to improve it, 30 are not invalidated by the
fact that they may limit the jury's freedom or desire to find the
facts arbitrarily or ignorantly, or to disregard the law. Common
law precedent for preventing jury consideration of an issue which
lacks adequate evidential support exists in the demurrer to the
evidence. Directed verdicts simply continue this function without the penalty that the movant must sacrifice the right to a jury
determination of the facts in his favor if the judge is unable to
say that the jury must so find them.
Mr. Justice Black objected to this approach, apparently on
the ground that the availability of a directed verdict motion without the penalty of loss of the right to go to the jury if the motion
fails has created an instrument which makes it too easy to get a
judicial evaluation of the evidence and which accordingly increases the frequency of rulings withdrawing a case from the
jury. Just how far he intended to carry this objection was left
unclear. He commended as an "excellent discussion of the history
of the directed verdict" an article 40 which concluded that any
36.

319 U.S. 372 (1943) (Rutledge, J.).

37.

Walker v. New Mexico & So. Pac. R.R., 165 U.S. 593 (1897).

38. Ex PartePeterson, 253 U.S. 300 (1920).
39. As suggested by the Court, one of the methods by which
judges have traditionally controlled the factfinding performance of juries
has been through the rules on admissibility of evidence, "yet it would
hardly be maintained that the broader rules of admissibility now
prevalent offend the Seventh Amendment because at the time of its
adoption evidence now admitted would have been excluded." 319 U.S.
at 390 n.22.
40. Hackett, Has a Trial Judge of a United States Court the
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federal directed verdict practice must be unconstitutional. Prefatory to the statement of his view of the maximum reach of judicial power, he noted that a verdict should be directed, "if at all,"
only in very limited circumstances. 41 But there is no clear statement that directed verdicts are simply unconstitutional.
The majority response to the protest that directed verdict
motions are at least constitutionally questionable because they
are likely to be made much more freely than demurrers to the evidence is unduly facile. The basic notion offered is that a motion
for new trial was historically available, so history allows consideration of the facts by both judge and jury, while the demurrer
to the evidence establishes the historic validity of precluding any
jury consideration of the facts. Surely, it is reasoned, the
seventh amendment does not prohibit a combination of these features in a motion which enables the judge to prevent the jury
from considering the facts, but which allows the jury to consider
the facts if the judge finds it appropriate. 4 - As pleasing as the
result is, it might be wished that it had been left to the more direct proposition that preserving the constitutional right to jury
trial does not require the historic gamble of demurrer to the evidence or the historic waste of a useless new trial.
Constitutional permission of directed verdicts simply sets the
stage for the major inquiry. Everyone knows that the Constitution allows directed verdicts, even if no one can quite say why;
no one knows any articulable standards defining the constitutional limits of such judicial control Statements of the appropriate standards have varied widely over the course of the past
century or so. Practice in applying the standards varies as
widely at the present time. The following examination of the
general statements of appropriate standards is undertaken with
the purpose of urging that it would be mistaken to hold that the
Constitution can somehow be taken as prescribing a definite
standard limiting the scope of a procedure unknown at the time
of its adoption. It is hoped to set the stage as well for the ensuing discussion of some specific issues arising in directed verdict
practice and of the very specific problem of the standards to be
applied by federal courts in diversity cases.
Right To Direct a Verdict, 24 YALE L.J. 127 (1914), cited at 319 U.S. 402
n.13. Hackett's general approach is summarized in his statement that
"the right of a trial by jury is to be preserved by a stability of procedure." 24 YAm L.J. at 131.
41. 319 U.S. at 407.
42. Id. at 392-94.
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General Standards.
a.

In Statement.

Measuring the sufficiency of evidence to raise a question for
jury determination was approached in Galloway as a matter not
fairly referable to history.43 A brief reminder of the main stages
of judicial statement should be enough to support this approach.
The original method of statement, as might be expected, was
that as the directed verdict was a means of accomplishing essentially the same result as the demurrer to the evidence, its availability should be "tested by the same rules. '44 However nicely
this may seem to respond to the historic orientation of the right
to jury trial, it really answers very little because of the obscurity
of the tests used on the demurrer. It has, for example, been asserted that the test of sufficiency of the evidence was essentially
the same as the modern "substantiality" test." In similar vein,
Thayer applauded the demise of the demurrer on the ground that
"it is more than likely that the just line between the duties of
court and jury was often overstepped. ' 40 On the other hand, it
seems fairly clear that the nature of the demurrer as an admission of the opponent's proof and everything it reasonably tended
to prove precluded-at least in theory-any consideration of the
effects of the evidence offered by the movant, 47 a point as to
which it will be urged below that modern practice clearly dif48
fers.
Closely associated with this reference of standards to the
demurrer to the evidence is the common supposition that nineteenth century courts followed a "scintilla" rule which required
a case to be submitted to the jury if there was any evidence whatever to support the position of the party opposing the motion for
directed verdict. 49 There is no question that most courts soon
43.
44.

Id. at 395.
Parks v. Ross, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 362, 373 (1850).

The Court

characterized the requirement as one of evidence "legally sufficient" to
establish the facts in issue.
45. See Chadbourn, Trial by Jury Under the Seventh Amendment, 92 U. PA. L. Ra,. 92, 100 (1943).
46. J. THAYER, TREATISE ON EviDENCE 238 (1898).

47. Blume, supra note 12, at 580-81; Sunderland, Directing a Verdict for the Party Having the Burden of Proof, 11 MicH. L. Rnv. 198,
198-99 (1913). Many courts, indeed, would allow a demurrer to the
evidence to be made only before the moving party offered any evidence of his own. See King, supra note 18, at 469. Cf. W. CoRNisu,
THE Juny 106 (1968) (British practice).
48. See text accompanying notes 141-60 infra.
49. James characterizes the scintilla rule as a "judicial legend,"
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abandoned any such rule in favor of a broader, if variously
phrased standard based upon the inquiry whether there was evidence "upon which a jury can properly proceed to find a verdict
for the party producing it." 5° This in turn soon yielded to frequent statements that a verdict might appropriately be directed
whenever the trial court would be obliged to set aside a contrary
verdict as against the weight of the evidence.51
Statements today remain as varied, even among federal appellate courts, as they have been over the course of history. It
is not at all uncommon to find courts stating that a directed verdict is appropriate only if there is no evidence, and that the case
must be submitted to the jury if there is any evidence supporting
a party's case. 52 None of the current opinions, however, gives any
reason to suppose that the standard actually applied accords with
the statement, with the possible exception of some of the opinions applying the Federal Employers Liability Act 3 discussed
below. 54
noting quite properly that if there ever was such a rule it has nearly
vanished. F. JAvmss, CvmvL PROCEDURE 272 (1965). Alabama, at least, still
says that it follows the scintilla rule; see, e.g., Huff v. Vulcan Life &
Acc. Ins. Co., 281 Ala. 615, 206 So. 2d 861 (1968). One of the most thorough examinations of the vicissitudes of the rule in a single state is
Danner, The Scintilla Rule in Ohio, 7 U. CiN. L. REV. 237 (1933), written
the year before the Ohio Supreme Court abandoned the rule in Hamden Lodge v. Ohio Fuel Gas Co., 127 Ohio St. 469, 189 N.E. 246 (1934).
50. Improvement Co. v. Munson, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 442, 448
(1871) (emphasis added). The Court's explicit rejection of the scintilla
rule could be classified as dictum by those who care, since its conclusion was that there was no evidence whatever to support the
position asserted to be fit for jury consideration. Id. at 449.
51. Pleasants v. Fant, 89 U.S. (22 Wall.) 116, 120-22 (1874). Probably the most frequently cited statement of this standard is Pennsylvania R.R. v. Chamberlain, 288 U.S. 333, 343 (1933).
52. E.g., Warner v. Billups Eastern Petroleum Co., 406 F.2d 1058,
1059 (4th Cir. 1969). Mr. Justice Black may very well mean to apply
this standard literally as a constitutional command that a verdict may
be directed only if there is no evidence to support submission to the
jury. See Warner v. Kewanee Mach. & Conveyor Co., 398 U.S. 906, 908
(1970) (dissenting from denial of certiorari).
An interesting contrast is offered by Little v. Bankers Life & Cas.
Co., 426 F.2d 509, 510-11 (5th Cir. 1970). There the court noted the general rule that it cannot consider the sufficiency of the evidence to go
to the jury on a point decided adversely to the appellant when no motion was made for a directed verdict, and concluded that it was accordingly limited to the question whether there was "any evidence supporting the submission of the ... issue and the jury's finding . ..."
See also Oliveras v. American Export Isbrandtsen Lines, 431 F.2d 814,
816-17 (2d Cir. 1970); compare First Nat1 Bank v. SBA, 429 F.2d 280,
283-84 (5th Cir. 1970).
53. 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1964).
54. See text accompanying notes 67-76 infra.
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At the other end of the spectrum, statements may still frequently be found equating the standards of sufficiency of the evidence to withstand a directed verdict with the standards allowing a trial judge to make a discretionary determination to award
a new trial because a verdict is against the great weight of the
evidence. 5 5 The Tenth Circuit has carried this position to the
point of stating that it will not superimpose its judgment on that
5
of the trial judge unless his judgment was "clearly wrong." 0
Some of the Tenth Circuit decisions, indeed, appear to approve directed verdicts in circumstances where only a test approaching
that actually used for granting a new trial would justify that result.57 It seems safe to say that all of the other federal appellate
courts would agree that the vast difference in consequences between granting a new trial and directing a verdict finally terminating the suit entails a marked difference in the relevant standards. 58
The most common current approach is often dubbed the
"substantial evidence" test and is stated in terms close to those
recently employed by the Fifth Circuit: directed verdict motions
should be denied "if there is substantial evidence opposed to the
motions, that is, evidence of such quality and weight that reasonable and fair-minded men in the exercise of impartial judgment
might reach different conclusions." 59 A concise statement of the
attitude taken in approaching this question may be borrowed
from an opinion of the Fourth Circuit, requiring that
55. E.g., Carroll v. Seaboard Air Line R.R., 371 F.2d 903, 904 (4th

Cir. 1967); Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, 288 F.2d 750,
757 (4th Cir. 1961).
56. Kiner v. Northcutt, 424 F.2d 222, 223 (10th Cir. 1970). Compare
Pleasants v. Fant, 89 U.S. (22 Wall.) 116, 120 (1874), affirming a directed
verdict, although the Court remarked that it would be difficult to find
error in submitting the case to the jury with proper instructions. Most
courts, of course, treat the appropriateness of a directed verdict as a
"question of law" admitting of no room for discretion in any court.
57. Although it is of course extremely difficult to be confident of
such statements on the basis of reported opinions, two decisions may
be hazarded as examples: Giblin v. Beeler, 396 F.2d 584 (10th Cir.
1968); Meeker v. Rizley, 346 F.2d 521 (10th Cir. 1965). See text accompanying notes 166, 167 infra. As might be expected, other opinions
of the same court describe the conventional standard. E.g., Taylor v.
National Trailer Convoy, Inc., 433 F.2d 569, 571-72 (10th Cir. 1970).
58. E.g., 5 J. MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 50.03[2] (2d ed. 1966).
59. Boeing Co. v. Shipman, 411 F.2d 365, 374-75 (5th Cir. 1969) (en
banc). See also, e.g., Fontana Aviation, Inc. v. Beech Aircraft Corp.,
432 F.2d 1080, 1084 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 39 U.S.L.W. 3361 (U.S.
Feb. 22, 1971); Business Development Corp. v. United States, 428 F.2d
451, 453 (4th Cir. 1970).
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the evidence must be considered in the light most favorable to
the party against whom the directed verdict or the judgment
n.o.v. is asked,.. . any conflict in evidence must be resolved in
his favor and ... every conclusion or inference that can be
legitimately drawn therefrom in his behalf must be drawn. 00
In essence, this approach represents an attempt to limit the
jury to its factfinding function by inquiring what is "reasonable." Traditional respect for the jury and its constitutional
benison requires that it be allowed to find whatever facts are
reasonably suggested by the evidence. The impossibility of defining reasonableness requires that the scope of freedom be left
large. But at some point the possibility that twelve jurors may
find the facts "unreasonably," and the much greater probability
that twelve jurors can misunderstand or happily ignore the law,
permits and requires judicial control0 1 The general statements
ordinarily adopted by the courts are simply a way of stating that
the fundamental tenet of control must be one of minimum interference.
b. Procrustean or Multifarious Standards?
The fundamental dilemma of judicial control in its application is that of reconciling the principle of minimum interference
with the obdurate need for some measure of control. Much of the
difficulty lies in the inevitable need for the sound exercise of
particularized judgment. But there are broader difficulties as
well, including the crucial uncertainty whether the same degree
of minimum interference is uniformly appropriate regardless of
the nature of the case, or whether judges should feel freer to interfere in some cases than in others.
Help in resolving the uniformity question may be found by
reflecting on the reasons underlying the jury's preferred position.
For the policy of deep respect for jury decisional freedom does
not need to be referred to the mysterious requirements of the
60. McClure v. Price, 300 F.2d 538, 543 (4th Cir. 1962).
61. It is not uncommon to scout the "reasonableness" notion of directed verdict standards on the ground that it leads presumably reasonable judges to disagree with presumably reasonable jurors and even
among themselves. See, e.g., L. GREN, JUDGE AND JURY 389 (1930),
where it is observed that frequently a jury returns a verdict which is
accepted by the trial judge as the basis for judgment, affirmed by an
intermediate appellate court and then finally set aside by a divided supreme court. This complaint misconceives the purpose of the test.
Courts are not seeking to find what is reasonable but only to create a
particularized definition, for the facts of the case before them, of the
outermost bounds of reasonableness. This question is of course a very
difficult one, depending in part on the personal experience and imagina-
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Constitution alone. Whether or not the civil jury should be preserved by the Constitution, several reasons in support of its preservation are commonly agreed upon and deserve consideration in
spinning out its constitutional consequences.
Among the reasons for favoring jury trial, one of the most
troublesome in terms of directed verdict standards is the desire to
have the jury effect some improvement in the law, at least for
particular cases, notwithstanding rejection of a general policy of
jury lawgiving freedom. This problem will be pursued at some
length in the later discussion of jury freedom in applying the
law.6 2 For the moment, it should suffice to anticipate the conclusion: in many cases, the directed verdict standard appropriately includes an allowance for reasonable jury lawmaking as
well as reasonable jury factfinding.
Another highly important purpose of jury trial is found in
the circumstance that, although jurors are no longer to decide on
the basis of particular knowledge of the immediate case before
them, they are supposed to bring to their task a vast wealth of
more generalized practical information of the world that far exceeds anything available to a single judge.0 3 It should be obvious
that however difficult it may be to reach any abstract definition
of the appropriate jury contribution, it may vary enormously
from case to case. Jurors are thought to have so much to contribute to the evaluation of many kinds of behavior that they are
accorded avowed lawmaking functions in determining what is
"reasonable" in the light of common experience in an enormous
variety of common transactions. Jurors probably have very little
indeed to contribute to an evaluation of the "obviousness" of a
patented improvement in computer circuitry.
A third major function of the jury lies in improving the acceptability of adjudication. However the quality of their product
would be measured on a hypothetical scale of justice, it is often
thought that use of the jury enables judges to perform a trial role
tion of the person asking it and in even larger part on his evaluation
of the desirable scope of jury freedom in terms of the overall adjudicatory functions of judges and juries. The fact that there is much room
for disagreement in seeking to apply the test does not establish that
it is attempting the wrong task, nor that any better results could be
reached by masquerading the nature of the attempt in some other word
formula.
62. See Part II, § D infra.
63. See, e.g., 9 J. WIGMoRE, EVIDENCE § 2570 (3d ed. 1940). Dean
Joiner concludes that juries are simply better than judges at the task of
adjudication. C. JOINER, CIvI JusTc AND THE JURY 31, 34 (1962).
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which is more acceptable to both parties, and that the end result
is likely to be more acceptable as well 4 This function may be
particularly important in the not inconsiderable number of cases
which are not really capable of rational decision-a jury can
terminate the case with a blessedly oracular verdict which requires no embarrassing explanations.
Various other roles are occasionally assigned to the jury.
One is that of protecting litigants against venal or simply incompetent judges. Another is that jury service is a valuable means
of educating citizens; yet another is that the jury is the most commonly available means of participating in the workings of democratic government.
Taking these various jury functions as a springboard, it
should be possible to restate a variety of considerations which
counsel that no attempt should be made to find in the seventh
amendment a rigid prescription of a single standard of judicial
deference applicable to all jury-tried cases alike.
First is the fact that history, formally recognized as the primary measure of the seventh amendment right, simply does not
provide any meaningful guidance in measuring the sufficiency of
a case for jury determination. Second, and closely related, is the
simple fact that it would be impossible to implement a uniform
standard in a uniform manner, no matter how it were stated.
Courts historically have been unable to fashion a uniform standard; courts today are equally helpless. Third, there are a great
many other devices of jury control which could be used to shape
the result desired by the judge, often with considerable effect.
Rulings on the admissibility of evidence, comments on the evidence, the way instructions are framed, the judge's own mien
and behavior during trial and a host of other tools are available
to influence the jury. There is little effective appellate control
over a broad range of trial court behavior in these areas.05 Forcing adoption of a single directed verdict standard might force
64. See, e.g., Wolf, Trial by Jury: A Sociological Aralysis, 1966
Wis. L. REv. 820. Some control over potential jury caprice may well be
necessary if the institution is to be acceptable at all. See, e.g.,
JoINER, supra note 63, at 19.
65. Dean Green has espoused a contrary view, suggesting that appellate courts have developed so many means of control that both trial
judge and jury have been reduced virtually to automata. See Green,
Jury Trial and Mr. Justice Black, 65 YALE L.TJ. 482, 486 (1956). This
conclusion seems considerably overdrawn; certainly perusal of a few
hundred directed verdict cases, selected almost at random, suggests that
appellate courts are allowing many rather questionable jury verdicts
to stand.
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trial judges to wield their other controls with more vigor, perhaps leading in some cases to results which would not be accepted under proper standards as a directed verdict but which
are accepted as the verdict of the jury, even though the jury was
artificially forced along a path which would not otherwise have
been followed. Finally, apart from such negative reasons, there
are excellent reasons for supposing that the nature of the jury's
sound contribution varies enormously across the spectrum of
cases triable as of right to a jury. It has already been suggested
by way of example that members of the jury may have a great
deal to contribute to understanding and evaluating some fact
situations and very little to contribute with respect to others.
This proposition may be generalized to a certain extent by observing that as life, law and litigation become more complex, so do
the tasks entrusted to juries. 6 Juries may be trusted to handle
routine litigation with a small measure of judicial supervision;
according a parallel degree of freedom in more complex cases far
beyond the reasonable comprehension of anyone, regardless of
the nature of the legal difficulties and factual uncertainties involved, makes no sense whatever.
One of the currently popular areas focusing interest on the
question of uniform standards involves litigation under the Federal Employers Liability Act. Supreme Court opinions dealing
with the sufficiency of an injured worker's case for jury consideration have opened a wide vista of jury speculation, both in the
area of fact and in the area of legal evaluation of the facts
found. 7 Many circuit courts of appeal have announced that the
directed verdict standards found in FELA cases are unique and
do not control other cases.6 8 Professor Wright, one of the leading commentators on federal practice, characterizes the ques66.

E.g., P. DEVLIN, TRIAL BY JURY 65 (rev. ed. 1966); Green, supra

note 65, at 484. There is very little indication that courts are willing to

consider the suitability of jury trial as an element in determining the
contemporary scope of the seventh amendment in defining the nature
of issues triable to a jury. But cf. Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531,
538 n.10 (1970).
67. Two of the most frequently cited cases are Rogers v. Missouri
Pac. R.R., 352 U.S. 500 (1957) and Lavender v. Kurn, 327 U.S. 645
(1946). A pair of particularly uncomplicated cases illustrating the extent of jury freedom are Ferguson v. Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc., 352
U.S. 521 (1957) and Ringhiser v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry., 354 U.S. 901
(1957), rev'g 241 F.2d 416 (6th Cir.), aff'g 148 F. Supp. 529 (S.D. Ohio
1956).
68. The leading recent discussion comparing FELA standards with
"ordinary" standards, and concluding that FELA decisions are not

controlling in other cases, is Boeing Co. v. Shipman, 411 F.2d 365, 370-

73 (5th Cir. 1969) (en banc), overruling Planters MIfg. Co. v. Protection
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tion of the applicabifty of the FELA decisions to other sorts of liti-

gation as one of the major unanswered directed verdict problems.69 While he offers no firm conclusion, his summary of
arguments in favor of applying the same standard to all federal
court litigation may be somewhat freely rendered as follows:
First, and foremost, the opinions in FELA cases frequently refer
to the historic role of the jury and to the seventh amendment
without any indication that FELA cases deserve or receive distinctive treatment. The Court has, indeed, relied on legislative
history as indicating that Congress intended seventh amendment
standards to govern the relationship between judge and jury in
FELA cases. 70 Added support for this proposition may be found
in various non-FELA opinions in which the Court has referred to
FELA opinions as if they established the general test of directed
verdicts; 71 has said that, as in FELA cases, jury trial is part of
the remedy; 72 has said that the seventh amendment prohibits
interference by directed verdict where the evidence raises a jury
question;73 and has reversed per curiam the substitution of judiMut. Ins. Co., 380 F.2d 869 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 930 (1967).
See also, e.g., Missouri-K.-T. Ry. v. Hearson, 422 F.2d 1037, 1040 (10th Cir.
1970). Somewhat more restrained statements are typified by Dehydrating Process Co. v. A.O. Smith Corp., 292 F.2d 653, 656 n.6 (1st Cir.),
cert. denied, 368 U.S. 931 (1961); other courts simply make statements
such as that "In FELA cases a minimal scintilla of evidence may support a jury verdict," Kuberski v. New York C.R.R., 359 F.2d 90, 92
(2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1036 (1967).
Of course the cases are not all one way. See, e.g., Wratchford v.
S.J. Groves & Sons, 405 F.2d 1061, 1066 n.14 (4th Cir. 1969) (relying in
part on Planters Mfg. Co. v. Protection Mut. Ins. Co.); Lones v. Detroit,
T. & LILR., 398 F.2d 914, 919 n.4 (6th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S.
1063 (1969) (also relying on Planters).
69. 2B W. BAR ON & A. HOLTzOFF, FEDERAL PRAcTrcE & Pnocr au
§ 1075, pp. 400-04 (C. Wright ed. 1961). Some of the most recent commentary in addition to that cited by Professor Wright favors application of a uniform federal standard in all cases in federal courts. See,
e.g., Bagalay, Directed Verdicts and the Right to Trial by Jury in Federal Courts, 42 TEm L. REv. 1053, 1064-69 (1964); Note, 14 ST. Louis U.LJ.
349 (1969); 48 Tnm L. Rlv. 695 (1970); 1970 UTAH L. REv. 155 (semble).
70. Rogers v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 352 U.S. 500, 508 n.18 (1957).
71. Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370
U.S. 690, 696 & n.6 (1962) (private antitrust litigation, referring to
FELA decisions, among others, in stating the appropriate standards for
directed verdicts); Dick v. New York Life Ins. Co., 359 U.S. 437, 445
n.8 (1959) (referring to FELA cases as references for the federal directed verdict standards, while refusing to determine whether the federal standards should be applied in diversity litigation).
72. Atlantic & Gulf Stevedores, Inc. v. Ellerman Lines, 369 U.S.
355, 359-60 (1962).
73. International Terminal Operating Co. v. N.V. Nederl. Amerik
Stoomv. Maats., 393 U.S. 74 (1968).
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cial determination for jury determination. 74 Finally, it may be
urged that the seventh amendment would not allow the Court
or Congress to establish different measures of judicial control for
different types of cases-that preservation of the right to trial by
jury requires trial to a jury which is subject to a sufficient measure of judicial control to preserve its common law character, no
more and no less. 75
Close examinaton, however, reveals that none of these cases
establish a rigidly binding approach to the limitations placed by
the seventh amendment on directed verdicts. Instead, they stand
for no more than the proposition that the seventh amendment requires that there be no undue intrusion on the jury's sphere. So
much should be obvious in any event. And the question whether
the due extent of intrusion
may vary from situation to situation
76
unanswered.
remains
By way of brief anticipation of the later discussion of the
appropriate sphere of jury freedom, it is no secret that FELA
cases involve special reasons for allowing juries a wide discretion
in fact inference and in law application. The principle of corn74. 2B W. BARRON & A. HOLTZOFF, supra note 69, at § 1075, p. 403
n.53.20.
75. This argument would draw support primarily from the decision
in Herron v. Southern Pac. Co., 283 U.S. 91 (1931). There the Court refused to bind a federal diversity court to a state constitutional provision prohibiting directed verdicts in certain circumstances, ruling that
the state prohibition would be inconsistent with the role of the federal
judge. The federal judge, that is, is "not a mere moderator, but is the
governor of the trial"; the sense of trial by jury, as preserved in the
Constitution, is not simply trial before twelve men, but trial before
twelve men "'in the presence and under the superintendence of a judge
empowered to instruct them on the law and to advise them on the
facts, and .

.

. to set aside their verdict if in his opinion it is against

the law or the evidence.'" Id. at 95, citing Capital Traction Co. v. Hof,
174 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1898). The current impact of the Herron decision is
discussed below; see text accompanying notes 257-62 infra.
76. Compare the statement of Judge Haynsworth in Manaia v.
Potomac Elec. Power Co., 268 F.2d 793, 798-99 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
361 U.S. 913 (1959). In affirming judgment n.o.v. for the defendant, and
rejecting a claim that the judgment violated the plaintiff's rights under
the seventh amendment, he noted:
Were a court indifferent to the established basis upon which
powers have been allocated between the court and jury or beguiled into rejection of every view which seemed to it less
reasonable than its own, a violation of constitutional right might
well be said to have occurred. The District Court, here, however, was conscious of the limitations of its power and conscientious and objective in its exercise ....

The attempt,

therefore, to glamorize the problem by an invocation of the
Seventh Amendment is, at best, an irrelevance contributing
nothing to the objective disposition of such questions as this.
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pensation without fault for industrial accidents is widely accepted; the antiquated reliance on principles of negligence in the
FELA is tolerated only because the negligence principle has
been so far attenuated in its application by judges and juries
alike (and perhaps because jury awards are more attractive in
the eyes of injured workmen or their unions and lawyers than
scheduled benefits). The consequence of a mistaken denial of recovery for the injured plaintiff is disaster; the consequence of a
verdict imposing liability after dispensing with any real requirement of negligence is that one more easily anticipated cost is
added to the many costs of railroading. Although it sometimes
may seem that railroads are less than ideally situated for absorbing or redistributing extra costs, there can be no question
that they are far better situated than their injured workmen.
That the seventh amendment is appropriately applied to preserve
this area for jury justice does not mean that it is appropriately
applied to require allowing an equivalent scope of jury freedom
in areas where it may be more capricious or arbitrary.
The suggestion that the tightness of judicial control should
depend on the nature of the uncertainties and the danger of
wrong consequences involved in a particular situation will be
explored further in Part H. The present discussion is aimed
simply at establishing the relevance of the exploration of the
specifics of jury freedom with regard to the credibility of witnesses, inferences of fact from testimonial fact, and law application-there is no simple seventh amendment commandment precluding examination of the many different problems involved.
Likewise, it is hoped to establish that the seventh amendment
does not command a simple answer to the question of applying
state directed verdict standards in federal diversity litigation;
there is room to inquire whether there is ever reason to depart
from federal standards. With so much anticipation, these matters may now be examined.
H. SPECIFICS OF CREDIBILITY, INFERENCE,
AND APPLICATION
A.

INTRODUCTION

General statement of a principle of minimum interference
with jury functions is scant help in addressing a concrete problem. Although in the end there is no magic formula for disposing of a real, living case, there are various general problems
which at least admit of further analysis. The most convenient
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framework for approaching these problems breaks them down
into three main areas following a model of rational disposition of
adversary litigation conducted along our traditional lines. First,
the trier must determine what testimony he believes. Second,
taking the testimonial facts so established, it is frequently necessary to go beyond them in the half-logical, half-intuitive process
of "inferreing" other facts which have not been the subject of direct testimony. Finally, once all of the facts have been puzzled
out in one way or the other, it is necesary to plug those facts into
the applicable legal rules or standards to determine the outcome
of the case. Discussion will largely focus on these three steps as
if they were separate stages. But it is obvious that they are not
separate, even in theory. Tentative belief in a testimonial fact,
for instance, may ultimately be rejected because it is thought inconsistent with the inferences drawn from other testimonial facts
or even because the inferences it suggests by itself are thought
unreasonable. Likewise, the strength of the belief in any particular testimonial proposition will influence the nature of the
consequences drawn from it-a fact strongly believed may often
carry much further than one believed only as the least unlikely
in an array of improbable alternatives. Likewise, the requirements of the legal rules will shape the direction of the inference
processes and may even have some justifiable impact on the determination of facts, direct or inferential.
Beyond this theoretical interdependence of the steps suggested, it is clear that jury decisional processes seldom follow any
such model. Determination of a case is apt to be considerably
more direct and simple. Nonetheless, the model is of considerable aid in approaching directed verdict problems because it
forces attention into the paths necessary to implement the
principle of minimum intrusion in as reasoned a manner as
possible. If the question concerns the boundaries of reasonable
decision, the best way of finding them is by attacking separately
the reasonable boundaries of jury freedom to accept or reject
testimony, of jury freedom to go beyond direct testimony in its
factfinding quest, and of jury freedom in applying the law.
B.

CREDIBILITY

77

The right to determine the credibility of witnesses lies at the
core of the jury's factfinding function. If there is a conflict in
77. A lengthy and thorough examination of the general problems
encountered in judicial control of jury credibility determinations is
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direct testimony, it is clear that the jury must be allowed to determine which witnesses to believe, even if it chooses to believe
a single witness of dubious credentials in preference to twenty
witnesses of unassailed integrity. No matter how difficult, a decision between them must somehow be made 78 Since there is as
yet no set of intellectual lie-detecting rules which can enable a
judge to rule that no jury could reasonably come out one way
rather than another, the principle of minimum intrusion on the
jury's function is thus easily sufficient to justify the jury's general freedom. To be sure, a verdict which apparently rests on
a determination to credit the single witness may very well rest
on quite different factors.7 9 This risk is simply one illustration
of the necessary consequences of the initial assumption that juries
will follow the decisional model employed in tracing the boundaries of reasonable decision.
Some specific possibilities of judicial control, however, are
set within the framework of this broad general freedom with respect to credibility. Conceptually the most useful of these possibilities is that of limiting the jury's freedom to disregard the uncontradicted, unimpeached testimony of disinterested witnesses.
Establishing a rule that such testimony must be credited may
not dispose of a great many cases by directed verdict. Its implications are nonetheless useful in attempting to redefine some of
the most commonly mooted issues of judicial control. This issue
found in Dow, Judicial Determination of Credibility in Jury-Tried Actions, 38 NEB. L. Rnv. 835 (1959). Particularly useful are the repeated
themes that the basic approach should be that of seeking some reasoned
basis for a judicial ruling that a jury cannot reasonably credit, or discredit, certain testimony; and that determinations of credibility are inextricably interwoven with other parts of the decisional process.
78. Judges occasionally still resort to the notion that when all
else fails, resort should be had to counting the number of witnesses on
each side. See, e.g., Rodi v. Dean, 138 F.2d 309, 310-11 (7th Cir. 1943);
Zurich Ins. Co. v. Oglesby, 217 F. Supp. 180, 183 (W.D. Va. 1963); Caron
v. Franke, 121 F. Supp. 958 (W.D.N.Y. 1954). This approach has been
so thoroughly debunked, see 7 J. WiGMoaE, supra note 63, § 2033, that
it may be that such judicial statements are simply chosen as a more
polite course than a statement that the minority of witnesses were disbelieved on other grounds. Of course it is possible that jurors, too, resort to witness counting when all else fails. A very small degree of
insight may be afforded by Cohen, Cooper & Thorne, Lea Degres d'Evidence, 59 J. DE PSYCHOLOMIE NoRmALE & PATHOLOGIQuE 225 (1962).
79. Cf. Bevan, Albert, Loiseaux, Mayfield, & Wright, Jury Behavior as a Function of the Prestige of the Foreman and the Nature of
His Leadership, 7 J. Pus. L. 419, 444 (1958). In the moot trials reported
there, jurors divided about evenly on the credibility of the different witnesses and proceeded to resolve the issues on other grounds such as the
age of the plaintiff and her financial insecurity.
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is thus examined at the outset, as a prelude to the issues arising
when the assumptions of disinterest and lack of contradiction are
relaxed, and to the corollary issues of the evidence which may
be considered on motion for directed verdict, directing a verdict
for the party who has the burden of persuasion and similar matters.
1. Uncontradicted,Unimpeached, Uninterested Testimony.
It is important in setting the framework for a discussion of
the jury's role with respect to the credibility of uncontradicted,
unimpeached, uninterested testimony to be certain that the case
is one in which there is no implied contradiction to be found in
the circumstances surrounding the matter of direct testimony.
All of the discussion of this issue will ssume that there is no
such contradiction. As a model of such a case, there may be assumed a collision between two cars. Each car was driven by a
lone driver; neither driver survived the crash. Examination of
the remains of the cars has indicated no hint of mechanical malfunction in either. The debris left by the impact was scattered
in such a way that no one claims that the location of the point of
impact can be inferred from it. One witness, a highway patrolman, testifies to the event. He testifies that he had followed the
car driven by the defendant's decedent for a distance of two
miles along a straight highway under ideal driving conditions,
that the car was being driven at a very high rate of speed and
that it had twice veered from one side of the road to the other.
This car had been on its own side of the road for approximately a
mile before the moment of the accident; immediately before the
collision, however, it swerved directly into the oncoming lane of
traffic and collided with the car driven by the plaintiff's decedent.
Several courts have said that a jury should be allowed to disbelieve the sole witness. Many more have made it clear that the
jury must accept his testimony.8 0 It is submitted that the majority rule is correct, for a wide variety of reasons which, because
they are essentially negative, may be appreciated most easily
after examining the contrary arguments.8 '
Two major arguments can be advanced in support of the
80. See Annot., Credibility of Witness Giving UncontradictedTestimony as Matter for Court or Jury, 62 A.L.R.2d 1191 (1958).
81. In some small number of situations, a quick answer may be
found in the fact that both parties are agreed that the testimony of the
witness should be accepted. This notion of "admission," however, is use-
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minority rule that the jury should be allowed to determine the
credibility of all direct testimony. The first is that much direct
testimony, no matter how sincerely believed, is simply wrong.
In a single apt phrase, "the testimony of any witness describes
the combination of himself and the event.18 2 There is no need
to review the literature here. Lawyers have long known in a
general way the facts that are gradually being subjected to
greater psychological precision: witnesses often err in their ability to perceive events, in their subsequent recollection of them,
and in their ability to communicate to others their frequently
distorted recollections of often mistaken perceptions.8 3 One simple possibility, for instance, is that the patrolman in the example
case saw the accident as he did only because he had anticipated
it when he saw the approaching car.
The inability of human observers to record, retain and relate
perfectly given the best of will is subject to the further difficulty
that human will may itself add further distortions, either through
outright lying 4 or through a more or less unconscious process of
discarding and supplementing memories until they have been accommodated to the presently desirable contours.
The difficulties involved in measuring the abilities of a witness to perform the various chores required in testifying to past
events have led to occasional suggestions that expert witnesses
be allowed to testify as to the credibility of other witnesses, preferably on the basis of detailed extracurial examination and testing, but possibly on the basis of courtroom observation if nothing more satisfactory is possible.8 5 Although it seems unlikely
that such suggestions will soon be accepted with regard to expert
less when a party insists that the credibility of the testimony should be
evaluated by the jury. The admission concept is explored in Dow,
supra note 77, at 841, 864, 873-76.
82. Weinstein, Some Difficulties in Devising Rules for Determining Truth in JudicialTrials,66 CoLuiw. L. Rrv. 223, 231 (1966).
83. Several easily accessible works explore the difficulties. In
addition to Weinstein, supra note 82, see J.MARsrALL, LAw AND PSycHOLOGY iN CONFLCT (1966); Haward, Some Psychological Aspects of
Oral Evidence, 3 BpmIsH J.OF CRIMINOLOGY 342 (1963); Marshall, Evidence, Psychology and the Trial: Some Challenges to Law, 63 COLUM.
L. REV. 197 (1963); Rokes, Psychological Factors Governing the Credibility of Witnesses, 1968 Is. L.J. 84, 150, 269 (1968).
84. It has been suggested that "perjury is more readily committed
in accident litigation than in other types of cases." Baer, The Relative
Roles of Legal Rules and Non-Legal Factors in Accident Litigation, 31
N.C.L. REv. 46, 67-68 (1952).
85. References to the early literature can be readily found in more
recent writings. See, e.g., J.FRANK, COURTS ON TRM 100 (1949); Juviler, Psychiatric Opinions as to Credibility of Witnesses: A Suggested
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testimony ranging beyond fairly gross defects in ability or personality, they do underscore the weight of the argument that a
proposition is not necessarily true merely because a witness is
willing to assert it.
The second major argument advanced in support of allowing jury freedom to reject uncontradicted, unimpeached testimony of an uninterested witness is that the jury should be able
to rely on the demeanor of the witness. In the jargon of the social sciences, "there is frequently posited a relationship between
the manner of a witness' verbal, gesticulative, facial, and gross
postural behavior and the conclusions . . . [the] jury . . . draw
from his testimony." 86 Presumably such demeanor "evidence"
is logically relevant in two different ways-first as a basis for
determining whether the witness is consciously trying to depart
from the truth, and second as an index of his probable ability to
know and tell the truth.
The question raised by these arguments in favor of jury
freedom may be simply stated. It is clear that much testimony,
whether or not honestly given, bears scant relationship to the
underlying reality. People are accustomed to judge both the
truthfulness and the abilities of other people by outward appearances. Is a jury, then, likely to make fewer mistakes if it is allowed free rein to reject uncontradicted testimony which is not
at odds with any known facts, and which is given by an uninterested witness who has not been impeached in any way, than
if it is required to accept such testimony? Several considerations
suggest that more, not fewer, mistakes would result.
Practical knowledge of the influence of demeanor on credibility judgments, and the accuracy of its influence, is hard to
come by. The Chicago Jury Project so far has not been able to report any conclusions on the factors leading juries to whatever
Approach, 48 CALIF. L. Rnv. 648 (1960); Tuchler, Credibility of a Witness,
8 J. FOR. Sci. 325 (1963); Weihofen, Testimonial Competence and Credibility, 34 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 53 (1965); Note, Psychiatric Evaluation of
the Mentally Abnormal Witness, 59 YALE L.J. 1324 (1950).
86. Fishman, Some Current Research Needs in the Psychology of
Testimony, 13 J. SOCIAL IssuEs 60, 64 (1957). Lawyers are likely to feel

more comfortable with a lawyerly definition by way of example; see,

e.g., Ladd, Some Observations on Credibility: Impeachment of Witnesses, 52 CORN. L.Q. 239, 257 (1967): "[T]he candor and forthrightness

of the witness, his hesitancy or willingness to testify, his evasion or
concealment, his poise or frustration, and his emotional reaction to
questions indicated through his demeanor and conduct on the witness
stand also aid in determining the credit to be given his testimony."
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estimates of credibility they make.8 7 There is, however, some
little information on the influence of demeanor on others. Psychiatrists discussing the possibility of expert testimony on the
credibility of witnesses regularly emphasize that a useful diagnosis requires intensive consultation and that attempts to reach
conclusions solely on the basis of courtroom demeanor rest on a
very weak foundation.8 8 Judges occasionally announce theh
own rules of thumb for measuring credibility; almost invariably
the rules are so patently absurd as to cast serious doubts on the
rationality of the judges' decisional processes. Probably the best
known example is found in the instruction of one trial judge to a
jury that if a witness wipes his hands while testifying, it is "almost always an indication of lying. Why it should be so we don't
know, but that is the fact."8 9 Even Judge Frank, a leading champion of the importance of allowing credibility determinations to
be based on courtroom demeanor, admits that "occasionally there
are astonishing revelations of absurd rules-of-thumb some trial
judges use" in evaluating demeanor 00 There may well be double value in the suggestion of an NLRB trial examiner that it is
far better for the trier who observes the witnesses not to explain
the criteria used in evaluating their credibility. 91
Such quasi-empirical data are barely supplemented by a few
beginning essays at psychological experimentation to determine
87. "There is today almost no real knowledge about how credibility
judgments are formed, and a moment's introspection is sufficient to
remind us how mysterious must be this process ... ." FL KALVEN &
IL ZEIsEL, THE Aiva
cAN JURY 169 (1966). See generally id. at 168-81,
381-90. In comparing juries with judges, the only measurable distinction was that juries may tend to be more willing to credit defendants
accused of serious crimes who have unblemished prior records. Id.
at 177-81.
88. See, e.g., Davidson, Appraisal of the Witness, 110 AZL J. OF
PsYcHiATRY 481 (1954); Tuchler, supranote 85.
89. Quercia v. United States, 289 U.S. 466, 468 (1933). Judge Frank
found such a rule of thumb outrageous; see J. FRANK, supra note 85, at
335; Wigmore characterized the decision of the Supreme Court, reversing
the trial court, as a "singular blunder." J. WIGMORE, THE SCIENCE OF
Wigmore's examples of other "quite
JUDICIAL PROOF 603 n.1 (1937).
worthwhile rules of thumb" rise no higher. See id. at 602-09.
90. J.FRANK, supra note 85, at 247.
91. Sahbr, Demeanor Evidence: Elusive and Intangible Imponderables, 47 A.B.A.J. 580, 582 (1961):
Not only would it not serve any useful purpose but it would unduly prolong and add nothing to a decision to describe a witness
as having a furtive look, a nervous twitch, a flushed face or
perspiring freely. Those indicia are better left unsaid in the
hope that judgment as to such matters should be left to the
sense and experience of the one who observed the witnesses,
guided, of course, by acceptable standards.
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the effects of demeanor on the accuracy of judgment. Although
the area is one in need of much more intensive attention 2 and
the situations constructed for the experiments clearly cannot be
equated with the situation surrounding actual jury deliberation,
the few tentative findings dramatically underscore the fear suggested by the judges' own statements. For what the psychologists have found so far is that, as compared to persons making
judgments based on recordings or transcripts of the same testimony, persons making judgments on the basis of observation of
the "witnesses" form significantly less accurate judgments. 93 In
short, the much-despised cold record of appellate review actually
may be the least distorted of all possible bases for judgment.
Abstract analysis readily suggests several reasons why severe difficulty is encountered in attempting to rely on witnesses'
demeanor in discovering the truth. As a beginning proposition,
the old-fashioned confidence that "few people have the ability to
conceal their perjury

' 94

is giving way more and more to the rec-

ognition that many people can successfully conceal their perjury
even from themselves-by the time they come to testify to the lie,
they believe it sincerely.9 5
Perhaps more important to the overall use of demeanor as
92.

The need for research is concisely summarized in Fishman,

supra note 86, at 64-65.

93. Perhaps the most instructive study isMarston, Studies in Testimony, 15 J. AM. INST. OF CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 5,22-26 (1924). More
recent work isreported in Maier & Thurber, Accuracy of Judgments of
Deception When an Interview is Watched, Heard, and Read, 21 PERSONNEL PSYCH. 23 (1968); Maer & Janzen, Reliability of Reasons Used in
Making Judgments of Honesty & Dishonesty, 25 PERCEPTUAL & MOTOR
SKILLS 141 (1967).
Slight additional help may be found in Fernberger, Can an Emotion
Be Accurately Judged by its Facial Expression Alone?, 20 J.CRaM. L. &
CRIv=MOLOGY 554 (1930), concluding that "judgments of the emotional
states in others are in the nature of social meanings dependent more
upon the stimulus situation than upon anything else." Id. at 564. If
jurors are not equipped by experience to evaluate accurately the
"stimulus situation" confronting witnesses at trial, this conclusion
would carry over.
A nonclinical observation of interest isreported in 1948 ScoTs LAw
TIMEs (NEws) 91-92: "There is something to be said in favor of a
dispassionate examination of the written record. One may miss the
high lights, but one can see the evidence steadily and see it whole.

One may miss the clash of battle, but at any rate the dust of the arena
has settled."
94. See M. BROWN, LEGAL

PSYCHOLOGY 106
LICH, LOST ART OF CROSS-EXMINATION 16 (1970).

(1926); see also J. Eim-

95. See, e.g., J.MARSHALL, LAW AND PSYCHOLOGY IN CONFLICT 33-36
(1966); Slovenko, Witnesses, Psychiatry and the Credibility of Testimony, 19 U. FLA.L.REv. 1,7 (1966).
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a guide to decision is the lack of experience with the trial setting
in which demeanor is generated. Jurors have ample experience,
it can be assumed, with judging the demeanor of others in ordinary life situations; they ordinarily have little experience, frequently none, in evaluating demeanor in the stress created by
trial.
One of the simplest parts of the trial pressure problem is that
the witness is thrust very much to center-stage; and there is ample justification for the everyday observation that "the effect of
an audience is to slow down the mental and physical performance
of an individual."9 6 Emotions are aroused, mistakes result and
create new emotions, and the process feeds on itself.
This audience effect is of course tremendously complicated
because all the participants are aware of it. At one level, complication follows from the fact that lawyers are fully aware of the
importance of demeanor, have their own traditions as to "good"
and "bad" demeanor, and attempt to see to it that their witnesses' honest stories are not lost because of correctible idiosyncracies of demeanor. Whether careful rehearsal is called
horseshedding, coaching, or something else, the result is that
courtroom demeanor is often the result of conscious attempts to
9
shape it. 7
Quite apart from lawyers' efforts, witnesses can hardly avoid
coaching themselves, deliberately attempting to present the best
possible face to the courtroom world. Most people have considerable practice at this sort of exercise in other settings; few have
much practice at controlling their own demeanor in the setting
of an adversary trial. The result of such efforts may be a witness who is literally too good to be trues--even though he is in
fact testifying as accurately as any witness who ever followed an
oath. Conversely, a witness testifying accurately may be so uncomfortable about the anticipated legal consequences of his testimoney as to appear the worst sort of liar; it is even conceivable
that a witness who feels honor-bound to tell the truth may still
96. Haward, supra note 83, at 352.
97. Various aspects of witness preparation, and its effects, are re-

flected in 3 l BELZ, MODEN TEmIs 2544 n.41 (1954); M. BnowN, supra
note 94, at 112; 2 F. BuscH, LAw & TACTrCS 3x Juny TaRtAs 529 (1959);
3 Id. 1, 127-28, 509-10 (1960); J. FRAx, supra note 85, at 81-83; Fishman,
supra note 86, at 64-65.
98. A typical observation is offered in Trail v. Village of Elk River,
- Minn. -, 175 N.W.2d 916, 922-23 (1970)-the witness' testimony "reveals such an unusually acute recollection of the facts and so articulate
a presentation of them ... that this testimony can be seriously questioned...."
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be willing to tell it in such a way that he hopes no one will believe
him. The intermediate shadings of fear, embarrassment and eagerness to have done with things hardly need cataloguing.
Pressures resulting from the gravity of the trial occasion
are probably inevitable. But our adversary mode of trial serves
to exacerbate the problems confronting witnesses and jury almost beyond measure. The witness is faced with the chore of
telling his story in response to questions following a pattern
often far removed from his own natural narration instincts.
Even the well-rehearsed pattern is apt to be interrupted by objections and other bewildering procedural arcana. Then comes
cross-examination, a wonderful truth-discovering engine which
is habitually misused for the purpose of attacking and discrediting the witness by any means available within the broad ranges
of the legally and ethically permissible, if not occasionally beyond. 99
Witness reactions to such procedures may be of small value
in evaluating their credibility, particularly to jurors who themselves have scant experience in measuring demeanor under such
circumstances. The problem is further accentuated, however, by
the overall pattern of the trial. First one part of the story is
told, then another; one side tries its version, then the other tries
its own. Small wonder that many students of the problems of
credibility conclude helplessly that our modes of adversary procedure make the jury's task nearly impossible.10 0 A particularly
biting edge may be honed on the blade, however, by asking
whether really significant changes could be made in the basic
procedural framework without discarding the civil jury. The
combination of an investigative rather than adversary system
with jury trial might be even less suited to any of the goals
99. Cf. Slovenko, supra note 95, at 15, where it is pointed out that
among the difficulties faced by an expert psychiatrist in attempting to
evaluate a witness solely on the basis of courtroom performance is the

fact that
[t]he aura of cross-examination (with its implication of hostility
and adversity of interest) provides an emotional climate far

different from the ideal psychiatric interview. The witness feels
attacked and abused, and this immediately elicits defense mech-

anisms that can only shut out or distort pertinent psychiatric

material.
100. See, e.g., J.

MARSHALL, supra note 95, at 94-95; Broeder, The
Functions of the Jury: Facts or Fictions?, 21 U. Cm. L. REv. 386, 391-98
(1954); Roche, Truth Telling, Psychiatric Expert Testimony and the
Impeachment of Witnesses, 22 PENN. BAR Ass'N Q. 140, 142 (1951);
Stern, The Psychology of Testimony, 34 J. ABNORMAL & SOC. PSYCH. 3,
7-10 (1939).
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served by public adjudication, whether they be finding the truth,
"economizing of resources, inspiring confidence, supporting independent social policies, permitting ease in prediction and application, adding to the efficiency of the entire legal system, or
tranquilizing disputants.' '0 1
One final step remains in tracing out the theoretical difficulties of the jury's task in evaluating credibility. In a very real
sense, jurors are in the position of being witnesses of the witnesses and are subject to all of the same probabilities of distortion in perception and recollection as other witnesses. 02 When
they come to the stage of deliberation, these difficulties may be
reduced or accentuated. Since they function as a group, group
abilities may cover some of the individual mistakes in perception
decisional process may also contriband recall; 0 3 but the group
04
ute its own distortions.
In short, there are many reasons for hesitating to put much
confidence in the ability of juries to discover the truth by discerning evaluation of witness demeanor. The jury's main factfinding advantages lie in the contribution of a variety of everyday
experience in the world; ordinary experience seems to offer little
help in the adjudicatory task of assessing credibility. Any attempt to draw from the lessons of ordinary experience, indeed,
may simply make matters worse, unless the lesson is the wise one
that the courtroom situation is like nothing the juror has previously encountered. Given such difficulties, where have the
courts come out in formulating the limits of control by directed
verdict?
1 05
In the casebook-celebrated opinion in Dyer v. MacDougall,
Judge Learned Hand suggested that, theoretically, juries should
not only be allowed to disbelieve uncontradicted, unimpeached
testimony but should also be allowed to conclude from their disbelief and the demeanor of the witness that the truth is in fact
the opposite of the testimony. In terms of the hypothetical case
sketched above, this would mean that if the sole eyewitness testified that the car of the plaintiff's decedent had swerved into the
lane occupied by the car of the defendant's decedent, the jury
could nonetheless find that the plaintiff had carried its burden
101. This list is taken from Weinstein, supra note 82, at 241.
See, e.g., J. FRANK, supra note 85, at 22; J .MARSHALL, supra
note 95, at 90-95.
103. See, e.g., P. DnvLx, supra note 66, at 140.
104. See, e.g., J. MARSHALL, supra note 95, at 94; Haward, supra note
83, at 353.
105. 201 F.2d 265 (2d Cir. 1952).
102.
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of proving that the accident happened on the opposite side of the
road. Judge Hand rejected this theoretical possibility on the
ground that, if it were allowed, it could be allowed only in cases
in which the trial judge determined that there was enough in
the "demeanor evidence" to justify such a finding and that there
could not be effective appellate review of the trial judge's ruling.
It is rather difficult to understand from the opinion why it was
assumed that the trial judge should be able to determine whether
the particular case was suitable for such an exercise of jury wisdom. Once the theoretical possibility is admitted, the general
principle of minimizing intrusion on the jury's functions, and the
observation that the "best" witness may be the least trustworthy
of all, would suggest that all cases should be allowed to go to the
jury. 10
This conclusion would effectively abolish directed verdicts: as soon as a litigant could discover what must be established to fall within a recognizable rule of law, he could get to
the jury merely by producing witnesses who testified that none of
the necessary events had occurred. 10 7 Presumably few litigants
would anticipate sufficient possibilities of victory to undertake
such a hazardous task, and fewer juries would accept the invitation to lawlessness tendered by whatever factors of sympathy
encouraged the litigant to undertake the gamble. However small
the risks may be, there seems no reason to allow them ever to be
run. With the exception of a single inexplicable statement by
the Supreme Court, distortedly quoting from Dyer v. MacDougall,10 8 federal courts accordingly have been unanimous in reject106. It is not necessary to follow the principle that the jury may
sometimes consider demeanor in evaluating uncontradicted testimony to
the conclusion that they must always be allowed to do so. Conceptually,
an intermediate stage is easily definable in which both trial and appellate judges ask the same question: given the nature of the testimony,
in all of the aspects reflected on the cold paper record, is it sufficiently weak that it should be subjected to the jury's appraisal of demeanor? In form, at least, this approach would not require the trial
judge to evaluate the demeanor of the particular witnesses in the particular case; focus would instead be on the quality of the evidence in
some more abstract sense. This sort of approach seems a bit too rarified
for practical application.
107. See, e.g., Janigan v. Taylor, 344 F.2d 781, 784-85 (1st Cir.),
cert. denied, 382 U.S. 879 (1965).
108. NLRB v. Walton Mfg. Co., 369 U.S. 404, 408 (1962). The Court
quotes the portion of Judge Hand's opinion establishing the logical proposition that disbelief in a witness' testimony arising from his demeanor
may be used to establish a belief in the contrary proposition. It
does not go on to note that Judge Hand found this logical possibility
an insufficient basis for judicial action.
In other opinions, the Court has squarely taken the position that
"disbelief of the ... testimony would not supply a want of proof."
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ing the possibility there suggested, 109 frequently without even
recognizing the theoretical problem. 1 0
Some courts, led by the Second Circuit, have nonetheless
been willing to state that the jury at least has the right to reject
all oral testimony, no matter how purely disinterested, uncontradicted and unimpeached.11
The majority, however, adhere
to the proposition that demeanor is not to be trusted even this
11 2
far, and require jury acceptance of such testimony.
Commentators are similarly divided.

Wigmore is actually

Moore v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry., 340 U.S. 573, 576 (1951). See also Nishikawa v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 129, 137 (1958).
109. A delightful recent example is found in Curran v. Salvucci,
426 F.2d 920, 923 (1st Cir. 1970). See also Bankers Life & Cas. Co. v.
Guarantee Reserve Life Ins. Co., 365 F.2d 28, 34 (7th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 913 (1967); Davis v. National Mort. Corp., 349 F.2d 175, 178
(2d Cir. 1965); Mandelbaum v. United States, 251 F.2d 748 (2d Cir.
1958); Eckenrode v. Pennsylvania R.R., 164 F.2d 996, 999 n.8 (3d Cir.
1947), affd, 335 U.S. 329 (1948). But cf. NLRB V. D'Armigene, Inc., 353
F.2d 406, 411 (2d Cir. 1965).
Judge Frank concurred in Dyer v. MacDougall, urging that as a general matter both juries and judges sitting without juries should be able
to make findings based solely on disbelief of contrary testimony. He
argued that the basis of decision chosen by the majority-the need for
appellate review of directed verdict rulings-logically implied that trial
judges would be given the freedom the majority was denying to juries.
See 201 F.2d at 269-72. The Mandelbaum opinion cited above, 251
F.2d 748, shows that the Second Circuit has indeed applied the Dyer
rule to judges as well as juries.
110. See, e.g., Brinks v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry., 398 F.2d 889, 893
(6th Cir. 1968); Bennett v. Wood, 271 F.2d 349, 352 (8th Cir. 1959).
111. Two of the clearest expressions are found in Purcell v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 221 F.2d 953 (2d Cir. 1955), a per curiam opinion redolent

of the style of Judge Learned Hand; and Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Havana
Madrid Restaurant Corp., 175 F.2d 77, 79-80 (2d Cir. 1949), penned by
Judge Frank. The Second Circuit may be wavering from this view.
See, e.g., Simblest v. Maynard, 427 F.2d 1, 5 (2d Cir. 1970), where the
court rules that, at a minimum, the evidence to be considered on a motion for directed verdict is all the evidence favoring the opponent of the
motion plus all the "uncontradicted, unimpeached evidence unfavorable
to him." The only reason for considering such testimony must be that
the jury would be required to believe it; see text accompanying notes
141-60 infra.
The Ninth Circuit has provided a welter of opinions containing
broad statements of the right to disbelieve witnesses, but they are ordinarily written in cases involving interested witnesses. See, e.g., Wood v.
Commissioner, 338 F.2d 602 (9th Cir. 1964); Ramos v. Matson Nay. Co.,
316 F.2d 128, 132 (9th Cir. 1963); Joseph v. Donover Co., 261 F.2d 812,
824 (9th Cir. 1958); NLRB v. Howell Chevrolet Co., 204 F.2d 79, 86 (9th
Cir.), aff'd on other grounds, 346 U.S. 482 (1953).
112. See, e.g., Chicago, R.L & P. Ry. v. Howell, 401 F.2d 752 (10th
Cir. 1968) (dictum); Chicago & N.W. Ry. v. Strand, 300 F.2d 521 (8th
Cir. 1962); Walton v. Owens, 244 F.2d 383, 388 (5th Cir. 1957); Reed v.
Murphy, 232 F.2d 668, 674 n.10 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 831
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inconsistent on the subject, announcing in one passage that the
jury has the right to disregard any testimony it chooses not to
credit" 31 and approving in another passage the proposition that
in appropriate circumstances a jury may be compelled to accept
even the testimony of interested witnesses." 4 Other writers
have suggested a rule like that implied (and perhaps impliedly
rejected) in Dyer v. MacDougall, allowing a trial judge to direct a
verdict only when he can determine that there is nothing in the
demeanor of the witness which would justify a reasonable jury
in discrediting his testimony. 1 5
The arguments canvassed above suggest that the majority
rule of enforced belief is the proper one. Such a rule leads to
mistaken decision when the witness is mistaken, as often happens,
or is simply lying. But if jurors are left free to reject testimony
where the only reasonable basis for disbelief is the demeanor of
one or more witnesses, the great difficulty of the task and the
unfamiliarity of the setting suggest that perhaps more mistakes
will be made and that there is little reason indeed to suspect that
fewer mistakes will result. Nor is there any significant reason
to suspect that trial judges, even though more experienced, are
likely to do better. And overriding the speculative nature of the
possibility that juries can by some sophisticated process improve
on the results of a flat rule is the fact that often they simply will
not try. A general verdict which apparently is based on rejection of uncontradicted testimony will often be based not on calculations of credibility, but simply on misunderstanding, misapplication or wilful rejection of the law. It might be urged that,
since juries may improve the law by ignoring it, they should
nonetheless have broad freedom, or at least freedom in areas of
law which are in need of some contemporaneous community tuning. The more reasonable conclusion appears to be that the lawpreserving rule of directed verdicts requires the majority rule. 110
(1956). Other cases are examined below in the discussion of enforced
belief even of interested witnesses. See text accompanying notes 124-27
infra.
113. 7 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2034, at 260-61 (3d ed. 1940). Earlier,
it is stated that "[t]he witness' demeanor, . . . is always assumed to be

in evidence." 3 Id. at § 946.
114. 9 Id. at § 2495.
115. Dow, supra note 77, at 842, 848, 880, 882; Note, The Power of
the Court To Determine Witness Credibility, 107 U. PA. L. REv. 217, 230,
236-37 (1958).
116. See F. JAMES, CIVIL PROcEDuRE 279-80 (1965).

Perhaps it should be noted that some courts follow varying versions
of a rule that a party is bound by his own testimony to the extent that it
is unfavorable to him. There is no reason to bind a party by testimony
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2. Interested Testimony.

One of the reasons why the rule just explored may not serve
to dispose of many cases by directed verdict is that frequently
the relevant testimony is provided by a witness who is not disinterested. There does not appear to be any significant reason
to suppose that juries are better able to utilize demeanor in evaluating the testimony of interested witnesses than in evaluating
that of disinterested witnesses. But there is considerably greater
reason to suppose that decisions based on compelled belief of such
testimony will be mistaken. However high current levels of perjury may be, the peak which would be reached if parties to a suit
knew that they could automatically win by direct testimony to
crucial facts-and could defeat an opponent's possibly perjured
testimony only by providing contrary direct testimony-would
be breathtaking. And the volume of honestly intended, but deluded, self-serving testimony would remain, as it is now, beyond
calculation. No one would champion a rule which requires belief of anything an interested witness might say.
Beginning from this point, the initial problem to be faced in
differentiating the rules to be applied to interested testimony lies
in determining when a witness should be considered to be interested. It might be held that all willing witnesses are interested, simply because they identify with the side which has
trusted them by offering their testimony. 117 Presumably such a
level of interest is too low to be taken into account. Likewise, the
general interest any witness has in maintaining his own sense of
integrity and consistency by repeating in court testimony he has
previously given should not be enough to warrant departure
from the rules which apply to disinterested witnesses. Although
as to matters which are potentially within the perception of other
witnesses, and courts generally do not apply the rule when there is a
conflict in testimony as to such matters. See Canadian Pac. Ry. Co. v.
Sullivan, 126 F.2d 433, 440 (lst Cir.), cert. denied, 316 U.S. 696 (1942);
Dow, supra note 77, at 872; but see Bolam v. Louisville & N.R.R., 295
F.2d 809, 811-12 (6th Cir. 1961). An interesting testing example is
Brown v. Poland, 325 F.2d 984 (10th Cir. 1963), where the plaintiff testified that at the time of the accident he had the right to control and direct his wife's driving, and the trial court accordingly charged the
jury that her negligence was imputed to the plaintiff. The basis urged
for ignoring the plaintiff's own testimony was testimony by a psychiatrist that the plaintiff had a dependent personality and his trial testimony simply compensated for his personality inadequacies. The
appellate court was unimpressed.
117. See, e.g., Marshall, Evidence, Psychology and the Trial: Some
Challenges to.Law, 63 COLUM. L. Rnv. 197, 216 (1963).
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little more should be required, it remains difficult to know where
to suggest a line. It would be possible to urge that any shared
community of interest, even on a very general and abstract plane,
should be enough; social, economic, political, ethnic, sexual, and
other "classes" could be constructed, for instance, which would
frequently separate the litigants from each other and assign the
crucial witness to some class in common with the party favored by
his testimony. The possibility of bias and the resulting distortions of testimony cannot be denied. Nonetheless, "interest" at
such levels of abstraction would often involve too low a level
of danger to justify altering the permissible scope of jury freedom. There may remain situations of such intense group consciousness that they should be taken to place a witness in the interested category. Similarly, more particular forms of involvement between a witness and a party or issue involved in the actual case should readily be found to invoke the rules applied to
interested witnesses. Simple friendship, for instance, involves
sufficient pressures to warrant such treatment. 118
The Supreme Court has provided a pair of rulings which are
useful to introduce the next step of the problem. In a muchquoted decision of seventy years ago, it announced that although
a jury may not disbelieve unimpeached and uncontradicted witnesses, "the mere fact that the witness is interested in the result
of the suit is . . .sufficient to require the credibility of his testimony to be submitted to the jury ..... 1"9 Scarcely more than

thirty years later, however, it announced that the many broad
statements that the jury is at liberty to reject testimony solely
on the ground of the witness' interest "cannot be accepted without qualification" and ruled that in the case before it the jury
was bound to accept the testimony of one of the defendant's employees.1 20 The lesson suggested by these statements can stand
as a fair indication of general practice-sometimes a jury is compelled to believe the testimony of interested witnesses; sometimes
it is not. Unhappily, the only general guide that can be offered
is that the courts are seeking to enforce the general directed verdict approach of attempting to discover what a reasonable jury
118. See, e.g., Ramos v. Matson Nay. Co., 316 F.2d 128, 132 (9th
Cir. 1963) (corroboration of a supposedly injured seaman's story could
be rejected on the ground that the witness "was helping a fellow seaman
by telling a fictitious story").
119. Sonnentheil v. Christian Moerlein Brewing Co., 172 U.S. 401,
408 (1899). This statement is approvingly quoted by the Court in Sartor v. Arkansas Nat. Gas Corp., 321 U.S. 620, 628 (1944).
120. Chesapeake & 0. Ry. v. Martin, 283 U.S. 209, 216 (1931).

19711

DIRECTED VERDICTS

basic point.is simply that courts frequently compel acceptance of
interested testimony, again often with good reason.
A few hard cases may suffice to close out the discussion. As
it happens, all were tried without juries; each would pose as
difficult a problem if it were tried to a jury and the question
was framed in the directed verdict context. 2 8 In one a taxpayer
and the sister of her tax consultant testified that a petition for
redetermination was mailed at the appropriate time and that the
necessary stamped certified mail receipt had been obtained. The
receipt was lost; the appellate court ruled that it was appropriate
for the Tax Court to reject the interested testimony.120 In another, the way was left open to reject the testimony of a canner
that in 1944 he was packing 27 percent more berries in his cans
than in 1942, so his 1944 prices should not be controlled by reference to his 1942 prices.13 0 In another case, on the other hand, a
petitioner for habeas corpus testified that prior to his guilty plea
he had not been advised of his right to counsel; the court ruled
that, although the court docket noted that he had been advised of
his rights, and an affidavit of the sentencing judge stated that
while he could not recall the particular case he always advised
defendants of their rights, the prisoner's testimony must be accepted.' 3 1 Finally, there are many cases involving testimony of
applicants attempting to get into this country on the basis of citizenship, allowing rejection of their testimony even though there
tradiction to allow rejection of the expert testimony. See, e.g., Cundick v. Broadbent, 383 F.2d 157, 161 (10th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390
U.S. 948 (1968) (nonjury trial); Stafos v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 367 F.2d 314
(10th Cir. 1966).
128. Although appellate courts ordinarily accord a broader scope to
jury factfinding than they allow trial judges under the "clearly erroneous" standard of Rule 52 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
there seems little reason to distinguish between judge and jury in
most of the present problems. The tradition of jury freedom may be
offset by the greater adjudicating experience of the trial judge; there
seems no reason to allow the judge less freedom than the jury enjoys.
129. Wood v. Commissioner, 338 F.2d 602 (9th Cir. 1964).
130. Chamberlain v. Flemming, 160 F.2d 804, 807 (8th Cir. 1947).
131. Browning v. Crouse, 356 F.2d 178 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 384
U.S. 973 (1966). A strange contrast is provided by Gallegos v. Cox,
358 F.2d 703 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 869 (1966), where the same
judge wrote for the court that uncontradicted testimony by a petitioner
for habeas corpus relief that his guilty plea was not made knowingly
and understandingly could be rejected as so inherently improbable as to
be unworthy of belief. Lujan v. United States, 431 F.2d 871 (5th Cir.
1970), a case remarkably similar to Browning v. Crouse, rules simply
that the trier of facts is not bound to accept the petitioner's testimony
"even if uncontradicted."
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is no substantial contradictory showing.8 2 All of these cases seem
hard because they combine obvious temptations to perjury with a
significant degree of difficulty in obtaining disinterested corroborating testimony and involve a high degree of danger of oppressive government action. Whatever other value they may have,
they should support the conclusion that there really cannot be a
flat directed verdict rule of either mandatory acceptance or free
rejection of interested testimony.
3.

CircumstantialContradiction.

Directly contradictory testimony almost always raises a jury
question. Circumstantial contradiction can likewise make it clear
that the credibility of testimony which is not directly contradicted should be left to the jury, even though it is otherwise unimpeached and emanates from a disinterested witness. Inferences from the circumstances established by the testimony of
others, or of the witness himself, may conflict either with the direct testimony or with inferences which can be drawn from it.
Probably all courts would today accept the proposition that such
conflict is sufficient to make the credibility of the direct testimony a jury question at some point far short of rendering the
testimony inherently improbable. 133 So too the one-time notion
that circumstantial evidence is not sufficient to raise a jury question when there is contradictory direct testimony seems properly
34
abandoned, at least in the federal courts.
As might be expected, there is very little more to be said
about this subject which does not embrace the entire subject of
132. The honorable ancestor of these cases is Quock Ting v. United
States, 140 U.S. 417, 424 (1891).

See also Lau Ah Yew v. Dulles, 257

F.2d 744, 746 (9th Cir. 1958); but cf. Nishikawa v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 129
(1958), rev'g 235 F.2d 135 (9th Cir. 1956). Some special corroboration requirements were adopted by statute for some claims of right to
enter or remain in the United States not arising out of citizenship by
birth; see 7 J. WIGMORE, supra note 113, § 2066, at 379-80.
133. Among the more entertaining illustrative cases are Donald v.
Zack Meyer's T.V. Sales & Service, 426 F.2d 1027 (5th Cir. 1970); Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry. v. Howell, 401 F.2d 752 (10th Cir. 1968); Urban Redevelopment Corp. v. Commissioner, 294 F.2d 752 (10th Cir. 1961) (reviewing findings of the Tax Court); Johnson v. Baltimore & 0. Ry., 208 F.2d

633 (3d Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 943 (1954); The Rocona v. Guy
F. Atkinson Co., 173 F.2d 661, 665 (9th Cir. 1949) (reviewing findings of
a judge); Shapiro v. Rubens, 166 F.2d 659 (7th Cir. 1948) (reviewing
trial court findings). A case which deserves to be ranked as a modernday classic is Powers v. Continental Cas. Co., 301 F.2d 386 (8th Cir. 1962).

134. See generally Dow, Judicial Determination of Credibility in
Jury-TriedActions, 38 NEB. L. REv. 835, 876 (1959).
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might reasonably do in circumstances where no more definite rule
121
can be laid down.
Exemplification by a few cases may be the easiest method
of illustrating the correctness of the current approach. One of
the most commonly encountered situations in which courts announce, and follow, a rule of free disbelief is that of testimony by
taxpayers as to their motives in undertaking various transactions
calculated, if not designed, to reduce their tax liabilities.' 22
Given the frequently low level of societal pressures to honesty in
such situations, a policy of free disbelief seems eminently sound.
Likewise, in situations where a witness is called upon to testify
to what would have been done if something else had not first occurred, the slope down into comfortable certainty that the favorable thing would have been done is so easy that a policy of free
disbelief seems incontestable. So, for instance, an insurance
medical examiner asked to testify whether a life insurance policy
would have issued on a given medical showing if the applicant
had not died while the application was pending need not be automatically believed. 12 3 Examples could be multiplied; the point
seems sufficiently made that there are many situations in which
interested testimony may properly be rejected without other
showing to support its rejection.
On the other side of the coin lie many cases requiring that a
jury accept interested testimony. At times the justification
121. One typically backward statement of a very common approach

is found in Taylor v. Bair, 414 F.2d 815, 818-19 (5th Cir. 1969), where
the court first announces that the mere fact of interest is generally
sufficient to take the case to the jury, and then finds an "exception"
where the testimony really is uncontradicted and "is clear, direct, and
positive as well as being free from contradiction, inaccuracies, and circumstances tending to cast suspicion on it."
Other statements amounting essentially to a "reasonable man" ap-

proach to the problem may be found in Ferdinand v. Agricultural Ins.
Co., 22 N.J. 482, 126 A.2d 323 (1956); 9 J. WIGMom, supra note 113, § 2495,
at 306, quoting extensively from the superb opinion in Jerke v. Delmont State Bank, 54 S.D. 446, 223 N.W. 585 (1929).
122. See, e.g., Glimco v. Commissioner, 397 F.2d 537, 540-41 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 981 (1968); Goldman v. Commissioner, 388
F.2d 476, 479 (6th Cir. 1967); Breland v. United States, 323 F.2d 492
(5th Cir. 1963). Occasionally, however, courts require acceptance of
even taxpayer testimony, e.g., Dudley v. United States, 428 F.2d 1196,
1201-02 (9th Cir. 1970); Southeastern Canteen Co. v. Commissioner, 410
F.2d 615, 623-25 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 833 (1969) (circumstantial corroboration supports the result); Nicholas v. Davis, 204 F.2d
200, 202 (10th Cir. 1953).
123. Union Trust Co. v. Kansas City Life Ins. Co., 197 F. Supp. 471
(D. Md. 1961) (dictum), aftrd on other grounds, 300 F.2d 606 (4th Cir.
1962).
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seems clearly found in the fact that if the testimony were untrue,
it could easily be contradicted. 2 4 As a first approximation, indeed, it may be accepted that in all situations where it would be
easy for the opposing party to offer at least some contradictory
evidence if the interested testimony were untrue, the interested
2
testimony should be accepted if no such showing is attempted.t 5
Beyond the cases of failure to adduce easily available evidence lie cases of strong circumstantial corroboration. In one
compelling case, Mexican sellers of sisal testified that they would
not have sold to the bankrupt purchasing firm if they had realized
it had acquired the name of the firm they had formerly dealt with.
Corroboration was found in the fact that under Mexican law it
would have been illegal to sell to the bankrupt if the facts had
been known.1 26 As before, examples could be multiplied; 1 27 the
124. Chesapeake & 0. Ry. v. Martin, 283 U.S. 209, 216 (1931)
stresses this factor.
125. See Bobbe, The Uncontradicted Testimony of an Interested
Witness, 20 CoRN. L.Q. 33, 39-41 (1934).

126.

Potucek v. Cordeleria Lourdes, 310 F.2d 527 (10th Cir. 1962),

cert. denied, 372 U.S. 930 (1963). As a bankruptcy case, involving a petition in reclamation, the matter was tried to a referee rather than a jury.
As suggested in note 128 infra, the same result should follow in a jury
trial. Compare Interamerican Ref. Corp. v. Texaco Maracaibo, Inc.,
1970 CCH Trade Cases 73,069 (D. Del. 1970).
127. See, e.g., Brinks v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry., 398 F.2d 889 (6th Cir.
1968); Thornton v. Buchmann, 392 F.2d 870, 873-74 (7th Cir. 1968); Reitan
v. Travelers Indemn. Co., 267 F.2d 66 (7th Cir. 1959); Texas Co. v. Hood,
161 F.2d 618, 620 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 829 (1947). An extreme
example of the lengths to which the principle is sometimes carried
is Myers v. Day & Zimmermann, Inc., 427 F.2d 248, 252 (5th Cir.
1970), where the court ruled that a plaintiff was entitled to a directed
verdict that he had carried his burden of proving he did not know of
the hole he fell into by testifying that he did not know of it. Cf. Dickinson v. United States, 346 U.S. 389 (1953), ruling that a draft board must
accept a registrant's testimony of entitlement to a ministerial classification where there is no incompatible evidence.
Expert witnesses provide a good testing example. There are many
statements that experts need not be believed by a jury, e.g., Campbell
v. TVA, 421 F.2d 293, 297 (5th Cir. 1969); Franks v. National Dairy
Prods. Corp., 414 F.2d 682, 685 (5th Cir. 1969); Remington Arms Co. v.
Wilkins, 387 F.2d 48, 54 (5th Cir. 1967) ("It is said that according to the
laws of science it should be impossible for a bumblebee to fly, but it
flies nevertheless"). With all these statements, the same court has nevertheless ruled-as it surely must-that uncontradicted expert testimony as
to the fact and basic nature of severe personal injuries must be accepted by a jury; see Parker v. Wideman, 380 F.2d 433 (5th Cir. 1967).
More recently, it has ruled that uncontradicted expert medical testimony
must be accepted where it "bears on technical questions of medical
causation beyond the competence of lay determination." Webster v.
Offshore Food Serv., Inc., 434 F.2d 1191, 1193 (5th Cir. 1970). Some
courts profess a general principle that experts must be believed, absent contradiction, but in opinions finding sufficient circumstantial con-
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jury freedom to draw inferences from direct testimony. Although the general rule requiring that jurors accept genuinely
uncontradicted testimony is supported by strong considerations,
it is not universally accepted, and there is reasonable room to
urge that it is not of overwhelming importance. When circumstantial contradiction creeps into the picture, accordingly, the
general rule should be reduced to a caution that direct testimony, otherwise uncontradicted and unimpeached, should be
accorded considerable respect in weighing the sufficiency of inferentially contradictory circumstantial evidence. And as already noted, in such cases the process of drawing inferences and
determining which witnesses and what testimony to believe is a
single interrelated task, not a pair of discrete mental operations.
4. Corollariesand Miscellany.

a. Directing for Proponent.
In large part, the permissibility of directing a verdict for a
party bearing the burden of persuasion is controlled by the rules
just canvassed. To the extent that the case is made out by oral
testimony which the jury is not at liberty to disbelieve, a verdict
may be directed. 135 The cases frequently involve situations
where no challenge is raised as to the truth of the facts established by the testimony, 130 but there are also cases in which the
party opposing the motion has clearly sought to challenge the
137
credibility of the controlling testimony.
Questions of appropriate inferences and law application are
apt to be involved in a proponent's motion as well, particularly
where a directed verdict is sought on a major issue such as liability. Because of this admixture, it is common to find in the
cases the statement that a verdict may be directed for the party
135. The nexus between the rules has been drawn frequently. See,

e.g., F. JAmmrs, supra note 116, at 279-80; Sunderland, Directinga Verdict
for the Party Having the Burden of Proof, 11 MIcE L. Rrv. 198 (1913);
Note, supra note 115.
136. E.g., Hughes v. Mobil Oil Corp., 421 F.2d 1248 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 398 U.S. 950 (1970); Pieseski v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 393 F.2d 900
(3d Cir. 1968); Old Dominion Stevedoring Corp. v. Polskie Linie Oceaniczne, 386 F.2d 193 (4th Cir. 1967).
137. A clear example may be found in Norfolk So. Ry. v. Davis
Frozen Foods, Inc., 195 F.2d 662 (4th Cir. 1952). See also Colonial Refrigerated Transp. Inc. v. Mitchell, 403 F.2d 541, 547 & nll (5th Cir.
1968). Cf. Dickinson v. United States, 346 U.S. 389 (1953), where the
Court ruled that absent proof "incompatible" with the draft registrant's

testimony of activities entitling him to ministerial status, the testimony must be accepted.
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having the burden of persuasion only when the evidence is
"overwhelming.' 38 Here too it is clear that it is proper to direct
a verdict, although there may of course be cases which seem a
questionable exercise of the power. 139 The issues differ little
from other issues of judicial control of the inferential and law application functions and may be approached on the basis suggested
below. 140
b. Evidence Considered.
A second corollary governing the evidence to be considered
on a motion for directed verdict would seem to follow from the
principles just examined as clearly as the first corollary that a
verdict may be directed for the party having the burden of persuasion. The court must, at a minimum, consider all of the evidence favorable to the party opposing the motion which the jury
may believe, and must in addition consider all of the unfavorable evidence which the jury must believe.14 1 Consideration of
anything less would seem so plainly inconsistent with the basic
principles of compelled belief as to require no further discussion,
were it not for the opinion of the Supreme Court in Wilkerson v.
McCarthy.142 There, citing no authority, Mr. Justice Black
stated that it is "the established rule" that the court "need look
only to the evidence and reasonable inferences which tend to
support the case of a litigant" against whom a directed verdict is
sought. 1 43 This statement has caused sufficient consternation to
warrant further examination than it would seem, in principle, to
merit.
The most important reason for disregarding the literal sweep
of the Court's statement in Wilkerson is that the Court was not
faced with any unfavorable evidence of a sort which the jury
should be compelled to believe. The particular matter of direct
138.

See, e.g., Gatenby v. Altoona Aviation Corp., 407 F.2d 443 (3d

Cir. 1968, 1969); 2B W. BARRON & A. HOLTZOrF, FEDERAL PRAC IcE & PRo-

§§ 1074.1 & 1075, at 396 (C. Wright ed. 1961).
139. See, e.g., Missouri-K.-T. Ry. v. Hearson, 422 F.2d 1037 (10th
Cir. 1970); Oliver v. Hallett Constr. Co., 421 F.2d 365 (8th Cir. 1970);
McPherson v. Tamiami Trail Tours, Inc., 383 F.2d 527 (5th Cir. 1967).
140. See Part II, §§ C & D infra.
141. This conclusion is mandatory for any case in which a verdict
is directed for the party having the burden of persuasion. If the court
could consider only the evidence favoring the party opposing the motion,
there would be nothing to support the case of the party seeking the
directed verdict and scant basis for granting the motion.
142. 336 U.S. 53 (1949).
CEDURE

143.

Id. at 57.
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fact giving rise to implications which the Court thought to be
controlling was the frequency of use by railroad yard employees
in general of a certain plank, surrounded by guard chains, spanning the repair pit into which the plaintiff fell. There was direct
testimony that yard employees frequently used the plank; there
was also contrary direct testmony. The Court ruled simply that
the jury could believe the testimony of frequent use rather than
the contrary testimony. So much the general rules of jury
4
freedom in crediting conflicting testimony clearly mandate.? "
The Court's statement that consideration should be given only to
the favorable evidence is thus an accurate response to the needs
of the case before it, and it need not mean that the same approach
is appropriate when there is unfavorable evidence which a jury
should not be allowed to ignore.
Later Supreme Court opinions shed little light on the meaning the Court may attach to its loose phrase in Wilkerson.1' 5 The
statement has, to be sure, been quoted. 140 But some opinions
strongly suggest that the Court is in fact willing to consider all of
the evidence in the record in passing on a directed verdict issue.147 Notwithstanding this obscurity, distinguished commentators have suggested that, pending authoritative clarification,
lower federal courts should consider only the evidence favoring
the party opposing a motion for directed verdict.1 48 Since lower
144. A similar analysis of the Wilkerson opinion is forcefully presented by Judge Rives' dissent from the en banc majority opinion in
Boeing Co. v. Shipman, 411 F.2d 365, 381-82 (5th Cir. 1969).
145. Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370
U.S. 690, 696, 700-01 (1962) is occasionally cited as approving the perplexing standard sometimes drawn from Wilkerson. Nothing in the
opinion sheds any light on the problem either way.
146. See, e.g., Webb v. Illinois Central R.R., 352 U.S. 512, 513-14
(1957).
Compare, e.g., Compton v. Luckenbach Overseas Corp., 425
F.2d 1130, 1132 (2d Cir. 1970), considering only the evidence favoring the
nonmoving party as the required standard in Jones Act and FELA cases,
with Simblest v. Maynard, 427 F.2d 1 (2d Cir. 1970), considering "uncontradicted, unimpeached evidence" unfavorable to the nonmoving
party in an ordinary litigation.
147. See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253,
277 (1968), where the Court affirmed summary judgment for an
antitrust defendant after observing that the showing made by the
plaintiff was such that "given no contrary evidence, a jury question
might well be presented," because of the "overwhelming amount of contrary evidence." Cf. fllinois Cent. ILR. v. Norfolk & W. Ry., 385 U.S. 57,
66 (1966), equating the standard of reviewing administrative determinations upon the record considered as a whole with the standard for directing a jury verdict.
148. 2B W. BAmRON & A. HOLTZOFr, supra note 138, § 1075, at 399400; Bagalay, Directed Verdicts and the Right to Trial by Jury in Federal Courts, 42 Tx. . REV.1053, 1061 (1964).
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federal courts are in fact regularly indulging the habit of considering all the evidence, 1 49 it may be worthwhile to begin with
an examination of the situations where no one is likely to contend for literal application of an approach considering only the
parts of the evidence favorable to the party opposing the motion,
and then to work on to the more general problem.
The clearest situation would be that of a witness who testifies that "the traffic light was red-I mean green" and who adamantly insists thereafter that it was green and that his original
statement was simply a nervous slip of the tongue. If there is no
other evidence that the light was red, the fact that one part of
the evidence favors the party opposing a motion to direct the jury
that it may not find the light was red should not be sufficient to
defeat the motion. 150 Closely analogous situations are provided
by the witness who testifies that she did not hear the train blow
its whistle but then adds that she seldom hears the train whistle
because she has become accustomed to its regular sound and does
not mean to say that it did not blow on the particular occasion
in question; 151 and by the little old lady who repeatedly testifies
that she did not know what happened to cause the idling car to
leap the curb when she slid across the seat behind the wheel but
is then led on cross-examination to say that she did not put her
foot on a pedal and hold it down. 1 52 The respective courts seem
clearly right in ruling that the juries could not use such testimony to defeat otherwise uncontradicted testimony that the
whistle was blown; nor to find that the car had jumped the curb
because a defective throttle remained stuck open after a foot hit
it and was removed, even though there was no showing that that
149. See text accompanying notes 154-56 infra.
150. This and related examples are thoroughly examined in Dow,
supra note 134, at 843-49.
151. See Hummel v. New York Cent. R.R., 117 Ind. App. 22, 66 N.E.
2d 901 (1946). Many courts generalize this sort of situation into a rule
that negative testimony to the nonoccurrence of a situation cannot prevail over positive testimony of its occurrence; see Dow, supra note 134,
at 856-58. At a minimum, this approach must rest on compelled acceptance of testimony to the occurrence and should be governed by the
appropriate rules. It frequently goes beyond this minimum to compel
rejection of testimony of the nonoccurrence by witnesses who do not
mean to say that they do not know whether it occurred, on the
ground that they were not consciously attempting to measure the occurrence. See, e.g., Brinks v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry., 398 F.2d 889, 893
(6th Cir. 1968) (one of many train whistle cases). Such decisions are
obviously on thin theoretical ice, although the practical soundness of
the results is generally beyond cavil.
152. See General Motors Corp. v. Muncy, 367 F.2d 493, 498 (5th Cir.
1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1037 (1967).
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car or others like it had ever had a similar experience.
Rulings that testimony which would be sufficient standing
alone cannot be accepted because contrary to physical facts, even
those established by other testimony rather than immutable scientific law, are such familiar examples of considering evidence
unfavorable to the party opposing the motion as to require no
153
more than marginal comment.
Going beyond these clear situations, it seems highly significant that statements can be found in virtually all of the federal
courts of appeals that "all" of the evidence must be considered,
albeit in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion.154 There are, largely because of Wilkerson, contrary statements in some of these courts; 155 in many of the cases, however,
these contrary statements seem to have had as little bearing on
153. One of the most frequent applications of the "physical facts"
rule which does not rest on testimony beyond that of the witness is
found in the common rule that testimony that the witness stopped and
looked, saw there was nothing coming and then immediately got hit
by a train cannot be accepted. See, e.g., Guttierrez v. Union Pac. R.R.,
372 F.2d 121, 122 (10th Cir. 1966); Baltimore & 0. Ry. v. Joseph, 112 F.2d
518 (6th Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 312 U.S. 682 (1941). Properly applied,
the rule includes 'room for a different result when there is some reasonable explanation for failing to see the train; see Wisnewski v. Baltimore &0. Ry., 186 F.2d 538 (3d Cir. 1951).
The same approach is frequently taken when proof of the facts
found to be inconsistent with the witness' testimony is adduced by other
-witnesses. Highly questionable cases in which federal courts have followed such an approach include Carstens Plumbing & Heating Co. v.
Epley, 342 F.2d 830, 835 (8th Cir. 1965); Peters v. Fitzpatrick, 310 F.2d
704 (7th Cir. 1962); O'Connor v. Pennsylvania R.R., 308 F.2d 911 (2d
Cir. 1962). A thoroughly desirable note of caution is sounded in Born v.
Osendorf, 329 F.2d 669, 672 (8th Cir. 1964).
154. Two recent leading opinions examining the question thoroughly
are Simblest v. Maynard, 427 F.2d 1 (2d Cir. 1970), and Boeing Co. v.
Shipman, 411 F.2d 365, 374 (5th Cir. 1969) (en banc). See also Wilkins v.
Hogan, 425 F.2d 1022 (10th Cir. 1970); Hannigan v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.,
410 F.2d 285 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 902 (1969); Schneider v.
Chrysler Motors Corp., 401 F.2d 549, 555 (8th Cir. 1968); Uniform Oil Co.
v. Phillips Petrol Co., 400 F.2d 267, 268 (9th Cir. 1968); State Farm Mut.
Ins. Co. v. Borg, 396 F.2d 740, 742 n.2 (8th Cir. 1968); Ledwin v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 394 F.2d 608, 613 (3d Cir. 1968); Dehydrating
Process Co. v. A. 0. Smith Corp., 292 F.2d 653, 656 & n.6 (lst Cir.),
cert. denied, 368 U.S. 931 (1961); Grooms v. Minute Maid, 267 F.2d 541,
543 (4th Cir. 1959); cf. Smith v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 394 F.2d 254, 256-57
(6th Cir. 1968) (following state law).
155. Opinions in the Seventh Circuit provide a particularly fruitful
source" of contrary statements. See, e.g., Casko v. Elgin, J. & E. Ry.,
361 F.2d 748, 749 (7th Cir. 1966) ("part" of the evidence test-FELA
case); Marmo v. Chicago, R.L & P.R.R., 350 F.2d 236, 238 (7th Cir. 1965)
(same); McKay v. Upson-Walton Co., 317 F.2d 826, 828 (7th Cir. 1963)
("all" the evidence); Lyons v. J.C. Penney Co., 316 F.2d 753 (7th Cir.
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the result as in Wilkerson itself, and in some of them it is transparent that the court then went on to consider all of the evidence. 156
In short, it seems clear that it would be absurd to apply
literally a rule requiring consideration of only the parts of the
evidence favorable to the party opposing a directed verdict motion, that most courts have recognized the logic of considering
parts of the evidence unfavorable to that party, and that nothing
in Wilkerson required a different approach. The foundation for
requiring consideration of all unfavorable evidence which a jury
would be required to credit seems unshakable.
It would be logically possible to go further than the rule here
proposed, and to allow consideration of all of the evidence including the unfavorable evidence which the jury is not required
to believe. Courts following a "new trial" standard for directed
verdicts would of course take such an approach. 157 Even short of
that commodious standard, it would be possible to determine
that at some point jury reliance on a case which would be sufficient standing alone becomes too unreasonable to be tolerated
because the opposing case seems so much stronger, even though
it is not based on such evidence as the jury would have to accept
if the party seeking the directed verdict had the burden of persuasion. 5 8 If the process of defining the limits on jury free1963) ("part" of the evidence-non-FELA case); Byrne v. Shell Oil Co.,

295 F.2d 797 (7th Cir. 1961) (same).

See also Simpson v. Skelly Oil Co.,

371 F.2d 563, 567 (8th Cir. 1967) ("part" of the evidence); Kingston v.
McGrath, 232 F.2d 495 (9th Cir. 1956) (same).

156.

A particularly clear example is Helene Curtis Indus., Inc. v.

Pruitt, 385 F.2d 841 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 913 (1968).

157.

A very strong statement of this position is provided in Blume,

Origin and Development of the Directed Verdict, 48 MIcH. L. Rsv.
555, 576-81 (1950).

158.

Such an approach seems to be suggested in Hyman & New-

Louse, Standards for Preferred Freedoms: Beyond the First, 60 Nw. U.L.
Ri.v. 1, 19 (1965); cf. Jaffe, Judicial Review: Substantial Evidence on the

Whole Record, 64 HARV. L. REV. 1233, 1240, 1245-47 (1951).

The Second

Circuit has recently drawn a sharp line between an approach which per-

mits consideration of all of the evidence, whose appropriateness it
did not determine, and an approach permitting consideration of "uncontradicted, unimpeached" evidence unfavorable to the party opposing
the directed verdict motion as well as the evidence favorable to that
party. Simblest v. Maynard, 427 F.2d 1 (2d Cir. 1970). Needless to
say, federal courts have occasionally decided cases on a basis which
requires that evidence which would be sufficient standing alone be
disregarded because of contrary testimony deemed much more persuasive by the court. See, e.g., Gudgel v. Southern Shippers, Inc., 387
F.2d 723, 726, 727 (7th Cir. 1967); Fore v. Southern Ry., 178 F.2d 349 (4th
Cir. 1949) (a considerably more sympathetic example).
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dom were entirely one of identifying the area of reasonable probability in the midst of uncertainty, this approach should be taken.
Contrary evidence surely bears on the probable veracity of testimony. Nonetheless, this approach seems inappropriate. The effect, whatever the form of statement, is an intrusion on the
credibility function inconsistent with the jury's recognized freedom to reject all testimony which is contradicted directly or by
reasonable inference, and to credit any testimony which is not
preposterous. Whether this freedom is rational depends on all
the unknowns surrounding the jury's credibility function; the
controlling consideration is that the freedom cannot conclusively
be found irrational. On motion for directed verdict, then, the
jury must be accorded the privilege of discrediting all of the evidence opposing the case which, by hypothesis, is sufficient standing by itself. 59 Once this is done, the sufficient case remains
alone and must be submitted to the jury.-IG
c. Miscellany.
Current summary judgment practices are directly blessed
by the rule of mandatory belief defined above. If a jury must
be allowed at trial to utilize a witness' demeanor as the sole basis
for rejecting his testimony, there would be a very strong basis for
arguing that summary judgment may never be granted for a
party who would have the burden of persuasion at trial on the
basis of a showing which would, at trial, take the form of oral
testimony.' 61 There might still be room for responding that the
159. A more obscure way of phrasing the same conclusion would
be that the direct testimony favorable to the party opposing the motion
for directed verdict and favorable inferences drawn from it are, if
sufficient alone to make out a case for the jury, likewise sufficient direct or circumstantial contradiction to obviate any possible requirement
that the evidence favoring the moving party be credited.
160. It goes with only footnote saying that once the evidence to be
considered on the motion has been defined, it must be tested by the gen-

eral interference-minimizing approach.

All of the reasonable infer-

ences favorable to the party who wishes to go to the jury must be assumed, as must be any additional inputs the jury may contribute by way
of general factual knowledge or law application.
161. See Sartor v. Arkansas Natural Gas Corp., 321 U.S. 620, 624
(1944): "[Alt least a summary disposition of issues of damage should
be on evidence which a jury would not be at liberty to disbelieve and
which would require a directed verdict for the moving party." See also
Walpert v. Bart, 280 F. Supp. 1006, 1013 (D. Md. 1967), aff'd, 390 F.2d 877
(4th Cir. 1968); Dale Hilton, Inc. v. Triangle Publications, Inc., 27 F.R.D.
468, 475 (S.DTN.Y. 1961) ("demeanor testimony alone cannot defeat a
motion for a directed verdict," hence cannot defeat a motion for summary judgment).
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general equation of summary judgment standards with directed
verdict standards' 62 is only a first approximation, and that the
seventh amendment allows the gain of "efficient" pretrial disposition to offset loss of the jury determination which would be
required if the same showing were advanced at trial. Although
some courts may at times approach such a response as a matter
of practical application, the difficulties with it are too obvious to
163
require further comment.
Finally, the rule of compelled belief should be set against the
rules which in some fashion deny the right to believe direct testimony or compel that it be disbelieved. In various circumstances,
courts still require that testimony be corroborated before it may
be accepted as sufficient to establish some particular proposition. 6 4 More dramatic illustrations are provided by cases which,
without purporting to follow any generalized rule such as the
corroboration rules or even the principles governing testimony
"contrary to physical fact," determine that direct testimony simply may not be accepted. In some of these cases, the contrary
evidence is very strong, the evidence rejected by the court is very
weak, and there are peculiar dangers of presumably misplaced
jury sympathy. 65 In others, the most that can be guessed is that
the odor of duplicity or self-serving is simply too strong for judicial nostrils. 166 A few of the decisions may be subject to explanation only on the basis of the judicially favored status of one
of the parties. 67 No attempt will be made here to develop an
162.

163.

56.02[10] (2d ed. 1965).
General treatment of the credibility problems resulting from
See 6 J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE

summary judgment motions may be found in 6 Id.

56.15[4]; Asbill &

Snell, Summary Judgment Under the Federal Rules-When an Issue of
Fact Is Presented,51 MICH. L. REV. 1143, 1148-54 (1953); Bauman, A Rationale of Summary Judgment, 33 IND. L.J. 467 (1958); Dow, supra note

134, at 901-04; Note, Summary Judgment Under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 56-A Need for a Clarifying Amendment, 48 IOWA L. REV.
453, 462-63, 468 (1963).
164. See generally 7 J. WIGMORE, EVmECE §§ 2030-75 (3d ed.
1940). An interesting historical vignette is provided by McBratney,
The One Witness Rule in Massachusetts, 2 Am. J. LEGAL His. 155 (1958).
165. See, e.g., Haskins v. Point Towing Co., 421 F.2d 532 (3d Cir.
1970); Fischer Constr. Co. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 420 F.2d 271
(10th Cir. 1969); General Motors Corp. v. Muncy, 367 F.2d 493, 498 (5th
Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1037 (1967).

166. See, e.g., Giblin v. Beeler, 396 F.2d 584, 587-88 (10th Cir.
1968).

167. A possible example of this situation is found in Meeker v.
Rizley, 346 F.2d 521 (10th Cir. 1965). The court notes, id. at 525 n.1, that
the plaintiff testified that the defendant sheriff told plaintiff that he
would shoot him, beat him, keep him in jail and throw the key away

if plaintiff did not register as a criminal for the national census. Af-
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acceptable rationale for this form of judicial control. The cases
first cited provide examples which seem to justify a reserve
power of this nature to ensure reasonable decision; the cases last
cited demonstrate that great care needs to be taken with this,
just as with other, bases for judicial control.
C. INFERENCE

1. Interrelations.
In the actual decisional process, the task of drawing inferences from facts established by direct testimony is inevitably intertwined with the task of determining which direct testimonial
facts to believe. Various parts of the direct testimony may be
credited initially, only to be discredited after comparing their implications with the inferences drawn from other direct testimony
thought to be more credit-worthy. Alternatively, no initial credibility judgments may be made at all, the process being carried on
as a single seamless whole. In either case, the choice between
conflicting items of direct testimony may rest on some factor
bearing directly on credibility or on an estimate of the correspondence of the competing direct or inferred facts with the
jury's concepts of common sense and everyday experiential probabilities.
So too, the tasks of crediting direct testimony and drawing
inferences from it may be intertwined in the decisional process
with the task of law application. In part, this process is entirely
legitimate-the perceived legal implications of some direct or inferential facts may preclude the need for determining the credibility or implications of other portions of the direct testimony.
And in part the process may be the spurious one of matching the
express or implicit fact determinations to the needs of the applicable rules of law. Many would add that the actual decisional
process, particularly in the case of jury decisions, is apt to omit
any such complicated involvements in favor of a more direct determination of who should win, and how much.
For purposes of directed verdicts, much of this complication
can be left behind. As has been established, the principle of
minimum intrusion requires beginning from the assumption that
the jury will believe only the parts of the direct testimony most
firming a directed verdict for the defendants, the court then says in the
body of the opinion that "evidence is lacking to establish that Meeker
was forced by threats of great bodily harm and at gun point to sign the
national census as a criminal in custody." Id. at 527.
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favorable to the party opposing the directed verdict motion, as
well as such other parts of the testimony as they are compelled
to accept. There is some need, of course, to examine possible inferential [circumstantial] contradictions in determining whether
the jury is obliged to accept testimony which is not directly contradicted. And the maximum permissible reaches of legitimate
inference obviously must enter into the determination whether
any particular piece of direct testimony is favorable or unfavorable to the party opposing the motion. Each of these processes,
fortunately, seems subject to the same principles and difficulties
as the overriding problems of inference posed by a directed verdict motion. This conclusion makes it possible to focus discussion
entirely on the nature of the judge's function in determining the
permissible scope of jury inference freedom on the basis of such
direct testimonial facts as must be taken as established for purposes of the directed verdict motion.
2.

Unique Circumstances.

It is commonplace that in large part the problem of defining
the range of reasonable inference is dependent on the unique
circumstances of each particular case. No self-applying rule can
be offered for determining what inferences are reasonable. General statements of the approach to be taken to such problems may
nonetheless be helpful in establishing the mood of judicial control
and in suggesting the possibility of a more helpful method of
analysis. The common form of expression adopted by federal
courts has changed significantly in recent years, in a way which
affords an easy introduction to the problem of inference control,
so the cases will be used as a framework for a more elaborate
statement of the basic difficulty before suggesting a possibly useful way of restating it.
Much of the judicial discussion is, inevitably, centered on application of the civil "preponderance of the evidence" measure of
the burden of persuasion. One common approach to the sufficiency of circumstantial evidence has been to state that a case
must be sufficient to support an "actual belief" in the truth of the
essential propositions.'0 8 A slightly more useful approach was
168.

The "actual belief" standard is discussed, and effectively

criticized, by several authors. See, e.g., Ball, The Moment of Truth:
Probability Theory and Standards of Proof, 14 VAND. L. REv. 807, 818-30
(1961); Cullison, Probability Analysis of Judicial Fact-Finding: A Preliminary Outline of the Subjective Approach, 1 U. TOL. L. REv. 538,
571-76 (1969); Weinstein, Some Difficulties in Devising Rules for De-

termining Truth in JudicialTrials, 66 CoLum. L. Ruv. 223, 230 (1966).
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once common in the federal courts, implicitly recognizing that
decision---"'belief"--must depend on some sort of balance of
competing probabilities but insisting that circumstantial evidence
is not sufficient "where proven facts give equal support to each
of two inconsistent inferences," only one of which would support
the desired jury finding. 69 Currently, federal courts have
shifted away from this approach to an even more nebulous form
of statement, primarily on the ground that judges should not presume to instruct juries on the basis of a determination that, to the
judicial eye, conflicting inferences are equally probable. In this
view, "the very essence" of the jury's function "is to select from
among conflicting inferences and conclusions that which it considers most reasonable." 70 Although courts still occasionally
announce the "equal inferences" rule, it seems clear that the
newer view is more generally adhered to, and that recurring statements of the older view are often belied by the decisions accompanying them 1'7 1 or adopted to cover up some other basis for deci2

sion. 17
Terse statements of the foundations of the newer view of the
jury's function may be found in the observations that courts
simply lack the ability to say whether two or more reasonable
inferences are equal,' 73 or that the very fact that inferences seem
equal to a judge is strong evidence that other reasonable men
74
might rationally regard one as more probable than the other.
A more elaborate statement of the justification would focus on
the reasons for deference to the jury. The process of inference,
after all, is one which must depend not only on the matters in
evidence but also on application to the evidence of general knowledge of life at loose and in the large. Much of the value of the
169. Surely the best-known announcement of this principle must be

Pennsylvania R.R. v. Chamberlain, 288 U.S. 333, 339-40 (1933).
170. Tennant v. Peoria & Pekin Union Ry., 321 U.S. 29, 35 (1944),
quoted in the much weaker factual context of Sentilles v. Inter-Caribbean Shipping Corp., 361 U.S. 107, 110 (1959). Each case is an FELA
decision; the approach adopted by the Court is followed by other courts
in ordinary litigation; see notes 173-75 infra.
171. See, e.g., Calvert v. Katy Taxi, Inc., 413 F.2d 841, 844 (2d
Cir. 1969).
172. Such a case may be Pittman v. West Am. Ins. Co., 299 F.2d
405, 411 (8th Cir. 1962), where it looks very much as if the equal inferences concept was employed in lieu of a determination (whether or not
warranted) that the sole evidence relied upon to avert a directed verdict
was too incredible to be believed.
173. Yeager v. J.R. Christ Co., 364 F.2d 96, 100 (3d Cir. 1966).
174. Wratchford v. S.J. Groves & Sons Co., 405 F.2d 1061, 10G6-67
(4th Cir. 1969).
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jury is thought to lie precisely in bringing such general knowledge to bear on problems with a collective earthy wisdom which
17
a single, often cloistered judge cannot command.
Perversely, the reason for honoring the jury's contribution
to the inference process provides simultaneously the need for imposing the restraint of a more refined, if abstract, judicial second
guess. Jury wisdom is often drawn from pure but unknown
wells; it also is often drawn from wilful disregard of the law,
prejudice, 17 or simple ignorance or superstition. 1 7 7 So, in one
common situation often giving rise to judicial control, it is frequently held that the fact that a patron "slipped and fell" on an
object on a store floor does not, without more, support an inference that the object was placed there by an agent of the store or
was left there so long as to make it unreasonable for the store not
to have discovered it.'78 The notion is that a finding of liability

would not be based on any evidence-although little more evidence may be needed to turn the balance'79-but on some less
worthy consideration.
The difficulties of exercising the power of judicial control in
responding to the inference dilemma may be illustrated by a
few examples left to footnote annotation. 80 It should be ap175. An elegant statement of this principle may be found in Hyman
& Newhouse, Standards for Preferred Freedoms: Beyond the First, 60

Nw. U.L. REv. 1, 13 n.38, 15 (1965).
176.
177.

See also Ball, supra note 168, at 829.

See Weinstein, supra note 168, at 233-35.
See, e.g., Weltmer v. Bishop, 171 Mo. 110, 71 S.W. 167 (1902),

writ dismissed, 191 U.S. 560 (1903), reversing judgment entered on a
jury verdict for defamation of the plaintiff's "magnetic healing" services,
on the ground that the jury simply could not be allowed to reject the
defense that indeed the services were worthless.
178. See, e.g., Joye v. Great Ati. & Pac. Tea Co., 405 F.2d 464 (4th
Cir. 1968).
179. See, e.g., Rumsey v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Corp., 408 F.2d 89
(3d Cir. 1969) (en banc).

180. One of the most easily impugned applications of attempted
judicial control is the rule against drawing an inference from an inference; see F. JAmEs, CIVIL PROCEDURE 276 (1965). Nonetheless, courts occasionally invoke this notion in all seriousness; see, e.g., Crown Cork &
Seal Co. v. Morton Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 417 F.2d 921 (6th Cir. 1969)
(evidence of an unvarying practice to send an order acknowledgment
form might support an inference that one was sent in this case but could
not support the further inference that it was received).
Compelled inferences likewise lead to highly questionable results.
So in Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Schroeder, 414 F.2d 1316 (5th Cir.
1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1058 (1970), the court ruled that a jury could
not conclude that the insured decedent had met an accidental death in
an automobile collision because of evidence that the car had been
driven erratically for half a mile before it left the road. The jury would
have to conclude from the car's behavior, according to the court, that
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parent, even without example, that very little can be said in the
abstract about the best method for determining the strength of
the inferential possibilities, or probabilities, suggested by the evidence in a particular case. There may be some help for juries
in allowing more explicit testimony by experts on general probability methods or on specific probabilities in a particular factual
setting, although even here there are obvious reasons for proceeding with much caution.'' There seems to be little help indeed for a judge confronted with the task of determining whether
the inferences sought to be drawn from the evidence are so improbable as to be forbidden to the jury. This lack of clear controlling standards means that judicial decision in any particular
the driver must have been disabled and that accordingly the cause of
the disability was the cause of the crash. For want of any showing
that the disability was accidentally caused, the jury's verdict and judgment for the plaintiff were reversed.
Recent examples of very close decisions, all requiring judgment notwithstanding a jury verdict to the contrary, include Armstrong v. Commerce Tankers Corp., 423 F.2d 957 (2d Cir. 1970); Ruthig v. Saginaw
Transfer Co., 337 F.2d 393 (7th Cir. 1964); Bruce Lincoln-Mercury, Inc.
v. Universal C.LT. Credit Corp., 325 F.2d 2 (3d Cir. 1963). There seems
to be little need to spread out the details of these or other decisions in an
attempt to point up the difficulty which should be obvious on reading
them. Readers doubtless can supply their own favorite examples in
any event.
181. General treatments of the utility of a probability approach to
decision making include Ball, supra note 168; Cullison, supra note 168;
Finkelstein & Fairley, A Bayesian Approach to Identification Evidence,
83 H.Inv. L. REv. 489 (1970); Kaplan, Decision Theory and the Factfinding
Process,20 Sn . L. REv. 1065 (1968). Perhaps the boldest suggestion is
that of Finkelstein and Fairley that expert testimony be received as to
the application of probability theory in a particular case, based upon a
broad range of hypothetical prior probabilities a jury might derive from
the evidence in the case, as the basis for deriving a further probability
figure on the addition of further (statistical or looser probability) evidence. 83 HARv. L. REv. at 502-09. They conclude that, at a minimum,
jurors forced to make a quantitative estimate of their suspicions will
consider the evidence more carefully and rationally. A somewhat comparable suggestion that jurors may share a general human trait to
underestimate the probable strength of their inferences is advanced in
Kaplan, Decision Theory and Reasonable Doubt, in CozhVuxmcATioNs
ScIENcEs AND THE LAW: REFLEcTIONS FROM mE JuImmncs CoxRMucE

251, 258 (L. Allen & M. Caldwell eds. 1965). It is further suggested that
juries may in some way be made to function more accurately by forcing
a more analytic approach to the decisional task, but that this cannot
be extended to the point of requiring an elaborate probability analysis
of the evidence. Id. at 258-59. See also Broun & Kelly, Playing the
Percentagesand the Law of Evidence, 1970 U. ILL. L.F. 23, 29-32, 45-48;
Cullison, supra note 168; Kingston, The Law of Probabilities and the
Credibility of Witnesses and Evidence, 15 J. For. ScL 18, 22 (1970) (suggesting that psuedo-objective estimates of probability may well cause
more confusion than clarity).
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case involves an inescapably large element of freedom to give effect to various notions of policy and expediency.1 8 2 In part, this
freedom and uncertainty counsel that great care be exercised in
limiting the range of inferences held available to the jury. In
broader part, however, the range of judicial freedom raises the
question whether the desirable degree of uncertainty left open
to jury resolution (or speculation) may depend on the nature of
the uncertainty involved. The proposition offered below is that
in fact juries are allowed to determine uncertainties of much
higher order in some areas than in others, and that this approach
is entirely proper.
3.

General Principles.

Decision between alternatives ordinarily involves a consideration of the expected desirability of each alternative and the
expected losses resulting from a mistaken decision. Few people
would willingly wager one thousand dollars for a ten percent
chance of winning eleven hundred dollars and a ninety percent
chance of losing all. The choice between competing inferences,
and ultimately between competing possible verdicts resolving the
questions of liability in a civil action, is subject to similar analysis. Decision must rest on an evaluation of the degree of uncertainty, the gains from correct decision, and the losses from mistaken decision. Much of this evaluation, however, is at least
formally provided for judge or jury by legal rules for resolving
uncertainty, cast in the form of rules as to the burdens of production and persuasion. If the standard of proof embodied in the
"preponderance of the evidence" requirement applied to most issues is equated, as it often is, 1 8 3 with any probability greater than

fifty percent, there is an implied judgment about the relative
losses resulting from a mistaken verdict for the proponent of the
issue (here identified, for simplicity, as the plaintiff) and from a
mistaken verdict for the defendant. The judgment, simply, is
that a mistaken denial of recovery to a deserving plaintiff is just
as costly as a mistaken imposition of liability on an innocent defendant.18 4 Literal acceptance of this proposition would leave
182.

See Bagalay, supra note 148, at 1062-64; Hyman & Newhouse,

supra note 175, at 15; James, Functions of Judges and Jury in Negligence
Cases, 58 YALE L.J. 667, 674 (1949).
183. See, e.g., Porter v. American Export Lines, Inc., 387 F.2d 409
(3d Cir. 1968).

184. This initial proposition is clearly developed in Ball, supra note
168, at 816-24. The textual discussion below examines the adequacy of
the assumption that in all cases the loss resulting from a mistaken
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the problem of judicial control of jury inferences at the point examined above: every case presents a unique problem, judges
should be wary of undue intrusion on the jury's legitimate contributions to the task, and little more can be said. Short reflection, however, reveals that this description of the operation of
the burden rules, and the concomitant directed verdict functions is inadequate both as a practical description of what actually happens and as a conceptual prescription for what ideally
should happen.
On the plane of description of actual decisional processes, one
of the obvious failings of the determinations implicit in the model
just sketched is that it builds on the premise inherent in most
legal rules that a choice must be made between only two possible
decisions-a "yes" decision in which a determination of liability
is accompanied by an effort to award a full measure of damages
or other relief, or a "no" decision in which a determination of no
liability results in a denial of any relief whatever. Judges as well
as juries, however, often resolve uncertainty in a quite different
way, compromising between a full "yes" or "no" answer by rendering a judgment for partial relief corresponding to an inability
to reconcile an uncertain evaluation of the "facts" with an absolute decision either way. The bets of justice can be hedged just
as other bets. It may very well be argued that this sort of decision making often represents an optimal adjustment to uncertainty, superior to the flat choice required by a legal theory
which superstitiously chooses to ignore the fact that legal administration is incapable of discovering absolute truth. The price
of this approach, however, is that, if honestly followed, it allows
only partial justice in any case short of the very rare one in which
absolute certainty is genuinely justified. Accordingly, it will be
verdict for the plaintiff is equal to the loss resulting from a mistaken
imposition of liability on the defendant If this assumption is accepted, however, there seems to be little need to worry about the decision to decide all evenly balanced cases against the party chosen by the
burden of persuasion rules. As examined in the ensuing textual discussion, it seems unlikely that many cases are really decided on the
basis of a determination that probabilities are precisely equal. When
that is the basis for decision, moreover, the allocation of the burden
often rests on the justifiable notion that governmental sanctions should
not be employed to redistribute private losses unless there is some
affirmative basis for supposing that government justice will not be
injustice. In other cases, allocation of the burden reflects some other
policy justifying the result as a means of encouraging diligent trial
preparation by parties with superior access to proof of handicapping
positions which are legally tolerated but not favored or of otherwise (at
least in desire) improving the litigational process.
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assumed that no general allowance should be made in the formal
rules for the fact of compromise decisions; they are noted only to
show that the formal model is only a formal model.
A more fundamental practical difficulty with the "more
probable than not" approach to the resolution of indecision is
that it suggests the possibility of a precision which is simply unattainable. It may very well be more helpful to juries to tell
them to decide by a balance of the probabilities than by a preponderance of the evidence; 185 it seems wildly unlikely that the
calculus of jury decision can ever lead to a determination that the
probability of liability is 0.50, or 0.51. Instead, instructions on the
burden of proof are designed to assist the jury in reaching a conclusion where they feel that their uncertainty is too high to justify a resolution of the controversy submitted to them. This assistance is in part simply a caution that care should be taken and
in part a reassurance that there is an acceptable general rule for
disposing of cases where reason fails. It is not an assistance
which can narrow the frequently broad range of uncertainty
within which a jury may justifiably find itself unable to reach a
unanimous decision either way. Even more clearly, it is not an
assistance which amounts to an effective control of the actual
level of probability a jury will require as a predicate for a finding
of liability.
Neither of these practical inadequacies of the formal concept
of the burden of persuasion has immediate consequences for directed verdict practices. The failure to take account of compromise may be ignored for the same reason that legal rules may
justifiably seek to preclude compromise. And the difficulties in
describing the balance of decision in close cases are by definition
encountered only in cases which were, initially, properly submitted to the jury under the general rules already outlined.
The conceptual limitations on the adequacy of the formal
model of the burden of persuasion, on the other hand, do have
implications for directed verdict practices. Acceptance of the
equal probability basis for decision rests, as noted, on the assumption that the loss resulting from a mistaken decision for the
party bearing the burden is equal to the loss resulting from a
mistaken decision for the other party. This assumption is unsound. There is no reason to suppose that the importance of the
respective losses is equal, and little reason to suppose that courts
185. See Porter v. American Export Lines, Inc., 387 F.2d 409 (3d
Cir. 1968).
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are incapable of developing rules on some other basis.
Scholars who have examined the difficulties of judicial deci-

sion making in terms of probability theory frequently agree that,
as in other matters, it is appropriate to vary the strength of the
showing required as a basis for action according to the circumstances of the particular situation. 8 0 Stated most baldly, the
proposition is that in some circumstances a plaintiff should be allowed to recover on a showing amounting to less than a preponderance of the evidence because a mistaken denial of recovery is
so disastrous that its possibility overwhelms the stronger probability that the decision is mistakenly imposing liability on the defendant.'8 7 The converse proposition may be true as well, of
course; because it is implicit in the decisions imposing a standard
of proof higher than a simple preponderance of the evidence,
there is less need of justification, but it should be noted that the
same phenomenon may occur when the burden of proof is the
ordinary one.
Juries are notoriously prone to accept a showing based on
less than an equal probability of liability. The position urged
here is that judges likewise take this approach in evaluating the
appropriateness of directing a verdict and that it is proper for
them to do so. Two lines of exemplification will be offered to
support this position. One will proceed by an examination of the
appropriateness of resting decision solely on an apparently accurate probability showing, seeking to establish that the nature
of the uncertainty involved weighs heavily on the acceptable
level of uncertainty. The other will involve a more amorphous
set of examples drawn from a variety of cases, seeking to establish a different range of uncertainties which may also be subject
to unequal thresholds of acceptable probability.
The first illustration in the first series may be borrowed from
a real case. The plaintiff, an employee in an automobile service
center, was badly injured by the explosion of a tubeless tire he
was mounting on a wheel rim. Evidence is available that be186. See, e.g., Cullison, supra note 168, at 570; Kaplan, supra note

181, at 1072-74; Note, Disregardof Scientific Proof by Juries, 41 J. CrvM.

L. & CMnINoLoGY 320, 323 (1950).
187. Cf. Young & Co. v. Shea, 397 F.2d 185, 188 (5th Cir. 1968), cert.
denied, 395 U.S. 920 (1969), where the court ruled that in proceedings for
compensation under the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 901 et seq. (1964), the claimant has the burden
of proving his case but must only prove it by a standard lower than
the preponderance of the evidence. The court admits that it is unable
to "ascribe a legal label" to this sort of burden.
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tween 75 and 80 percent of the tires sold at the center are manufactured by the defendant. If there is no other evidence that the
tire involved in this particular incident was manufactured by the
defendant, should the case be allowed to go to the jury? The
court said it should not.18 8 Very often this approach may be justified on the ground that it should be possible for the parties to
find something beyond the bare statistic, and they should be encouraged to do so.18 9 But suppose there really is nothing more
to be done-the plaintiff can show that he was unconscious after
the accident and that diligent attempts to identify the tire made
since the accident have failed. If there is a temptation to allow
that case to go to the jury, is the temptation as strong if the
plaintiff can show only that he was hit by a taxicab and that the
defendant owns four of the five taxicabs licensed to operate in
the town where the accident occurred? 19 0 Whatever the reaction to these possibilities, what of the case where the defendant
manufactured only 45 percent of the tires?
One range of uncertainty, in short, is that concerning the
identity of the actor involved in the transaction affecting the
plaintiff. The hazards of mistaken identification are so great, resulting in the imposition of liability on a defendant who had no
connection whatever with the incident involved, that courts are
very reluctant indeed to allow jury resolution of uncertainty
even when there is a very persuasive showing that the plaintiff's
requested resolution is indeed more probable than not.
A second range of uncertainty may involve the question
whether an identified actor has done anything which the law
recognizes as the basis for imposing liability. It might be shown,
for instance, that the defendant manufactured all of the tires
sold at the service center; that with all due diligence nothing
could be found out about the reason for the explosion of this particular tire, because the carcass has disappeared; and that on the
100 occasions on which tires of this model, made by this defendant, have exploded, 55 of the explosions resulted from a defect
in the tire and 45 resulted from carelessness of the person mount188.

Guenther v. Armstrong Rubber Co., 406 F.2d 1315, 1318 (3d Cir.

1969). The statement is purest dictum, since the court ruled that there
was other adequate evidence to support a jury submission of the
question.
189. See Ball, supra note 168, at 823.
190. Cf. Smith v. Rapid Transit, Inc., 317 Mass. 469, 58 N.E.2d 754
(1945). A taxicab company is substituted for a bus line to avoid as far
as possible a compensating tendency to resolve uncertainties against a
presumably rich or insured defendant. See text following note 194 infra.
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ing the tire. Most courts would be uncomfortable about allowing such a case to go to a jury; it seems likely that many would
not.
Further down the scale of importance come cases in which
there is a clearly sufficient showing as to the identify of the actor
and a similar showing as to liability-incurring conduct, but uncertainty as to the causal connection between the conduct and the
injury. In one newly famous case, a claimant sought workmen's
compensation benefits on the ground that her husband's death
from cancer was caused by his fall from an ice cream truck. This
claim was supported by expert testimony which the court accepted as establishing a "mathematical likelihood that the employee's death was causally related to his accident." Nonetheless,
it was found insufficient. 19 1 Whether or not most courts would
agree with this particular example, 0 2 it illustrates a category of
uncertainty whose mistaken resolution most would agree is less
serious than the categories just examined.
One final category may be offered. Assessment of damages,
given a sufficient showing of the identity of the defendant, his
wrongful conduct and its causal connection with the plaintiff's
claimed injury, is an area in which courts allow jury determination on the basis of very slender showings. In part this approach is a result of necessity; once the possibility of periodically reviewed serial awards is rejected, for instance, measurement of future damages must often depend on such probability
calculations as life expectancy. 10 3 In part, however, this approach results from a quite explicit determination by the courts
that once the fact of liability is established it is better to err on
the side of mistaken overcompensation than on the side of mis4
taken undercompensation.1
191. King's Case, 352 Mass. 488, 225 N.E.2d 900 (1967). This
case is set out as one problem, in a series which raises many of the
questions suggested in the text, in R. F=D & B. KAPLAN, MATERrALS FOR
A BAsic COURSE IN Crv PRocEDuRE 464-65 (Temp. 2d ed. 1968).
192. As suggested in the text below, one important ground for questioning the result is that workmen's compensation cases should be determined on grounds applicable to insurance problems generally and
may appropriately involve acceptance of a much greater level of uncertainty. See text following note 194 infra.
193. See Ball, supra note 168, at 814. The willingness to accept a
high level of uncertainty is underscored by the common rule that mortality tables may be introduced notwithstanding a showing of the ill
health of the person whose probable life span is in question. See, e.g.,
Kershaw v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 415 F.2d 1009, 1012 (5th Cir. 1969); Kanelos v. Kettler, 406 F.2d 951, 956 n.30 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
194. This proposition is so familiar in so many fields of law that
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The perhaps incomplete ranking of uncertainties just offered
is one way of testing the proposition that courts should allow
jury resolution of greater or smaller levels of uncertainty according to the nature of the consequences resulting from a mistaken decision. Another way of testing the proposition may be
found in examining a few cases for examples of other policies,
attached to particular areas of the law, which may likewise affect
the desirable degree of jury freedom to speculate.
The first example that may be offered is one already explored in Part I. In FELA cases, as there set out, the consequences of a mistaken denial of recovery are grave indeed for the
individual affected. The consequences of a mistaken imposition
of liability, on the other hand, may be comparatively minor, particularly as such mistakes become sufficiently generalized to be
insured against in one way or another. Decisions allowing a
patently broad scope of jury freedom to speculate as to the existence of fault, and its causal connection with the plaintiff's injury,
are thus entirely appropriate. In effect, such decisions admit
that a jury may properly return a verdict for the plaintiff even
though it would not be reasonable to infer a probability of liability as high as 50 percent. The same principle suggests that in
other cases where the defendant has a high ability to spread
losses, or indeed is immediately engaged in the insurance business, a similar degree of jury latitude is appropriate.
At the other end of the spectrum, there may be a variety of
reasons for restricting the permissible scope of jury inference to
limits more narrow than would result from an honest "preponderance of the evidence" approach to the sufficiency of the
evidence to induce reasonable persuasion. Perhaps the broadest
category of justification for such an approach may be found in
areas involving the intentional formation or alteration of legal
relationships in which it is important that people be able to rely
on some degree of stability in their planning. As a single excitation is really unnecessary. The curious, however, may find ample illustration in federal antitrust doctrine, even though the dangers of
undercompensation are substantially mitigated by the provision for
mandatory trebling of the damages found. See, e.g., Ford Motor Co. v.
Webster's Auto Sales, Inc., 361 F.2d 874, 887 (1st Cir. 1966): "Precise
computation of damages can rarely be derived from the complexities of
antitrust litigation. This court has recognized that older standards requiring 'certainty' of damages have given way to 'proof of losses which
border on the speculative, in order to implement the policy of the antitrust laws.'" See generally Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research,
Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 123-24 (1969).
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ample, there may be offered a case in which an insured changed
the beneficiary on his life insurance policy from his former wife
to his paramour. There was ample showing that the insured was
in a state of psychosis and alcoholism leaving him susceptible to
the exertion of undue influence and that the new beneficiary had
excellent opportunity to exert it. Nonetheless, the court ruled
that, absent any direct showing of attempted influence, it was
erroneous to submit the issue to the jury.""' It would be difficult
to say that only an unreasonable jury could infer the exercise of
undue influence; the justification for the ruling seems to lie
rather in the importance of stability in such matters and in the
danger of jury prejudice in choosing between paramour and onetime wife.
Inferential freedom may likewise be narrowed because of the
involvement of judicially favored or disfavored rights. The
strong current favor for free expression, for instance, has led to
an obvious narrowing of the scope of permissible inference in determining whether there has been a showing of the "actual malice" required to support a defamation action brought by a public
figure' 9 6 Judicial disfavor of the defense of contributory negligence, on the other hand, seems the only acceptable justification
for a recent decision refusing to allow a jury to infer, on the basis
of a showing that the deceased driver's blood-alcohol content was
such that he would not be in any condition to drive, that the passengers in the car were guilty of contributory negligence in riding with him.19 7

The foregoing examples have been offered in an attempt to
demonstrate that directed verdict standards are properly framed
to allow or deny jury disposition of inferential uncertainties on
the basis of criteria other than the reasonableness of a determination that the legally required findings are more probable than
not. If this is accepted, the problem of understanding the scope
of jury inference allowed in different cases, and of measuring the
appropriateness of a directed verdict in a particular case, is at
least seen to be different than the problem suggested by a general
195. Lyle v. Bentley, 406 F.2d 325 (5th Cir. 1969).
196. See, e.g., Bon Air Hotel, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 426 F.2d 858 (5th Cir.
1970); Washington Post Co. v. Keogh, 365 F.2d 965 (D.C. Cir. 1966), cert.
denied, 385 U.S. 1011 (1967). In Wasserman v. Time, Inc., 424 F.2d 920
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 940 (1970), two of three judges joined a
concurring opinion suggesting that at trial, the judge must make a
factual determination of the actual malice issue, and may allow the jury
to determine it only if the judge finds that actual malice has been shown.
197. Mittlieder v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 413 F.2d 77 (8th Cir. 1969).
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statement that every case is factually unique and that everything depends on an application of inferential reason to the
unique facts. Judges may nonetheless do well to continue to bury
these considerations under a blanket of just such generalities.
Reticence may be justified in part because litigation continues to
serve a witch-doctor function, and it would lose much of its perhaps dwindling acceptability if it were frankly confessed that ordinarily courts cannot really know what happened once upon a
time and are prepared to act in states of ignorance which vary according to individual circumstances.
A closely related reason for resorting to generalized expression is found in the close relationship between inferential freedom
and freedom to change the law. Some of the examples offered
depend on considerations which are not formally incorporated in
the relevant legal rules. The most poignant way of stating the
resulting dilemma is to observe that some of the reasons for altering the permissible scope of inference depend upon matters
which are formally ruled irrelevant. As a rather fanciful example, a court would clearly rule inadmissible evidence that an
injured FELA plaintiff enjoyed a net worth several times greater
than that of his railroad employer. Preclusion of such evidence
means that a broad scope of inference freedom may be allowed,
and used, in situations where the basic justificaton is absent.1 08
The jury, in short, may be led to act on the basis of the inferred
existence of facts which could be readily disproved if legal
rules recognized their relevance.
However deeply they may be buried, at any rate, the reasons
for allowing broad jury freedom of inference are inextricably entwined with the final problem of jury freedom, that of defining
the situations in which courts may legitimately be swayed by
the desirability of allowing juries to develop or alter the law
formally adhered to by the judges.

D. LAW APPLICATION
It was urged above that the need to ensure proper application of the law provides the primary justification for the institution of judicial control through directed verdicts. Paradoxically,
one of the justifications for limiting the scope of judicial control
is found in the importance of the jury's contributions in applying
or even modifying the law.
198.

This difficulty is explored at length in Cullison, supra note

168, at 582-87.
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Much of the jury's contribution to law application needs no
explication. The law of negligence has long been accepted as the
outstanding illustration of an area in which courts are unable to
formulate detailed rules in advance but must instead rely on a
general standard. Application of this general standard involves
generation of a unique rule, good only for the particular case in
which it is generated. Juries, with their supposed broad fund of
common knowledge of the ways of hypothetical reasonably prudent people, are given a broad freedom to develop this particular one-case rule with the hope that they may do a better job
than the judges can do. 199 Directed verdict practice is shaped
accordingly.
More difficulty is encountered in defending the possibility
that the jury may have something positive to contribute in applying apparently rigid legal rules which take no formal account of
the possibility of individualized adjustment. Ordinarily the
function of law application in such instances is indeed left to the
jury by default because of the problems of communication outlined earlier. The result often may be a failure of justice resulting from a verdict, untouchable by directed verdict or new trial
controls, which rests on failure to understand the law or a failure

even to attempt to understand

2

it. 00

Jury verdicts in disregard of the law, however, may not always involve a failure of justice. Justice of course requires some
approach to equal administration of the law in like cases and a
reasonable level of predictability. But it also requires some approach to an ultimately "fair" disposition of individual controversies. Jury trial is often defended as a contemporary institution on the ground that the application of formally absolute rules
should be attuned to reality by a continuing community control
exercised on a case-by-case basis. Lord Devlin has elegantly described the role the jury may play in this area, as a group which
199. This view of the jury's contribution is not universally shared.
See, e.g., P. DEvmn, TRULL BY JURY 141-43 (rev. ed. 1966) (suggesting that
many "carelessness" cases belong to recurring types, and that judges are
better equipped to dispose of such matters than juries).
200. It is frequently suggested that juries simply cannot understand
the complicated legal instructions often thrust upon them. See, e.g., 5
J. MooRE, supra note 162, 38.02[1], at 15; Farley, Instructions to JuriesTheir Role in the Judicial Process, 42 YALE L.J. 194 (1932); Hunter,
Law in the Jury Room, 2 OHIo ST. L.J. 1 (1935). But see Kalven, The
Dignity of the Civil Jury, 50 V... L. REv. 1055 (1964). Once the case is
submitted to the jury, moreover, there is often nothing to prevent them
from deciding it "on any basis whatever which appeals to their own
minds, tastes, prejudices, or emotions." James, supra note 182, at 680.
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attributes some-but not overriding-importance to the law,
which renders its decision "in a word and without a reason," and
which is thereby able to bring disposition of the particular case
"near to the aequum et bonum ... without injuring the fabric
20 1
of the law."
In civil cases, this sense of the importance of the jury's contribution is apt to run deepest in tort litigation, where there is
often a close affinity to parallel criminal prohibitions and a sig20 2
nificantly lower level of danger to predictability and stability.
Directed verdict practices doubtless do reflect such notions, in
spasmodic and uncertain fashion, by encompassing some allowance for jury tempering of the law.
The factors involved in admitting this sort of flexibility into
the law application process frequently may overlap the factors
explored in the parallel area of inference freedom. More leeway
may be given if the plaintiff is badly injured and in great need, if
the defendant enjoys a capacity for spreading losses which the law
does not take into account, and so on.2 0 3 But there are crucial
differences between jury freedom in applying the law, when such
freedom is not built into the legal rules themselves, and jury
freedom in drawing factual inferences.
One way of approaching the differences is to recall the suggestion that it frequently may be difficult to announce openly
that the permissible scope of jury freedom depends upon the relative gravity of the risk run in acting on a very possibly mistaken
determination. However difficult that may be, surely it must be
that much more difficult to announce that the permissible de201.

P. DEvLiN, supra note 199, at 151-58.

It is suggested that the

very limited availability of jury trial as a matter of right under current

British practice is tailored so that jury trial is available only when the
element of predictability is of little importance.
202. See, e.g., 5 J. MooRE, supra note 162, at 17. Compare L. GREMn,
JUDGE & JURY 122-23 (1930), suggesting that the jury "probably rendered
the most important of its scanty service to legal science in civil cases"

by steadfastly ignoring the law declared by the judges in cases dealing
with liability for work-related injuries. A thorough-going proposal for
reform, founded on notions such as these, is that juries simply be left
free to decide cases "as reasonably just persons acting reasonably," following a trial entirely free of present technical rules of evidence, parties
in interest, and so on. See White, The Reasonably Just Man, 5 HouSTON
L. REv. 575 (1968).
203. Compare Baer, The Relative Roles of Legal Rules and Non-Legal Factors in Accident Litigation,31 N.C.L. REv. 46, 51 (1952): "[T]here
is a distinct inverse relationship between the degree of the injury and the
extent to which a jury applies the substantive law of negligence." See
also Cullison, supra note 168, at 582-87.
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gree of jury freedom depends in part on the extent to which the
court is concerned with preserving the integrity of the particular
legal rules involved, whether initially created by judges or legislatures.204 Any open attempt to evaluate the relative desirability of legal rules so well established that they must be charged to
the jury must encounter obvious difficulties.
The difficulty of open announcement and application is compounded by the more fundamental difficulty that the dangers of
jury lawlessness are here quite unchecked. Jury ignorance and
prejudice may interfere with decisions as to credibility and with
the inferences drawn from the credited testimony, but there is a
modest check in the evidence and the common experience jurors
are supposed to bring to its evaluation. Jury ignorance and
prejudice are left free to run rampant when it becomes a question
of allowing jurors to disregard legal rules whose foundation
they can understand only dimly, if at all. Justice by plebiscite
can be an unredeemably ugly monster.2 0 5 Some slight help may
be found in relaxing the directed verdict standards which would
otherwise apply to allow jury adjustment of the law only in situations where the danger of the more common forms of prejudice are minimized. The dangers are nonetheless great.
Finally, jury departure from the law must remain a spasmodic and uncertain thing. Some juries will, presumably, loyally adhere to the court's instructions to follow the law pronounced by the court. The result may at times accord with the
strength of the individualized factors making it just to depart
from the general law; it may often degenerate into a capriciously
different treatment of cases which should be treated alike. On
a longer range view, moreover, the possibility of relying on jury
justice may operate to retard the emergence of desirable new
legal doctrines which judges would be forced to adopt if they
were not free to throw responsibility for achieving justice over
204. Cf. Law v. Converse, 419 F.2d 38, 42-43 (3d Cir. 1969), upholding
a refusal to allow argument that the jury might properly disregard the
law. The court noted that a realistic acknowledgment that "there are
many elements which creep into a jury's deliberations contrary to the
principles which govern them" does not "justify exalting the jury's
wayward action into a principle of law which is to be expounded to it
in advance of its deliberations.... [T]here can be no justifiable claim
that because the disregard of the rules which bind a jury sometimes expresses a community sense of justice, a party therefore has the right to
declare to a jury that it is its legal function to flout the law and disregard the judge."
205. See, e.g., Broeder, The Functions of the Jury: Facts or Fictions?, 21 U. Cmr. L. REv. 386, 411-13 (1954).
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to the jury.

No attempt will be made here to offer a justification for
exercising varying degrees of control over jury law application
in terms which can be elaborated into any semblance of guiding
standards. The underlying notions seem intractable to more than
the nebulous general observation that directed verdict standards
do in fact vary, at least on occasion, according to varying estimates of the importance of preventing jury tampering with the
legal rules involved. This observation may have some small
utility as a defeatist category for explaining decisions that might
otherwise seem inexplicable. It is of great importance, however, as the final piece of a framework for the immediately ensuing analysis of the problems raised by diversity litigation in the
federal courts.
III. STANDARDS IN DIVERSITY CASES
A.

PRESENT POSrION

No settled answer has yet been given to the question whether
state or federal standards should be used to measure the sufficiency of the evidence for jury consideration in cases brought in
federal courts because of diversity jurisdiction. Clearly, state
law must be looked to for a definition of the matters which must
be proved to establish a claim governed by state law. Equally
clearly, state standards for measuring the sufficiency of the evidence frequently either are the same as federal standards or lead
to the same conclusions in a particular case, notwithstanding differences in abstract statement. Nonetheless, there inevitably
occur cases in which it is clear beyond evasion that a different
result is commanded by state standards than by federal standards.206 Opposite choices between the competing standards have
been made by different courts of appeals, and the Supreme
Court has explicitly avoided making a choice.
206. State standards may vary along any of the dimensions of the
directed verdict problem. State courts may allow generally greater
jury latitude-Alabama, for instance, continues to adhere at least in
statement to the "scintilla" rule; see Huff v. Vulcan Life & Acc. Ins.
Co., 281 Ala. 615, 206 So. 2d 861 (1968); Scott v. Southern Coach & Body
Co., 280 Ala. 670, 197 So. 2d 775 (1967). Likewise, they may allow juries
to reject uncontradicted testimony regardless of the circumstances; see,
e.g., Chisholm v. Hall, 255 N.C. 374, 121 S.E.2d 726 (1961).
On the
other hand, state courts may consider more of the evidence than would
federal courts in determining the reasonableness of a jury verdict; see,
e.g., Pedrick v. Peoria & E.R.R., 37 Ill. 2d 494, 229 N.E.2d 504 (1967)
(containing a lengthy list of various state standards). Federal courts
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Turning first to the Supreme Court's efforts in this area, its
two most recent pronouncements are that the choice between
state and federal standards is a difficult one, which need not be
made to dispose of the particular cases involved.20 7 Only a short
while earlier, to be sure, the Court had announced that its 1940
decision in Stoner v. New York Life Insurance Company2 08 had
established that federal courts should follow state standards of
sufficiency of the evidence "to raise a jury question whether the

state-created right was established,

' 20 9

but the later position is

clearly right in the implied ruling that Stoner did not involve
210
such a determination.
Lack of controlling guidance from the Supreme Court has,
not unpredictably, left the various courts of appeals split not only
occasionally note the clear differences in standards in deciding particular cases. See, e.g., Planters Mfg. Co. v. Protection Mut. Ins. Co., 380
F.2d 869, 878 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 930 (1967). The court's
statement in Plantersof the need for choice is not affected by its subsequent rejection of the position that federal standards found in FELA
cases are equally applicable to diversity cases. See Boeing Co. v. Shipman, 411 F.2d 365, 373 n.9 (5th Cir. 1969), again rejecting reliance on state
standards, this time because they allowed more rather than less jury
freedom.
207. Mercer v. Theriot, 377 U.S. 152, 156 (1964); Dick v. New York
Life Ins. Co., 359 U.S. 437, 444-45 (1959).
208. 311U.S.464 (1940).
209. Byrd v.Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Co-op., 356 U.S. 525, 540 n.15
(1958). Courts of appeal had made similar use of Stoner. See, e.g.,
Lennig v.New York Life Ins. Co., 122 F.2d 871, 872 (3d Cir. 1941).
210. See 5 J.MooRE, supra note 161, 38.10. As a brief statement,
the case involved a federal trial held by the court without a jury, based
on a claim of total disability within the meaning of four insurance policies. In state court suits brought for benefits claimed with respect to
earlier periods, state appellate courts twice had ruled that there was
sufficient evidence to take the claim to a jury, although final jury verdicts had not yet been rendered inany of the state suits. The record in
the federal trial consisted of the actual record of one of the state trials,
plus some additional evidence favorable to the claimant. The trial court
held that the claimant was disabled; the court of appeals reversed, apparently relying primarily on the ground that there was no need to
respect the determinations by intermediate state appellate courts as
to the definition of total disability. In reversing the federal court of
appeals, the Supreme Court spoke clearly only to the point that deference must be given to determinations of state law by state appellate
courts and concluded that apparently the state supreme court would
likewise conclude that a finding of total disability would be supported
by the evidence. No directed verdict question was before the Court; the
issue was approached primarily as one of "law"; there are at least
overtones of a 'law of the case" sort of notion that the litigants
should be bound by prior decisions that there was sufficient evidence to
support a finding of total disability; nothing in the opinion deals with
the problems of jury control in diversity litigation.
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between themselves but also among the decisions in a single circuit over time. Everyone has a pet list assigning the different
courts to the categories of following federal standards, following
state standards or following the lead of the Supreme Court in
refusing to decide on the ground that no difference in result is
prescribed by state or federal standards. 21-' There is no apparent
harm in appending a reasonably current nose-count below, if it is
recognized that the citations could be proliferated and that there
is still ample opportunity for change in the position taken by
many of the courts.212 Examination of the comments annexed
See e.g., 2B W. BARRON & A. HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE &
§§ 871.1 & 1072 (C. Wright ed. 1961); 5 J. MOORE, supra note
162, %1 38.10 & 50.06; Bagalay, Directed Verdicts and the Right to Trial
by Jury in Federal Courts, 42 TEXAs L. REV. 1053, 1057 (1964).
212. In addition to the decisions cited in the authorities noted above,
most of the courts of appeals have provided useful current opinions, as
follows:
Second Circuit: At the time this is written, the most current pronouncement is Simblest v. Maynard, 427 F.2d 1 (1970), noting that the
issue has been bypassed in the court's recent decisions. See also Calvert
v. Katy Taxi, Inc., 413 F.2d 841, 846 (1969), stating that federal courts
have the power to formulate their own standards but that the court has
so far elected to honor state standards.
Third Circuit: For a long while, the Third Circuit produced opinions following state law and other opinions following federal law, often
seeming oblivious to the conflict. See, e.g., Hanley v. Heckler, 380 F.2d
986 (1967) (state law); Walsh v. Miehle-Goss-Dexter, Inc., 378 F.2d 409,
414 (1967) (federal law); Sleek v. J.C. Penney Co., 324 F.2d 467 (1963)
(state law). More recently, the court has noted the question and announced that the cases before it do not require a choice. See, e.g.,
Neville Chem. Co. v. Union Carbide Corp., 422 F.2d 1205, 1211 (1970);
Kridler v. Ford Motor Co., 422 F.2d 1182 (1970); Rumsey v. Great Atl. &
Pac. Tea Co., 408 F.2d 89 (1969) (en banc); Denneny v. Siegel, 407 F.2d
433, 439 (1969) ("our decisions have displayed aberrant tendencies").
Fourth Circuit: Federal law is plainly followed. Wratchford v. S.J.
Groves & Sons Co., 405 F.2d 1061 (1969).
Fifth Circuit: Federal standards control. Boeing Co. v. Shipman,
411 F.2d 365 (1969) (en banc).
Sixth Circuit: Most opinions follow state standards, frequently without mentioning the possibility of some other approach. See, e.g.,
Thompson v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 423 F.2d 1257 (1970); Gilreath v. Southern Ry., 323 F.2d 158, 162 n.4 (1963) (no reason to reexamine the problem
where a peculiar state practice is involved). In Lones v. Detroit, T. &
I.R.R., 398 F.2d 914, 918-19 (1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1063 (1969), however, it is suggested that reexamination of the court's position may be
appropriate when the circumstances of an actual difference between
state and federal standards so require.
Seventh Circuit: This circuit follows federal standards. See, e.g.,
Gudgel v. Southern Shippers, Inc., 387 F.2d 723, 725 (1967).
Eighth Circuit: Eighth Circuit opinions have long followed the
course of avoiding decision on the ground that state and federal standards are similar. See, e.g., Schneider v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 401
F.2d 549, 554-55 (1968); Rochester Civic Theatre, Inc. v. Ramsay, 368
211.
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to the list should support an observation that there is some drift
toward applying federal standards; courts which formerly respected state standards now tend to find that there is no need to
determine the issue, and some courts have entrenched their commitment to the federal standards. A more important observation
is that almost invariably the opinions approach the question as if
it were unitary--either all questions of the sufficiency of the evidence must be resolved by reference to federal standards or all
must be resolved by reference to state standards.
Commentators, for once, seem to be following the same drift
21 3
as the courts. Most opt for application of federal standards..
Discussion, moreover, is again ordinarily cast in the mold of an
assumption that reference should be had to either federal or state
standards for answering all of the different problems of sufficiency.
The position urged here is that federal courts may apF.2d 748, 753 (1966). At times this leads to statements of a federal
standard which would be extremely difficult to recognize as the federal
standard if the court had not so labelled it. See, e.g., Grand Island
Grain Co. v. Roush Mobile Home Sales, Inc., 391 F.2d 35, 41-43 (1968).
N-mth Circuit: The express statements on the issue are that federal
law controls. See, e.g., Safeway Stores v. Fannan, 308 F.2d 94, 97
(1962); Peterson v. Exum, 283 F.2d 499, 502 (1960); Phipps v. N.V. Nederlansche Amerik. Stoomv. Maats., 259 F.2d 143, 145 (1958) (dictum).
Nonetheless, the court frequently decides such questions by referring
solely to state opinions. See, e.g., Union Pac. R.R. v. Hormaechea, 418
F.2d 990 (1969).
Tenth Circuit: Again, the court's express pronouncements are that
federal law controls. See, e.g., Kiner v. Northcutt, 424 F.2d 222, 223
(1970); Weeks v. Latter-Day Saints Hospital, 418 F.2d 1035 (1969); Chicago, R.L & P. Ry. v. Howell, 401 F.2d 752 (1968). And again, opinions
can be found in which the sufficiency of evidence is expressly measured
against the requirements of state opinions. See, e.g., Union Pac. R.R. v.
Lumbert, 401 F.2d 699 (1968).
213. See, e.g., 2B W. BARRON & A. HOLTZoFF, supra note 211, §§ 871.1
& 1072; 5 J. MooRE,

FEDERAL

PRACTICE

1 38.10 & 50.06 (2d ed. 1951, 1966);

Bagalay, supra note 211, at 1054-58; Feldman, The Difference Between
the Pennsylvania and Federal Tests of Sufficiency of Circumstantial
Evidence of Negligence and the Choice of Law in Federal Diversity
Cases, 72 DicK. L. REV. 409, 425-29 (1968); Comment, 15 VILL. L. REv. 193
(1969). Judge Clark quite apparently found the issue difficult, leaning
at first toward the use of state standards and later toward use of federal
standards. Compare Clark, State Law in the Federal Courts: The
Brooding Omnipresence of Erie v. Tompkins, 55 YALE L.J. 267, 289-90
(1946), with Clark, Federal ProceduralReform and States' Rights; To a
More Perfect Union, 40 TEXAS L. REv. 211, 220-21 (1961). A few writers
have urged that state standards should control. See, e.g., S. Moore,
A Century Old Problem: Federal or State Law as Determinative of
a Directed Verdict in a FederalCourt, 4 U. RICH. L. REv. 282 (1970); Morgan, Choice of Law Governing Proof, 58 HARv. L. REV. 153, 171-77 (1944).
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propiately follow their own standards of the sufficiency of evidence to go to the jury with respect to at least most of the problems surrounding jury evaluation of witness credibility. Problems of jury freedom with respect to drawing inferences from the
evidence and applying the law to the facts, however, should almost invariably be referred to state standards. Support for this
position will be sought first in a demonstration that there is no
constitutional command to follow federal standards and then in a
detailed examination of the reasons why the general policies
commanding deference to state law in diversity litigation require
a significant measure of respect for state directed verdict standards. The heart of the position advanced will be the simple
proposition that directed verdict standards are too intimately
bound up with clearly "substantive" state concerns to be ignored.

B. CONSTITUTIONAL FREEDOM
It has occasionally been urged that the problem of choosing
between different directed verdict standards in diversity cases
could be avoided by incorporating the seventh amendment right
to jury trial into the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. 214 If state courts were bound to follow the same standards
as federal courts, there could indeed be no problem of choice.
Several reasons, however, counsel against embracing this solution.
There is, of course, a long history of express refusal to hold
state courts bound by the seventh amendment. 215 Although this
history obviously cannot be relied upon with absolute confidence,
particularly in view of the recent extension to state courts of the
sixth amendment right to trial by jury in criminal prosecutions, 216 it at least suggests that some good reason should be required before intruding a new, and rigidly historical, requirement on the states. Whether or not they are accepted, there are
excellent reasons for doubting the utility of modern civil jury
trial, particularly as to some of the types of cases embraced by
214. See, e.g., Londrigan, Judge or Jury-Who Weighs the Evidence?, 55 ILL. B.J. 732, 740 (1967).

215. Citation of cases is unnecessary. It may be noted, however,
that federal courts have been extremely reluctant to impose even absolute minimum requirements of sufficiency of proof under a more general due process requirement. See, e.g., Wood v. Conneaut Lake Park,
Inc., 386 F.2d 121 (3d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 907 (1968); cf.
Delia v. Court of Common Pleas of Cuyahoga County, 418 F.2d 205 (6th
Cir. 1969).

216. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968).

19711

DIRECTED VERDICTS

the seventh amendment right. The need for experimentation
with alternative forms of trial, free of any need to use a jury or
to wander so far from historical doctrines of substance and procedure as to avoid the historical test, stands as an insurmountable barrier to any honest determination that there are now sufficiently compelling reasons to shackle the states to the accidental
growth pattern of this centuries-old institution.2 1 7
Incorporation, moreover, would resolve the dilemma of
choosing between state and federal standards only if it were concluded that the seventh amendment commands the standards
presently followed by the federal courts. It was shown above - s
that any conclusion that current federal standards are so blessed
by constitutional commandment cannot rest in history, but must
rest in the proud confidence of truth newly discovered. Little
more can be safely drawn from the constitution than the general
principle that judicial intrusion must not go so far as to negative
the essential functions of the jury. Judicial hesitancy and confusion as to the nature of the federal standard might thus suggest that the fashionable pronouncements of the moment should
not be foisted off on the states. More important, however, are
the positive reasons for honoring state court determinations of
the division between judge and jury. Since these reasons are of
vital importance in directly examining the choice problem, they
will be postponed to that discussion. For the moment, it is
enough to note that there is simply no reason adequate to bind
state courts to a uniform federal constitutional measure of the
sufficiency of evidence for jury determination.
An alternative constitutional route might also be found to
lead to the conclusion that federal courts must follow federal directed verdict standards. Patently, the seventh amendment applies to all trials in federal courts, whether the basis for jurisdiction is diversity or something else.2 1 9 Several commentators
217. A related ground for worry might be that incorporation would
lead to dilution of the federal right in order to allow some measure of
freedom to state courts. Compare Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 118,
129-33 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
This concern is likely to trouble only those few hardy souls who can
sincerely believe that every detail of present federal jury practice is
essential to preserve an effective lay contribution to the administration
of civil justice.
218. See text accompanying notes 43-76 supra.
219. Simler v. Conner, 372 U.S. 221 (1963); Atlantic & Gulf Stevedores, Inc. v. Ellerman Lines, Ltd., 369 U.S. 355 (1962); cf. Herron v.
Southern Pac. Co., 283 U.S. 91 (1931), discussed at text accompanying
notes 257-62 infra.
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have urged that, given the application of the seventh amendment, its directed verdict standards must follow. 2 20 Here again,
the response is two-fold: the seventh amendment should not be
found to embrace standards which control particular choices
within any probable range of choice between current federal and
state standards; 221 and affirmative reasons for following state
standards in some areas ought to be weighed carefully. A brief
statement of the principles which should govern the choice of
state or federal law in diversity litigation should suffice to pave
the way for an examination of these affirmative reasons for
deference.
C.

SUGGESTED APPROACH

1. Erie Restated.
Since the decision in Erie v. Tompkins 222 has meant different things to different people, it is wise to preface any discussion of its application to a particular set of problems with a statement of the underlying assumptions employed.
The most fundamental concept underlying the requirement
of deference to state law in diversity litigation is that the existence of "two or more inconsistent sets of directions, without
means of resolving the inconsistencies, '2 23 applicable to the
same ongoing, nonlitigative primary conduct according to the
often unpredictable accident of diversity jurisdiction, is "hostile
to the reign of law. 2 -24 The very concept of law requires that
there be a single controlling source of authoritative rules. This
purpose, however, could be served by holding state courts bound
to honor the rules announced by federal courts in deciding diversity cases. 225 Erie thus rests as well on the premise that diversity
220. Judge Parker has provided the strongest statement: Parker,
Erie v. Tompkins in Retrospect: An Analysis of its Proper Area and

Limits, 35 A.B.A.J. 19, 84-85 (1949). See also Feldman, supra note 213,
at 425-29. Cf. Whicher, The Erie Doctrine and the Seventh Amendment: A Suggested Resolution of Their Conflict, 37 TEXAS L. REV. 549
(1959).

221. See, e.g., Note, State or Federal Standard of Sufficiency of the
Evidence to Go to the Jury, 29 MD. L. REV. 260, 273-75 (1969).
222. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
223. H.M. Hart, The Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54
COLUM. L. REv. 489 (1954). See also id. at 505-06.
224. Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 112 (1945).
225. Compare Kurland, Mr. Justice Frankfurter, the Supreme
Court and the Erie Doctrine in Diversity Cases, 67 YALE L.J. 187, 188-204
(1957); cf. Note, Federal Common Law and Article III: A Jurisdictional Approach to Erie, 74 YALE L.J. 325 (1964). It is occasionally sug-
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jurisdiction was not meant to confer such power on the federal
courts. This conclusion seems to follow easily enough 6s to areas
of activity which would be beyond the legislative power of Congress, if indeed there are any such areas. 220 Even as to areas
which are subject to regulation if Congress should act, howeverand Erie itself surely involved such an area-this conclusion is
supported by a judgment that delegation of power in our federal
system to the federal legislative branch does not automatically
entail a corresponding delegation of power to the judicial branch,
particularly if the power is assumed only according to the hap22 7
hazard needs of diversity litigation.
Preservation of state power to formulate rules governing
primary conduct does not end with the prescriptive content of the
state rules. Remedial doctrines may be inseparably bound up
with the primary rules in a wide variety of ways. Adoption of a
treble-damages sanction, for instance, may be obviously designed
to control primary conduct directly. Definition of the primary
rules themselves, moreover, may be affected by the remedial
choices made in formulating them-broadly general concepts
gested that the federal courts were intended to use diversity jurisdiction to develop a uniform body of national law. See, e.g., Ahrens, Erie
v. Tompkins-The Not So Common Law, 1 WAsHBURN L.J. 343 (1961).
226. Judge Friendly offers as an example a rule abolishing charitable immunity; Friendly, In Praise of Erie-and of the New Federal
Common Law, 39 N.Y.U.L. REv. 382, 394-95 (1964). Although it may
be that Congress could not abolish the particular defense of charitable
immunity without undertaking some broader regulation of tort law or
charitable activities, it seems most unlikely that adroit use of the commerce power and the power to prescribe eligibility for federal tax
benefits could not accomplish this result as part of a broader scheme.
Perhaps a regulation prescribing the height at which all residential
lawns must be mowed would defy efforts to define a sufficient source of
federal power.
227. This judgment may be supported not only by abstract principles of federalism but also by interpreting the Rules of Decision Act, 28
U.S.C. § 1652 (1964), as demonstrating a congressional judgment that
its powers should not be shared with the judiciary. The strength of
this position is aptly appraised in Friendly, supra note 226, at 388-91.
Other clear statements of the divergence between judicial and congressional power may be found in, e.g., Hill, The Erie Doctrine and the
Constitution, 53 Nw. U.L. REv. 427, 439-43 (1958); Quigley, Congressional
Repair of the Erie Derailment, 60 MIcH. L. REv. 1031, 1059 (1962). One
response has been to suggest that it may be appropriate for Congress to
delegate basically common-law decisional powers to federal courts with
respect to particular areas, following the model created by section 301
of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1964). See
J.S. Wright, The Federal Courts and the Nature and Quality of State
Law, 13 WAYNE L. REv. 317 (1967). Such delegation would not depend on
diversity jurisdiction, and would lead to judicially developed rules
binding on state as well as federal courts.
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might be incorporated in a statute entrusted to an administrative
agency for initial enforcement when quite different standards
would be adopted if courts were to be original enforcing agencies,
and so on. In many instances it may be difficult to discern the
connections between remedial and primary doctrines so obvious
in these examples. The possibility of interdependence is nonetheless sufficiently important to justify respect for the state
way of doing things until some countervailing federal interest is
228
made out.

The source of the countervailing interest which allows federal courts to follow their own devices and desires in some aspects of diversity litigation must be found in the assumption that
there is some purpose in continuing the statutory grant of diversity jurisdiction. Whether the purpose is found in vague concern that outstate litigants should be protected against the reality or fear of prejudice in local tribunals or in an earthier concern
that outstaters should not be subjected to the occasionally deplorable inadequacies of state procedure, it leads to a conclusion that
federal courts should be able to afford better justice free of abject servility to state procedure. Given this premise, it is also fair
to assume that there is some room for implementing a desire that
federal courts should be able to function effectively, under their
own concept of sound procedure and without the confusing need
to mingle state and federal procedures. 229 Together, these considerations make it clear that federal courts should not be hamstrung by a fear that they may reach different results than
would state courts or that their different methods of doing things
may cause litigants to "shop" for a federal forum. Quite the con228. With sufficient charity , it may be possible to read this series

of concepts into the Supreme Court's latest pronouncement that the
policy of Erie, so far as it affects areas not involved with the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure, is to avoid "inequitable administration of the
laws." Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 468 (1965). The other announced policy, the need to discourage "forum-shopping," is considered
at text accompanying note 230 infra.
229. The pithiest statement of this principle is that "[t]he federal

system is an independent system for administering justice to litigants
who properly invoke its jurisdiction," and may properly consider its
own interests in doing things in its own ways. Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural
Elec. Co-op., 356 U.S. 525, 537 (1958). It seems quite probable that this

concern is carried too far in the broad statements in Hanna v. Plumer,
380 U.S. 460, 469-74 (1965), requiring application of any Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure regardless of the intrusion on state interests, unless

the intrusion is so great as to invalidate the rule for all litigation in
the federal courts. See, e.g., McCoid, Hanna v. Plumer: The Erie
Doctrine Changes Shape, 51 VA. L. Rzv. 884 (1965).
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trary, federal courts may properly seek to achieve a better outcome in cases within the diversity jurisdiction and thereby encourage litigants to resort to them. 230
2. General Choice.
The difficulty with choosing between state and federal directed verdict standards is that both sides of the Erie policy are
involved. State rules may be strongly bound up with primary
state rules; federal courts may claim a strong interest in affording sound justice by controlling possibly wayward local juries.
The significance of differing state standards of jury control
may be approached initially in the general terms used earlier in
approaching directed verdict problems at large. A state rule
which reflects a greater degree of jury freedom than would be allowed by federal courts carries with it a determination that formal rules of state law are not as important in comparison to the
possibility of more individualized justice as the federal courts
would determine under their general standards. Conversely, a
state rule which accords the jury less freedom carries with it a
desire that the jury be held more closely to the formal legal rules.
The very substance of state primary rules may be formulated in
reliance on the degree of jury freedom allowed in state proceedings. Ordinarily it will prove impossible to determine whether
any particular state rule has been thus affected by the state
courts' directed verdict rules; the state courts and legislatures
themselves develop rules against the general background of their
overall procedure, and presumably seldom consider such matters
explicitly. Without more, this impossibility would counsel that
federal courts treat state directed verdict standards as "bound
up" with all state primary rules and adopt the state standards in
toto.2 31
Unfortunately, there is more to the problem. In Byrd v.
2 32
Blue Ridge Rural Electrical Cooperative,
the Court made it
clear that even in diversity cases federal courts may assert an
affirmative interest in preserving their own customary division
of functions between judge and jury. The Court's decision went
only to the question whether a particular issue should be deter230. This point has been made well and often. See, e.g., Degnan,
The Law of FederalEvidence Reform, 76 HARV.L. REm. 275, 290 (1962);
H.M. Hart, supranote 223, at 512; Hill, supra note 227, at 454.
231. A clear statement of this principle is Morgan, supra note 213, at
171-77.
232. 356 U.S. 525 (1958).
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mined by judge or jury, assuming the presence of sufficient evidence to avoid a directed verdict if the issue were triable to the
jury. And the choice to follow the federal division of functions
was based on the assumption that the state division was in no
way "bound up" with the primary state rules. Nonetheless, it is
clear that the federal courts find a similar independent interest
in following federal standards for dividing judge and jury functions by means of directed verdicts. 233 Accordingly, some balance
must be found between the competing interests.
Returning to the general statement of state interests, it is
extremely difficult to conjure up a situation in which disregard
of state directed verdict standards would interfere with private
planning of primary activity, legitimately or otherwise. 234 The
general state interest in controlling jury freedom, however, does
extend beyond the general interest in maintaining the purity-or
prostitution-of state legal rules. Directed verdict standards
may additionally be adopted with a more or less deliberate intent
to benefit identifiable classes of litigants. 23 5r Just as federal
standards are binding on state courts entertaining FELA litigation, 236 for obvious reasons, so comparable state rules may reflect comparable state concerns. Less clear, but no less definite,
ideas of the just scope of social attempts to redistribute private
losses are involved as well. Preserving state law against legislative intrusion by federal courts is thus highly important, even if
not of demonstrably constitutional dimensions.
When federal practice would result in allowing a jury to determine issues which would be controlled by a state court, the intrusion on these state interests might be softened by the substitute control powers of a federal judge to comment on the weight
of the evidence and credibility of witnesses, and to grant a new
trial. 23 7 Comment, however, does not always control, even if it
is made; new trials are not always granted; and the burden of a
new trial-which may or may not lead to a different verdictis not inconsiderable. And such substitute controls are of no help
whatever when state practice would allow jury determination of
233. See, e.g., Boeing Co. v. Shipman, 411 F.2d 365, 369-70 (5th
Cir. 1969) (en banc); Wratchford v. S. J. Groves & Sons Co., 405 F.2d
1061, 1065-66 (4th Cir. 1969).
234. Id. at 1065.
235. See, e.g., Hill, supra note 227, at 541, 576-77.
236. See, e.g., Brady v. Southern Ry., 320 U.S. 476, 479 (1943); Bailey
v. Central Vt. Ry., 319 U.S. 350 (1943).
237. See Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Co-op., 356 U.S. 525, 540
(1958).
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a matter a federal court proposes to decide finally by directed
verdict.
The supposed federal interest against upsetting the ordinary
relationships between judge and jury in federal courts, moreover,
is hardly of vital importance if viewed simply as a matter of procedural convenience and uniformity. Measurable differences between state and federal standards are apt to occur in only a small
minority of diversity cases. When the state standard is in fact
identifiably different, there should ordinarily be little difficulty
in discovering the difference. The question will almost always be
one of applying the standards of the state in which the federal
court sits, moreover, so the possible initial difficulties should be
mastered in short order. Finally, directed verdict standards are
so little implicated with the integrity of the body of federal procedure that they are not even mentioned in the Federal Rules of
238
Civil Procedure.
More profound justification for following federal standards
may be found in the purposes of diversity jurisdiction to avoid
local unfairness. Federal court juries are local juries, perhaps
drawn from a less parochial area than many state juries, but still
subject to the dangers of prejudice and unfairness which may be
thought to justify the diversity jurisdiction.2 3 Control of such
prejudices through directed verdicts, rather than the less effective new trial device, properly represents a significant justifica2 40
tion for looking to the federal standards.
If these competing interests must be balanced in the abstraction of the general concepts just explored, the choice must seem
difficult and largely a matter of taste. Some general guidance
might be found in the decisions which establish that state rules
2 41 It
as to burden of proof and presumptions must be followed.
238. Since Rule 50 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides
only for the procedure by which motions must be made for directed
verdicts and for judgments notwithstanding the verdict, it is clear that
the mandate of Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965), that controlling
effect must be given to any applicable Federal Rule, does not affect
the present problem.
239. See Note, The Choice Between State and Federal Court in
Diversity Cases in Virginia, 51 VA. L. REv. 178, 180-84 (1965); compare
Summers, Analysis of Factors that Influence Choice of Forum in Diversity Cases, 47 IowA L. REv. 933 (1962).
240. See Note, Diversity Jurisdiction: State Policy and the Independent FederalForum, 39 IND. L.J. 582, 601-05 (1964); compare Parker,
Dual Sovereignty and the Federal Courts, 51 Nw. U.L. Rsv. 407, 409
(1956).
241. Dick v. New York Life Ins. Co., 359 U.S. 437, 446 (1959);
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is no mere coincidence that the competing interests in these areas
can be described in approximately the same terms as those used
above. Burden of production rules are enforced by directed verdict if the burden is not carried. Burden of persuasion rules
identify the party who must lose when the proof is too uncertain
to admit of reasonable resolution either way. Presumptions operate in the same ways. All control the fact finding functions
of juries. All are frequently designed to serve purposes other
than disposition of the immediate factual problem before the
court. There is thus a persuasive argument that state directed
verdict standards are at least as much implicated with the
broader state lawmaking function as the burdens of proof and
2 42
presumptions and should likewise be honored.
Fortunately, the choice between state and federal directed
verdict standards need not be left to expression in such broad
terms. Particularized exploration in terms of the categories of
credibility, inference and law application examined above should
serve both to reduce the task to more manageable proportions and
to suggest that the balance need not always be struck in the same
way. The examples offered below should also help to give concrete meaning to the importance of the choice.
3.

Specific Problems.
a. Credibility.

Federal courts generally should be able to follow their own
rules for controlling jury evaluations of credibility. Such rules
are as closely allied to the federal interest in achieving a fair disposition of litigation, potentially superior to the outcome which
might be reached under state rules, as any other aspects of diPalmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109, 117 (1943); Cities Serv. Oil Co. v. Dunlap, 308 U.S. 208, 212 (1939).
242. See, e.g., 5 J. MOORE, supra note 213,

50.06, at 2350 (limiting

the analogy to inference problems); Gorrell & Weed, Erie Railroad: Ten
Years After, 9 OHIO ST. L.J. 276, 281-83 (1948). The obvious dangers of
intruding on state practices, and the intimate relation to directed verdict problems, may be underscored by reflecting on the probable results
of the occasional suggestion that federal courts, freed from state di-

rected verdict practices, should likewise be free to ignore state res ipsa
loquitur doctrines. See Helene Curtis Indus., Inc. v. Pruitt, 385 F.2d
841, 853-54 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 913 (1968).
It is clear that the Supreme Court is not prepared to be overwhelmed by the analogy to burden of proof rules and presumptions. In
Dick v. New York Life Ins. Co., 359 U.S. 437 (1959), it simultaneously
announced that state presumptions must be followed and that there
was no need to determine whether state directed verdict practices must
likewise be followed.
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rected verdict practice. They may, further, be designed to fit the
capacities of federal court juries2 43 and to jibe with the surrounding devices of jury control through rules of evidence and judicial
comment on the evidence. Such rules, finally, are apt to be developed as general guides cutting across most varieties of litigation and accordingly are apt to be free from intimate involvement
with any particular primary state rules. A recognizable federal
interest and weak state interest thus suggest use of the federal
rule. If in some particular situation a state credibility rule appears to be tailored as a limitation upon, or facilitation of, a particular state right or remedy, on the other hand, the state rule
might be followed.
Although the cases are far from uniform, they at least suggest
the proposed pattern. 244 In terms of the problems discussed
above, it has been squarely held that a diversity court may require
a jury to credit uncontradicted testimony notwithstanding a contrary state rule 245 and similarly may direct a verdict for a party
with the burden of proof despite a contrary state practice."a So
too, it has been said that a federal court need not honor a state
rule that "negative" testimony cannot be considered in the face of
247
positive testimony.
Dictum in another case illustrates well the need to avoid a flat
rule even in this area. Texas follows a "discovered peril" rule in
negligence cases and has a rule that a jury is not bound by a defendant's statement as to when he discovered the danger and his
243. See Morgan, supra note 213, at 171; cf. Degnan, supra note
230, at 296.
244. See generally 5 J. Moors, supra note 213, 50.06, at 2350, suggesting that federal rules should control credibility determinations, while
inference problems might be left to state law.
245. Gatenby v. Altoona Av. Corp., 407 F.2d 443, 445 (3d Cir. 1968,
1969). The decision of the same court applying state rules as to belief of uncontradicted testimony in Hanley v. Heckler, 380 F.2d 986 (3d
Cir. 1967), led to a result comparable to that which should be reached
under federal law and did not expressly consider the matter.
246. Davis Frozen Foods, Inc. v. Norfolk So. Ry., 204 F.2d 839, 842
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 824 (1953).
247. Pass v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 242 F.2d 914, 919 (5th Cir.
1957). But see Dixie Ohio Express Co. v. Poston, 170 F.2d 446, 450-51
(5th Cir. 1948), apparently relying in part on the same state statute.
Roanoke City Mills, Inc. v. Whelchel, 208 F.2d 66 (5th Cir. 1953) follows
a silly state rule that a party is bound by the most unfavorable version
of his own testimony; yet in Employer's Liability Assur. Corp. v. Thomassie, 293 F.2d 110, 112 (5th Cir. 1961), a nonjury case, the same court had
the grace to rule that state cases relating to the quality and credibility
of proof are irrelevant, since "this is a matter which is governed by
federal law." See also Abernathy v. Southern Pac. Co., 426 F.2d 512,
514 (5th Cir. 1970).
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efforts to avert it. Surely it is right for a federal court to say that
this is the sort of state rule which, even though it goes only to the

question of credibility, is so obviously bound up with the state pri248
mary rule that it should be followed in federal courts.
b. Inference.
State rules controlling the inference function should be followed whenever they differ from the corresponding federal rules.
The federal interest in following the federal rules seems substantially the same as the federal interest in following the federal
credibility rules. The state interest in adherence to peculiar state
inference rules, however, is more than enough to overcome this
federal interest.
State rules defining the permissible scope of jury inference
are much more likely to be associated with specific doctrines of
primary law than are credibility rulings. This association is often
so close that the inference rule is in fact part of the substantive
rules; 249 the permissive inference doctrines ordinarily subsumed
under the res ipsa loquitur label, for instance, are surely intricately involved with general negligence rules. Even when it can
be said confidently that the inference rules are independent of the
conceptual content of the primary rules, they can affect the primary rules vitally. It was shown above that decisions as to the desirable scope of inferential freedom are inescapably affected by an
assessment of the competing dangers of mistaken decisions either
way. Such assessments by state courts, in the context of state
law, represent an evaluation of the interests affected by the primary rules, and more particularly by judicial application of the
primary rules, which is as important as the primary rules themselves. On a more practical level, in addition, it has already been
noted that the degree of administrative control over application of
the primary rules resulting from state inference rules may figure
importantly in development of the primary rules.
State inference rules may also be developed in more general
terms, without any specific association with particular primary
248. Abernathy v. Southern Pac. Co., 426 F.2d 512, 514 (5th Cir.
1970). The statement is dictum because there was evidence contrary to
the testimony relied upon by the defendant.
249. Cf. Evans v. S. J. Groves & Sons Co., 315 F.2d 335, 342 n.2
(2d Cir. 1963). The court applied state law on the sufficiency of evidence of vehicular skidding as evidence of negligence, without deciding
whether state law must be followed, noting that the state law could be

regarded either as one relating to the distribution of power between
judge and jury or "as a substantive rule."
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rules. The most likely instance of divergence between state and
federal practice is found when states continue to adhere to some
version of the rule that a jury should not be allowed to choose between "equal probabilities." 2 50 While the state interest in such
rules is not as great as in situations where there is a more immediate relationship to a specific primary rule, the arguments just
applied to the specific inference rules apply here as well, albeit in
diluted form.
Judicial pronouncements afford reasonable support for reliance on state inference rules, although the generally confusing
and contradictory nature of statements in this area prevents any
firm reliance on the attractive ones. Several decisions can be
found relying explicitly on general state inference rules, 2 11 even
in courts which generally proclaim a policy of applying federal directed verdict standards.2 52 One example should suffice to illustrate the purpose of honoring more specific state rules as well.
Several states adhere to a version of the "incontrovertible physical
facts" doctrine which requires a finding of contributory negligence despite testimony by the driver of an automobile that he
stopped, looked, saw nothing and drove across the empty tracks
only to be hit by a train. Employing such a state rule may be
justified, without regard to what the federal rule might be
thought to be (it is probably the same), on the ground adopted by
one court: "The. . .doctrine, sometimes referred to as a rule of
evidence, is in reality decisional law.., which affects the sub2 13
stantive rights of the parties.1

An especially attractive illustration of the pull toward state
standards may be offered as a final argument. North Carolina allows a plaintiff who has been nonsuited because of a deficiency of
evidence to commence suit again. When confronted with a second suit brought on the same proof as had been expressly held inadequate by a state court, can there be any doubt that a diversity
court should adopt the state ruling?2 54 The same problem may be
250. Examinations of such divergences between state and federal
law may be found in, e.g., Feldman, supra note 213; Note, supra note 221.
251. E.g., Vlases v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 377 F.2d 846, 851-52
(3d Cir. 1967); Sheptur v. Procter & Gamble Distrib. Co., 261 F.2d 221,
224 (6th Cir. 1958), cert denied, 359 U.S. 1003 (1959).
252. E.g., Wilkins v. Hogan, 425 F.2d 1022, 1025 (10th Cir. 1970);
Union Pac. R.R. v. Lumbert, 401 F.2d 699 (10th Cir. 1968). For general pronouncements by this court, see note 212 supra.
253. Bastian v. Baltimore & 0. Ry., 144 F.2d 120, 124 (3d Cir. 1944).

254. The Fourth Circuit followed state law without hesitation.

Carroll v. Seaboard Air Line IR., 371 F.2d 903 (4th Cir. 1967); see also
Hunt v. Bradshaw, 251 F.2d 103, 109 (4th Cir. 1958).
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presented elsewhere, in less glaring form, whenever simultaneous
litigation in state and federal courts arising out of the same transaction results in substantially identical records. 25 5 Divergent rulings really present the same problems as a unique federal litigation, but the embarrassment of the clear challenge to state law underscores the wisdom of adhering to state standards across the
board.
As always, questions of inference control are allied with questions of law application. The proposition that state inference
standards should be honored because of their effects on the development of state primary law is thus also implicated with, and
supported by, the discussion of control over jury law application.
c.

Law Application.

State directed verdict standards which affect the scope of jury
freedom in applying the law seem so obviously a part of state primary rules as to require no discussion. A state court may "purposely create a rule of law which it expects to be modified by jury
action; ' 25 6 outmoded rules may be retained far beyond any useful
life for similar reasons. The state determination that jury justice
may be better than judge justice would be completely thwarted if
the formal rule were applied without regard to the anticipated
jury freedom.
The clearest illustration of this principle is perversely found
in a case which may deny it. In Herron v. Southern Pacific Company,257 the Supreme Court came to grips with a provision in the
Arizona State Constitution requiring that in all cases the defense
of contributory negligence be left to the jury. In those pre-Erie
days, the Court ruled that a federal diversity court could apply its
own standards to direct a verdict for the defendant without regard
to the state rule. The state rule was found to be too importantly
related to the right to jury control to be regarded as a mere rule of
procedure, which would be referred to the state practice by the
Conformity Act.25 8 The Rules of Decision Act 259 was likewise
found inapplicable, without any clearer statement than that the
appropriate performance of the characteristic functions of a federal trial judge could not be altered by state law. Nothing what255. See Comment, 39 IowA L.REv. 362 (1954).
256. Note, State Trial Procedure and the Federal Courts: Evidence,
Juries,and Directed Verdicts Under the Erie Doctrine, 66 HAV. L. REV.
1516, 1521 (1953).
257. 283 U.S. 91 (1931).

258. Act of June 1,1872, ch. 255, § 5.
259. Now 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1964).
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ever was said about the fact that the state procedure was plainly a
modification of the formally announced rules of negligence law.
Neither was anything said expressly resting decision on any supposed requirement of the seventh amendment.
Since Erie, it might be thought that there could be no question as to the demise of Herron. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court
has cited it with apparent approval.2 00 And at least two courts of
appeals have expressly refused to follow identicial state rules, relying on the seventh amendment " or a more general notion that
federal courts should apply their own directed verdict standards.26 2 These decisions are plainly wrong. Whatever vague
notions might otherwise be found in the seventh amendment to
require judicial control of jury law application must be founded
primarily in concern for maintaining the purity of the legal rules
involved. When the authoritative source of those rules has
chosen to delegate some part of the lawmaking function to a jury,
returning in a particular area closer to the lawmaking freedom
juries were often allowed in 1791, there is neither historical nor
theoretical justification for imposing a different federal concept.
Similar principles are involved, although in a less dramatic
way, in other areas. State decisions involving the degree of control a judge should attempt to exercise over a jury's measurement
of relative degrees of negligence under a comparative negligence
statute, for instance, are so plainly bound up with the statute as
to require implicit federal obedience.2 0 3 Other examples surely
exist as well.
Converse problems may also occur, in areas where it is clear
that state courts impose tighter reins on jury lawmaking freedom
than would federal courts. Although one suspicious writer has
labeled some of these state rules "false substantive doctrine" deliberately designed to avoid the right to jury trial,2-0 4 the reasons
for honoring a clear state rule, once it is understood, are the same
as before.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The seventh amendment commands federal judges to accord
260. Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Co-op., 356 U.S. 525, 538, 540
n.15 (1958).
261. Diederich v. American News Co., 128 F.2d 144 (10th Cir. 1942).
262. Badger v. Louisville & N.R.R., 414 F.2d 880, 883 (5th Cir. 1969).
263. Compare Brunner v. Minneapolis, St. P. & S.S.MKR.R., 240 F.2d
608, 611-12 (7th Cir. 1957).
264. Green, Protection of Jury Trial in Diversity Cases Against
State Invasions, 35 Tsxms L. REv. 768, 771 (1957).
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respectful freedom to jury deliberations. It does not sanctify any
particular linguistic formulation of the standards elaborating its
basic command. It does not even prescribe mandatory answers to
the relatively restricted range of control questions susceptible of
categorical answer. Federal courts may legitimately accord
greater factfinding and law applying freedom to juries in some
areas than in others, depending on the strength of the desire to
keep pure the legal rules involved and on the nature of the consequences of jury error. In diversity litigation, this constitutional
freedom should be exercised to honor divergent state rules in the
area of factual inference, in the area of law application, and in
any areas of credibility determination that may be closely bound
up with related state primary rules.

